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Research Methodology 
This dissertation is a qualitative research with two methods of study. It involved 
interviews with Crime Scene Analysts and Offender Profilers. This method provided first 
hand and up to date information on the different approaches to offender profiling. 
The standard legal research method of case analysis has also been used. This involved 
extensive case analysis. Cases that involved offender profiling have been analyzed. This 
method provided adequate background information on the admissibility problems of 
offender profiling evidence. 
The limitation to this dissertation is the unwillingness of some profilers to grant 





This dissertation examined the use of offender profiling evidence in criminal cases. The 
meaning, history, approaches and legal admissibility of offender profiling have been 
discussed. The introduction of offender profiling into the courtroom has been 
controversial, problematic and full of inconsistencies. This dissertation therefore, 
examined the central problems with offender profiling evidence, and answered such 
questions as - Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to 
give expert profiling evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is 
offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently 
reliable as to be admissible? This dissertation has noted that in United States, there are 
inconsistencies in the court decisions on offender profiling evidence as a result of the 
three conflicting rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence. After a critical 
examination of the three rules, the adoption of one rule has been suggested. The Frye test 
standard combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 provides the best 
admissibility standard. 
Many people are confused as to the appropriate discipline of offender profiling. This 
dissertation has therefore, presented a step by step analysis of the history and 
development of offender profiling. Offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice that 
cuts across many disciplines. At the moment, it is best described as an art with the 
potential of becoming a science. This dissertation concludes that offender profiling is not 
6 
~ .................. --------~ 
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is too prejudicial than probative. This 
dissertation also concludes that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity and absence 
of sharing information amongst the different segments involved with offender profiling, 
and that this problem has limited the potential of offender profiling. Hence, some courts 
are not convinced as to the reliability and validity of this technique. Several 
recommendations have been made. 
7 
Introduction 
In spite of the ever-increasing media interest in the use of offender profiling in criminal 
trials, this technique is still not well understood by a lot of people, including judges, 
lawyers and jurors. Some people see offender profiling as some sort of mystic and others 
simply see it as a fiction. It is the aim of this dissertation to demystify offender profiling 
and try to raise the general level of knowledge and understanding of this crime 
investigation technique. This dissertation has two hypotheses. The first is that offender 
profiling is not widely accepted in courts because its reliability and the scientific basis 
has not been established and second, that there are inconsistencies surrounding the 
admission of offender profiling as a result of the conflicting rules and standards 
governing its admissibility in various jurisdictions. The central thesis of this dissertation 
is that offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible (in proving the 
guilt or innocence of an accused), its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its 
probative value and that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity, cooperation and 
absence of sharing of information among the different segments/profilers which has 
limited the potential of offender profiling. There is the problem with the existence of 
three rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence in United States. This has led 
to inconsistencies in the decisions to admit or exclude offender profiling and its 
derivatives. There has been a lot of conflicting court decisions on this technique. 
8 
This dissertation examined the central problems of offender profiling evidence. Two 
questions provided the guideline to this dissertation. First, is offender profiling 
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible? Offender Profiling involves gathering 
information from the crime scene, witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports, 
offender's physical descriptions, race, age, criminal records and so on. The question then 
is - how accurate is information gathered in this manner? Should it be tendered in court 
as proof of guilt or innocence? Offender Profiling does not point to specific offenders. It 
does not determine whether a given defendant committed a specific act. This question 
arises because in several cases the reliability and accuracy of offender profiling has been 
at issue. Second, is offender profiling more prejudicial than probative? Offender profiling 
is too prejudicial to the accused. Offender profiling only provides an indication of the 
type of person likely to have committed a type of crime. It does not point to a specific 
individual. This question arises because in several cases examined, courts have been 
inconsistent in their decisions on this issue. 
In chapter one, we have discussed the meaning and nature of offender profiling. The 
goals of offender profiling have also been discussed. Offender profiling is an innovative 
but worrying technique of crime investigation. In order to have a better understanding of 
this technique, the history and development have been discussed in this chapter. 
Offender Profiling is mainly used by the police to narrow down suspects list in cases 
where no physical evidence were left at the crime scene. In recent times however, this 
technique has been introduced into the courtroom as evidence and there has been a lot of 
9 
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controversy surrounding it. Hence, there had been conflicting court decisions on its status 
as admissible evidence. In several cases, the reliability, validity and scientific basis of this 
technique had been at issue. Chapter two therefore, introduced us to the principles and 
practice of offender profiling. The different approaches to profiling have been discussed, 
bringing out their various strengths and weaknesses. 
In chapter three, the general rules and principles governing the admissibility of scientific 
evidence are discussed. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence, The 
Daubert Decision and the Kumho Tire Co. decision have been critically examined. As we 
mentioned earlier on, there are a lot inconsistencies surrounding the admission of 
offender profiling in criminal cases. One reason has been identified and it relates to the 
fact that there are three main rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. The 
three rules are as follows. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and 
The Daubert Decision. Each state in United States has adopted one of these 
rules/standards. Some states are using Frye, some have adopted the Daubert criteria 
while others have adopted Frye plus their own Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that 
the Daubert criteria is the main rule at the federal courts. This leads us to the question - Is 
it possible to adopt one particular rule? This is a question that has also been examined. 
This dissertation is also aimed at providing a critical analysis of the use of offender 
profiling in criminal cases. Hence, in chapter four, we discussed the central problems of 
offender profiling evidence. Cases that involved offender profiling have been critically 
10 
examined. The different areas of challenging offender profiling have also been discussed. 
We have answered such questions as: 
(1) Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence? 
(2) Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling testimony? 
(2) Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? 
(3) Is offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue? 
(4) Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be admissible? 
One of the aims of this research is to provide a comparative analysis of the use of 
offender profiling in various jurisdictions. In chapter five therefore, we have discussed 
the admissibility of offender profiling in England and Canada. We have also examined 
the state of offender profiling in other countries. 
In this dissertation we have made some recommendations, looked at the future of 
offender profiling and have suggested areas where further research is needed. This 
dissertation argues that offender profiling is a specialized area of knowledge, but at the 
moment it has not reached a sufficient level of reliability as to be admissible. This 
dissertation is very critical of the continued admission of offender profiling in criminal 
trials and concludes that offender profiling is a technique based on assumptions, 
suspicion, stereotypes and probabilities. 
This dissertation differs from other previous published studies in many ways. First, this 
work has presented an interdisciplinary and non-segmental approach to the understanding 
11 
of offender profiling. The nature, theory, practice and the legal aspects of offender 
profiling have been presented in one study. This dissertation goes further with the theory 
that offender profiling can be used in developing crime prevention measures. There has 
also been an examination of offender profiling in a comparative perspective. Above all, 
none of the previous published studies examined the uneasy relationship among the 
different segments/approaches to offender profiling which has limited the potential of this 
technique. This work has demystified offender profiling. 
12 
CHAPTER ONE 
What is Offender Profiling? 
'Offender profiling' has become part of public consciousness 
even though many people are not really sure what it is and 
the great majority of people have no idea at all of how it is 
done. This ignorance is just as prevalent in professional 
circles as amongst the lay public. Psychologists, 
psychiatrists, probation officers and social workers all have 
an interest in how their disciplines can contribute to police 
investigations, but few practitioners are aware of exactly 
what the possibilities for such contributions are. Others, such 
as police officers and lawyers, who seek advice from 
'profilers' often also have only the vaguest ideas as to what 
'profiling' consists of or what scientific principles it may be 
based on. The army of students who aspire to emulate the 
fictional activities of psychologists who solve crimes is yet 
another group who desperately need a systematic account of 
what 'offender profiling' is and what the real prospects for its 
development are. I 
Offender profiling has been defined in many ways by various scholars based on their 
backgrounds. Similarly, offender profiling is known by various names such as 
psychological profiling, criminal profiling, criminal investigative analysis, crime scene 
analysis, behavioral profiling, criminal personality profiling, sociopsychological profiling 
and criminological profiling. In this dissertation however, the term 'offender profiling' 
will be used. 
1 David Canter, Series Preface, in D. Canter, and L. Alison, (eds) Profiling in Policy and Practice, VII 
(1999), 
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As Canter has noted, 'offender profiling' is a tenn coined by the FBI in the 1970's to 
describe their criminal investigative analysis work.2 He maintained that "when FBI 
agents first began this work they invented a new tenn to grace their actions: offender 
profiling. By doing so they created the impression of a package, a system that was sitting 
waiting to be employed, rather than the mixture of craft, experience and intellectual 
energy that they themselves admit is at the core of their activities,,3. 
Canter sees offender profiling as 'criminal shadows'. He maintained that a criminal 
"leaves psychological traces, tell-tale patterns of behaviour that indicate the sort of 
person he is. Gleaned from the crime scene and reports from witnesses, these traces are 
more ambigious and subtle than those examined by the biologist or physicist. They 
cannot be taken into a laboratory and dissected under the microscope. They are more like 
shadows, which undoubtedly are connected to the criminal who cast them, but they 
flicker and change, and it may not always be obvious where they come from. Yet, if they 
can be fixed and interpreted, criminal shadows can indicate where investigators should 
look and what sort of person they should be looking for,,4 
Canter and Heritage also maintained that "a criminal leaves evidence of his personality 
through his actions in relation to a crime. Any person's behaviour exhibits characteristics 
2D . 




unique to that person, as well as patterns and consistencies which are typical of the sub-
group to which he or she belongs".5 
Ainsworth defined offender profiling as "the process of using all the available 
information about a crime, a crime scene, and a victim, in order to compose a profile of 
the (as yet) unknown perpetrator,,6. For Davies, "offender profiling (more technically 
known as Criminal Investigative Analysis) is the name given to a variety of techniques 
whereby information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of an offender's 
behaviour is used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a description of 
the type of person likely to be responsible.,,7 
Geberth sees a criminal personality profile as "an educated attempt to provide 
investigative agencies with specific information as to the type of individual who may 
have committed a certain crime,,8. Turvey, writing from a behavioral evidence analysis 
point of view, defined offender profiling as "the process of inferring the personality 
characteristics of individuals responsible for committing criminal acts,,9. For Grubin, 
offender profiling refers to "information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of 
5 David Canter and Rupert Heritage, "A Muiltivariate Model of Sexual Offence Behaviour: Developments 
in Offender Profiling", Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, (1990). 
6 Peter .B. Ainsworth, Offender Profiling and Crime Analysis, 7 (2001). 
7 
Anne Davies, Rapists Behaviour: A three Aspect Model as a Basis for Analysis and Identification of a 
Serial Crime, Forensic Science International, 173 (1992). 
8 Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigations: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, 4th 
edition, 46 (1996). 
9 
Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 1 (2002). 
15 
an offender's behaviour, used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a 
description of the type of person likely to be responsible"lO. 
Put simply, offender profiling is a crime investigation technique whereby information 
gathered from the crime scene, witnesses, victims, autopsy reports and information about 
an offender's behavior is used to draw up a profile of the sort of person likely to commit 
such crime. It is a complementary technique and is usually taken up when no physical 
traces were left at the crime scene. Offender profiling does not point to a specific 
offender. It is based on the probability that someone with certain characteristics is likely 
to have committed a certain type of crime. 
Rationale for Profiling 
There are two operating words in offender profiling: modus operandi (method of 
operation) and behavior. The modus operandi could lead to clues about the offender. 
There is the idea that an offender is likely to commit a particular type of crime in a 
particular or similar pattern. Thus offender profiling is based on the premise that the 
modus operandi may lead to clues about the perpetrator and that the crime scene 
characteristics may point to the personality of the perpetrator. Behavior helps to predict 
the personality type or the motives for the crime. Therefore, the single most important 
thing that a pro filer looks for at a scene of crime is anything that may point to the 
personality of the offender. 
10 Don Grubin, Offender Profiling, Journal of Forensic Psychology 259 (1995). 
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The rationale behind this approach is that behavior reflects personality, and by examining 
behavior the investigator may be able to determine what type of person is responsible for 
the offense. II When profiling, the profiler notes the physical description, individual traits, 
any odd behaviour and remarks or records of anything that the offender said or did during 
the attack. Also to be noted are information about the steps the offender used to avoid 
being detected, method of killing, or the way he approaches his victims, as well as notes 
about the offender's gender, age group, race, occupation and criminal records. 12 
The Purpose/Goals of Profiling 
Offender Profiling is mainly used when the offender did not leave any physical trace at 
the crime scene. It is used to narrow down the suspects list. As Douglas and Olshaker 
have pointed out, "criminal profiling is used mostly by behavioral scientists and the 
police to narrow down an investigation to those who posses certain behavioral and 
personality features that are revealed by the way a crime was committed,,13. Continuing, 
Douglas and Olshaker also maintained that "the primary goal is to aid local police in 
limiting and refining their suspect list so that they can direct their resources where they 
might do the most good". 
11 
John. E. Douglas., Ressler, R.K., Burgess, AW., and Hartman, c.R., Criminal Profilingfrom Crime 
Scene Analysis .Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 403 (1986). 
12 
Norbert Ebisike, An Appraisal of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 44 (2001). 
13 
John. Douglas, J., and Olshaker, M., Mindhunte: Inside the FBI's Elite Serial Crime Unit, (1999). 
17 
"Another key use of a profile, is when necessary, to go proactive, which means letting the 
public become a partner in crime solving. The unknown suspect may have displayed 
some sort of odd behaviour to those close to him that will indicate his involvement with 
the crime. Getting the public, and hopefully those people to be aware of what they have 
seen, telling them to corne forward may solve the case". 14 
Egger maintained that "the purpose of profiling is to develop a behavioral composite, 
combining sociological and psychological assessments of the offender. Profiling is 
generally based on the premise that an accurate analysis and interpretation of the crime 
scene and other locations related to the crime can indicate the type of person who 
committed the crime".IS Hence, "because certain personality types exhibit similar 
behavioral patterns (in other words, behavior that becomes routine), knowledge and an 
understanding of the patterns can lead investigators to potential suspects".16 Similarly, 
Jackson and Bekerian maintained that "a profile is based on the premise that the proper 
interpretation of crime scene evidence can indicate the personality type of the 
individual(s) who committed the offence. It is assumed that certain personality types 
exhibit similar behavioral patterns and that knowledge of these patterns can assist in the 
investigation of the crime and the assessment of potential suspects". 17 
14 Id. 
15 Steven A. Egger, Psychological Profiling: Past, Present, and Future, Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice, vol. 15, No.3, August 1999,243 (1999). 
16Id. 
17 Janet L. Jackson, and Bekerian D. A. (eds), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 3 (1997). 
18 
Holmes and Holmes have outlined three major goals of profiling as follows. 18 
(1) Social and psychological assessments of offenders. 
This involves an evaluation of the social and psychological characteristics of the 
offender. In fact, "a profile should contain basic and sound information concerning the 
social and psychological core variables of the offender's personality, including the 
offender's race, age, employment status and type, religion, marital status, and level of 
education. This psychological information will help to focus the investigation by 
allowing police to narrow its range, which in tum will have a direct effect upon the 
number of days and weeks police must spend on the case".19 
(2) Psychological evaluations of belongings found III the possession of suspected 
offenders. 
This involves the evaluation of any items found at the suspect's home, such as souvenirs 
taken from the crime scenes, pictures, videos, books, magazines or other items that might 
point to the background and motives for the crimes, as well as link the suspect to the 
crime. Holmes and Holmes noted the case of Jerry Brudos a sadistic serial killer in the 
United States who had such a fetish about his victims' high heeled shoes. He took their 
shoes, wore and stored them at his home.2o 
18 Ronald. M. Holmes., and Stephen T. Holmes., Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool, 3 (1996). 
19 Id 
20 
Id, at 4. 
19 
(3) Suggestions and strategies for interviewing suspected offenders when they are 
apprehended. 
Another primary goal of profiling is to suggest the most effective interviewing strategy to 
be used once the offender has been arrested. As there are different types of offenders, one 
interviewing/interrogation strategy may not be suitable for all the different types, 
especially when dealing with rapists. As Holmes and Homes have pointed out, "not all 
people react to questions in the same fashion. For one type of offender, one strategy may 
be effective, but it is a mistake to assume that all those who commit similar crimes will 
respond to the same interviewing strategy. For example, not all serial murderers kill for 
the same reasons, and not all respond to the same type of interviewing strategy. Violent 
personal offenders also vary in their motives as well as their responses to interrogation,,21. 
It has been observed that offender profiling is usually taken up late in an investigation. 
Offender profiling tends to be normally taken up as an alternative where DNA profiling is 
impossible because there were no samples left at the scene of crime?2 There are 
obviously certain dangers with this approach. It is therefore suggested that in 
serious/major crimes, offender profiling should be used at the onset, along with the other 
techniques. It should not be left till later in the investigation when we have come to 
realize that no physical trace has been left at the crime scene, bearing in mind the issue of 
'staged crime scenes'. Important details might be lost later in the investigation and as we 
know, crime scenes can be tampered with, by both weather conditions and human 
tampering. 
21 Id, at 5, 
22 Eb' 'k lSI e, supra note 12, at 48, 
20 
~ ........................ ----~ 
Crime Scene Staging 
'Crime scene staging' occurs when the offender alters the crime scene in order to conceal 
the original intent. For instance, the offender may stage signs of burglary in order to 
conceal a homicide. Arguably, staging is mainly done by an organized offender as 
opposed to a disorganized offender. Hence, any evidence of staging at the crime scene 
may point to an organized offender. In fact, an offender stages a crime scene in order to 
"mislead the authorities and/or redirect the investigation. Staging is a conscious criminal 
action on the part of an offender to thwart an investigation,,23. Geberth has clearly 
outlined three types of staging: 
1. The most common type of staging occurs when the perpetrator changes elements 
of the scene to make the death appear to be a suicide or accident in order to cover 
up a murder. 
2. The second most common type of staging is when the perpetrator attempts to 
redirect the investigation by making the crime appear to be a sex-related 
homicide. 
3. Arson represents another type of staging. The offender purposely torches the 
crime scene to destroy evidence or make the death appear to be the result of an 
accidental fire. 24 
23 Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, 4th 
edition, 22 (2006). 
24 Id, at 23. 
21 
Modus Operandi or Method of Operation (MO) 
An offender's method of operation includes such things as the type of victim chosen, 
location of attack, time of attack, type of weapon used, as well as the method of gaining 
entry. The method of operation is very important in linking cases, but needs to be 
examined with caution. 
It should be noted that the method of operation can change. In fact, as an offender 
commits more crime, he/she learns new ways that will help avoid detection. Hence, the 
method of operation can change. For instance, an offender who normally strangles the 
victims with bare hands may change and start strangling the victims with stockings or 
start suffocating the victims with pillows. Similarly, an offender may change from 
attacking at night to attacking during the day time, or the offender may change from 
choosing females to males, young victims to older victims, blacks to whites, or blondes to 
brunettes. 
Douglas and Munn maintained that "the offender's actions during the perpetration of a 
crime form the MO. The offender develops and uses an MO over time because it works, 
but it also continually evolves. The modus operandi is very dynamic and malleable. 
During his criminal career, an offender usually modifies the MO as he gains experience. 
The burglar refines his breaking and entering techniques to lower his risk of apprehension 
and to increase his profit. Experience and confidence will reshape an offender's MO. 
22 
Incarceration usually impacts on the future MO of an offender, especially the career 
criminal. He refines the MO as he learns from the mistakes that led to his arrest,,25. 
Furthermore, "the victim's response can also significantly influence the evolution of an 
MO. If the rapist has problems controlling a victim, he will modify his MO to 
accommodate resistance. He may bring duct tape or other ligatures, he may use a 
weapon, or he may blitz-attack the victim and immediately incapacitate her. If such 
measures are ineffective, he may resort to greater violence or kill the victim. Thus, MO 
will evolve to meet the demands of the crime,,26. In fact, Turvey maintained that an 
offender's MO "most often serves (or fails to serve) one or more of three purposes: 
protects the offender's identity, ensures the successful completion of the crime and 
facilitates the offender's escape',27. 
Offender's Signature or Calling Card 
It should be noted that modus operandi is different from the 'signature aspects', or the 
'motives' of a crime. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "the signature of a perpetrator 
is the unique manner in which he or she commits crimes. A signature may be the manner 
in which the person kills, certain words a rapist uses with victims, a particular manner in 
25 John. E. Douglas, Munn, C. M., "Modus Operandi and Signature Aspects of Violent Crime, in Douglas, 
et ai, Crime Classification Manual, 260 (2006). 
26 Id. 
27 
Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 151 (1999). 
23 
which a perpetrator leaves something at crime scenes, or some other indicator,,28. Geberth 
also maintained that "the signature aspect of a violent crime is a unique and integral part 
of the offender's behavior. This signature component refers to the psychodynamics, 
which are the mental and emotional processes underlying human behavior and its 
motivations,,29. In fact, "when an offender displays behavior within the crime scene and 
engages in activities which go beyond those necessary to accomplish the act, he is 
revealing his signature. These significant personality identifiers occur when an offender 
repeatedly engages in a specific order of sexual activity, uses a specific type of binding, 
injures and/or inflicts similar types of injuries, displays the body for shock value, tortures 
and mutilates his victim, and engages in some form of ritualistic behavior".3o Geberth 
also noted that "one of the common signatures is that of the psychopathic sexual sadist, 
who involves himself in complete domination of the victim".3) 
The signature aspects of a crime, which can also be called the 'mark' of the perpetrator, is 
an element in an offender's behavior which in most cases may always be present, and 
recognizable at the scene of crime, but it can change. It is the overriding psychological 
need of an offender. It is what drives a killer to engage in an attack and the particular 
method of carrying out that attack. Signature aspects of a crime reveal the deep emotional 
needs that have to happen in order for the offender to fulfill his or her fantasy. Put 
simply, the signature aspect of a crime refers to the specific thing(s) that an offender tend 
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to do at the crime scene. It could be cutting off a specific part of the victim's body and 
taking it as a souvenir, cutting the victims throats, or putting the victims inside the bathe 
tub after killing them, and so on. Hence, signature can be described as the 'mark' of a 
killer, which may distinguish one killer from another. It should be noted however that 
there are various things that can affect signature. Therefore, signatures are not a 
conclusive or a reliable indicator that a particular offender carried out a particular attack. 
Offenders learn from other offenders, from television crime series, from their experience, 
develop new fantasies and they also read/learn from books on crime investigations and 
forensic science, and so their signature may change. Geberth will probably support this 
view, and he wrote: "the 'signature' component may also change to some degree. 
However, the change usually involves a progression of violence and sexual mutilation, 
which is consistent with the paraphilia sexual sadism seen in lust murders,,32. The point 
however, remains that signatures may change. 
Motives of a Crime 
The motive of a crime refers to the reason why the offender committed the crime. Motive 
deals with the primary reason why a particular crime was committed. It is one of the 
identifying elements at a crime scene. An offender can have different motives for 
32 
Id, at 822. 
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different crimes. Turvey observed that "an offender's motives are evidenced by signature 
behaviors that suggest overall signature aspects, or motivational aspects of a crime". 33 
Linkage Analysis 
Linkage analysis refers to the method whereby behavioral patterns, wound patterns, 
crime scene characteristics, victimology and other aspects of two or more crimes 
committed at different crime scenes are examined in an attempt to ascertain whether the 
crimes were committed by one offender. Linkage analysis has faced a lot of criticism. 
Professor Risinger and Loop, for instance, argued that linkage analysis "appears to have 
been developed, not as an investigatory aid, but primarily as a means of obtaining either 
the admission of other crimes evidence which might not otherwise be admitted, or a 
means to convince the jury that the other crimes evidence was more meaningful than they 
otherwise might believe, or both. In sum, it was not a way to identify unknown 
perpetrators, but a tool to help build a case against defendants already believed to be 
guilty". 34 
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Types of Crime Suitable for Profiling 
It has been recognized that not all types of crime are suitable for profiling. In fact, there is 
general agreement that crimes most suitable for profiling are: 
1. crimes where the perpetrator showed elements of psychopathology. 
2. crimes believed to be part of a series. 
3. violent crimes. 
4. attacks on strangers. 
5. contact crimes - crimes where the offender engaged in long conversations and 
communications with the victim. 
Serial murders, serial rapes, sexual homicides, ritual crimes, arson, and hostage taking 
have been seen to be very suitable for profiling. Research by Holmes and Holmes have 
shown that the types of crimes most suitable for profiling include sadistic torture in 
sexual assaults, evisceration, postmortem slashing and cutting, motiveless fire setting, 
lust and mutilation murder, rape, satanic and ritualistic crime and pedophilia.,,35 It has 
also been noted that "cases involving mere destruction of property, assault, or murder 
during the commission of a robbery are generally unsuitable for profiling, since the 
personality of the criminal is not generally revealed in such crime scenes. Likewise drug 
induced crimes lend themselves poorly to profiling because the true personality of the 
perpetrator is often altered,,36. 
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'Contact crimes' are suitable for profiling. In fact, "these 'contact crimes' are believed to 
be the ones in which aspects of an offender's underlying personality and motivations are 
most likely to be revealed by the way in which an offence or series of offences has been 
carried out".37 Schurman-Kauflin noted that "serial killers are the most frustrating and 
disturbing of all violent predators, but they are the most profilable. Why? When they kill, 
they are filling complex psychological needs. Sometimes, they may steal when they kill, 
but from my experience of studying serial predators for twenty years and interviewing 
over twenty five of them, their motivations are in their heads, not their wallets. Because 
they kill for psychological reasons, many times, they leave a lot of clues for profilers".38 
Geberth also maintained that "practically speaking, in any crime in which available 
evidence indicates a mental, emotional, or personality aberration by an unknown 
perpetrator, the criminal personality profile can be instrumental in providing the 
investigator with information that narrows down the leads. The behavioral characteristics 
of the perpetrator as evidenced in the crime scene - not the offense per se - determine the 
degree of suitability of the case for profiling,,39. 
37 A' msworth, supra note 6, at 9. 
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History and Development of Offender Profiling 
Offender Profiling goes as far back as 1876 when the Italian Criminologist, Physician and 
psychiatrist, Cesaro Lombroso (Nov. 6, 1835 - Oct. 19, 1909), published his work 
"L'Uomo Delinquente" (The Criminal Man), in which he argued that there are certain 
physical characteristics that are indicative of a born criminal. He maintained that by 
comparing information about similar offenders like race, age, sex, physical 
characteristics, education and geographic location, that. the origins and motivations of 
criminal behavior could be better understood and subsequently predicted. Lombroso, 
basing his ideas on Darwin's theory of evolution, maintained that there are six types of 
criminals, the born criminal, the insane criminal, the criminal by passion, the habitual 
criminal, the occasional criminal and the criminaloid. 
Lombroso had the idea that there is a born criminal and argued that criminality is 
inherited and could be identified by physical defects. For him, criminals have certain 
physiognomic deformities. He saw criminals as savage and atavistic. In his theory of 
atavism, he measured the heads of living and executed criminals against the skulls of 
apes and prehistoric humans and came up with the idea that criminals were victims of 
atavism. He maintained that 'born criminals' have the following physical 
characteristics/deformities: 
• Deviation in head size and shape from type common to race and region from 
which the criminal came. 
• Asymmetry of the face. 
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• Eye defects and peculiarities. 
• Excessive dimensions of the jaws and cheek bones. 
• Ears of unusual size, or occasionally very small, or standing out from the head as 
do those of the chimpanzee. 
• Nose twisted, upturned, or flattened in thieves, or aquiline or beak-like in 
murderers, or with a tip rising like a peak from swollen nostrils. 
• Lips fleshy, swollen, and protruding. 
• Pouches in the cheek like those of some animals. 
• Peculiarities of the palate, such as are found in some reptiles, and cleft palate. 
• Chin receding, or excessively long, or short and flat, as in apes. 
• Abnormal dentition. 
• Abundance, variety, and precocity of wrinkles. 
• Anomalies of the hair, marked by characteristics of the hair of the opposite sex. 
• Defects of the thorax, such as too many or too few ribs, or supernumerary nipples. 
• Inversion of sex characters in the pelvic organs. 
• Excessive length of arms. 
• Supernumerary fingers and toes. 
• Imbalance of the hemispheres of the brain (asymmetry of cranium). 
Lombroso maintained that the insane criminals were the type of criminals who suffered 
from mental illnesses and also had some physical deformities. The habitual criminals 
according to Lombroso are those who commit crimes as a result of poor socialization. 
The occasional criminals commit crimes to protect family honor and as self-defence. The 
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criminaloids are those who commit crimes when the opportunities anse In their 
environment. Lombroso maintained that criminaloids are usually left-handed, which he 
said was common among swindlers, are also characterized by early baldness and 
grayness, insensitivity to pain and that a large number of them abuse alcohol. 
Lombroso believed that the study of individuals should involve the utilization of 
measurements and statistical methods in compiling anthropological, social and economic 
data. He was against capital punishment and argued in favor of rehabilitation. He also 
contended that there should be humane treatment for criminals because their criminality 
is inherited. 
Lombroso's views were undoubtedly criticized. The greatest criticism came from Charles 
Goring an Englishman, who carried out a study of 3,000 English convicts and compared 
them with groups of university students, hospital patients and British solders. Using 
statistical methodology, Goring compared measurements of thirty seven specific physical 
characteristics of the groups and observed that "in fact, both with regard to measurements 
and the presence of physical anomalies in criminals, our statistics present a startling 
conformity with similar statistics of the law-abiding classes. Our inevitable conclusion 
must be that there is no such thing as a physical criminal type,,40. 
Goring also noted that "all English criminals, with the exception of those technically 
convicted of fraud, are markedly differentiated from the general population in stature and 
body-weight; in addition, offenders convicted of violence to the person are characterized 
40 Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, 174 (1913). 
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by an average degree of strength and of constitutional soundness considerably above the 
average of other criminals and of the law-abiding community: finally, thieves and 
burglars (who constitute, it must be borne in mind, 90 percent of all criminals) and also 
incendiaries, as well as being inferior in stature and weight, are also, relatively to other 
criminals and the populations at large, puny in their general bodily habit". Goring also 
observed some differences between criminals and non criminals in terms of sexual 
profligacy, alcoholism, and epilepsy, and he concluded that "the one vital mental 
constitutional factor in the etiology of crime is defective intelligence". 
Goring's views also met severe criticisms. Hagan argued that "while Goring refuted 
Lombroso's notion of physical differences, his own methodology was critically flawed. 
Eschewing the then-available Simon-Binet tests of mental ability, he used his own 
impressions in order to operationalize the mental ability of his subjects. The nail in the 
coffin of Goring's theory was the advent of wide-scale mental testing of US military 
conscriptees during World War 1. Using Goring's definitions of feeblemindedness, 
nearly one-third of the draftees would have been so classified; the standards for such tests 
were modified as a result. Other studies comparing mental age found no difference in 
performance by prisoners and the draft army, and one even found that the former 
performed better. As a result, the notion of feeblemindedness as a cause of criminal 
behavior was interred in the graveyard of outmoded criminological concepts,,41. 
Similarly, Sutherland and Cressey argued that Goring's study did not include women. 
That Goring saw crime as a male disposition. They also argued that Goring "considered 
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only few environmental factors, as opposed to many that exist", and finally that Goring 
did not consider a wide range of offenses in his study. 
It should be noted at this point that two of Lombroso's students - Enrico Ferri (1856 -
1929) and Raffaelo Garofalo (1852 - 1934), later took a different approach to the 
explanations of criminal behavior. For instance, Garofalo in this theory of moral 
degeneration, maintained that degeneration resulted from retrogressive selection and 
caused the individual "to lose the better qualities which he had acquired by secular 
evolution, and has led him back to the same degree of inferiority whence he had slowly 
risen. This retrogressive selection is due to the mating of weakest and most unfit, of those 
who have become brutalized by alcohol or abased by extreme misery against which 
apathy has prevented them from struggling. Thus are formed demoralized and outcast 
families whose interbreeding in time produces a true face of inferior quality".42 
Following the criticisms of his work and after further research, Lombroso later revised 
his work and admitted that social, economic and environmental factors also played 
significant roles in criminal behavior. He however, still maintained that at least 40 
percent of criminality is a result of biological heredity. Nevertheless, Lombroso's early 
explanation of criminality, using measurements is undoubtedly the beginning of the 
attempts to find a scientific basis to the idea of predicting crimes and criminals. 
42 Baron R. Garofalo, Criminology, trans. 110 (1914). 
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Following the work of Goring, Earnest Hooton, an American anthropologist, in 1939, 
carried out a study of 13,873 male criminals in 10 states and compared it with a civilian 
group of 3,023 and found out that "criminals are organically inferior. Crime is the 
resultant of the impact of environment upon low grade human organisms. To eliminate 
crime, the physically, mentally, and morally unfit must be exterminated or segregated 
completely in a "socially aseptic environment".43 
Hooton claimed that certain morphological characteristics were more common in 
criminals than among civilians. These characteristics include thin lips, straight hair, thin 
beards and body hair, thick head hair, long thin necks, sloping shoulders, low and sloping 
foreheads, compressed jaw angles, blue-gray and mixed eyes, protruding and small ears, 
tattooing, and nasal bridges and tips varying to both extremes of breath and narrowness.44 
Hooton also believed that criminals were inferior to non criminals, and that inferiority 
could be explained by heredity, arguing that physical inferiority indicates mental 
inferiority. Furthermore, Hooton claimed that murderers and robbers tend to be tall and 
thin; burglars and thieves tend to be undersized and that short and heavily built men tend 
to be involved in sexual offenses and assaults. 
Hooton's arguments were seen as fundamentally flawed. VoId, for instance, argued that 
Hooton "ignored the fact that more than half of his prisoners had served previous terms 
and a very large proportion of these previous sentences had been for crimes different 
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from the offense of the current tenn.,,45 Johnson also contended that "in using prisoners 
to represent criminals, Hooton ignored the effects of the differential selection of prisoners 
from the total body of offenders that the system of criminal justice makes according to 
factors extraneous to criminal behavior. Hooton's control group was too small and 
included firemen and militiamen who had been accepted for these occupations after 
passing a physical examination, thus exaggerating physical differences between offenders 
and nonoffenders,,46. 
Dr. Hans Gross, an Austrian judge and criminologist also made very important 
contributions towards the attempts to explain criminality and the prediction of criminals. 
In fact, he is widely regarded as the first person to write about offender profiling per se. 
In 1893 he published his work "Criminal Investigation: A Practical Textbook for 
Magistrates, Police Officers, and Lawyers", in which he maintained that criminals can be 
better understood by studying their crimes. Gross argued that "in nearly every case the 
thief has left the most important trace of his passage, namely the manner in which he has 
committed the theft. Every thief has in fact a characteristic style or modus operandi 
which he rarely departs from, and which he is incapable of completely getting rid of; at 
times this distinctive feature is so visible and so striking that even the novice can spot it 
without difficulty; but on the one hand the novice does not know how to group, 
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differentiate or utilize what he has observed, and on the other hand the particular 
character of the procedure is not always so easy to recognize".47 
Gross also maintained that by examining the character and beliefs of an offender that we 
can know more about the offender's criminal actions, and he wrote: 
Is it not known that every deed is an outcome of the total 
character of the doer? Is it not considered that the deed and 
the character are correlative concepts, and that the character 
by means of which the deed is to be established cannot be 
inferred from the deed alone? Each particular deed is 
thinkable only when a determinate character of the doer is 
brought in relation with it - a certain character predisposes to 
determinate deeds, another character makes them unthinkable 
and unrelatable with this or that person.48 
In 1888 there were several murder cases in the Whitechapel area of East London, 
England. In fact, between August 31 st and November 9th 1888, five female prostitutes 
were murdered, and the police had no clues as to the identity of the killer. On August 31, 
1888 Mary Ann Nichols was found brutally murdered. This was followed by the 
discovery of the viciously mutilated body of Annie Chapman on September 8, 1888. On 
September 30, 1888 was the discovery of the double murder of Elizabeth Stride and 
Catherine Eddowes. On November 9, 1888 another murder occurred and this time Mary 
Jane Kelly was brutally murdered. At this point Dr. Thomas Bond, a police surgeon was 
asked to perform an autopsy on Mary Jane Kelly. The killer after strangling the women, 
will cut their throat and then remove some of their internal organs. This prompted the 
47 
Hans Gross, Criminal Investigation, 478 (1924). 
48 
Hans Gross, Criminal Psychology, 55 (1934). 
36 
police to think that the killer may be somebody with anatomical or surgical knowledge 
like a surgeon or a butcher. 
Hence, Dr Bond was also instructed to give an opinion on this issue. After the autopsy on 
Mary Jane Kelly, Dr. Bond also studied the medical reports of the other victims as well as 
the police reports, and he decided to do a crime scene reconstruction to see if he could 
find any behavioral patterns that could lead investigators to the possible killer. He 
believed that the mutilations of the five victims suggested that one person was 
responsible for the five murders. Above all, all the five murders shared similar 
characteristics. All the victims were left in open places, where their bodies were found 
soon after they were killed, all the victims were women and prostitutes, all the victims 
were viciously mutilated and internal organs removed from their body. 
Dr. Bond produced a report/profile which he sent to the head of the Criminal 
Investigation Division, London. In his report/profile, Dr. Bond wrote that: 
The murderer must have been a man of great physical strength and 
of great coolness and daring. There is no evidence that he had an 
accomplice. He must in my opinion be a man subject to periodical 
attacks of Homicidal and Erotic mania. The character of the 
mutilations indicate that the man may be in a condition sexually, that 
may be called Satyriasis. It is of course possible that the Homicidal 
impulse may have developed from a revengeful or brooding 
condition of the mind, or that religious mania may have been the 
original disease but I do not think either hypothesis is likely. The 
murderer in external appearance is quite likely to be quiet 
inoffensive looking man probably middle-aged and neatly and 
respectably dressed. I think he must be in the habit of wearing a 
cloak or overcoat or he could hardly have escaped notice in the 
streets if the blood on his hands and clothes were visible. 
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Assuming the murderer to be such a person as I have just described, 
he would be solitary and eccentric in his habits, also he is most likely 
to be a man without regular occupation, but with some small income 
or pension. He is possibly living among respectable persons who 
have some knowledge of his character and habits and who may have 
grounds for suspicion that he isn't quite right in his mind at times. 
Such persons would probably be unwilling to communicate 
suspicions to the police for fear of trouble or notoriety, whereas if 
there were prospects of reward it might overcome their scruples.49 
It should be noted that the unknown killer was referred to as the "Leather Apron" killer, 
but in a letter he sent to the police he called himself "Jack the Ripper". As at today, the 
identity of this killer is still a mystery. Hence, the five murders still remain unsolved. 
Therefore, the accuracy or usefulness of Dr. Bond's profile/report cannot be evaluated. 
However, his efforts constitute another major contribution towards the history and 
development of offender profiling. 
In 1943 the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) asked Dr. Walter C. Langer, a 
psychiatrist based in New York to produce a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler. This 
was for military intelligence purpose, and not for criminal investigation. The OSS was 
the ann of the US Anny responsible for gathering intelligence. 50 The OSS wanted a 
personality profile of Hitler so that they will know the best interrogative 
strategy/technique to be used if he was captured. Dr. Langer studied and analyzed the 
speeches made by Hitler, studied Hitler's book - Mein Kampf, and interviewed those 
Who knew Hitler and he came up with a psychodynamic personality profile. Dr. Langer 
stated that he was asked by the OSS to provide "a realistic appraisal of the Gennan 
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situation. If Hitler is runnmg the show, what kind of person is he? What are his 
ambitions? We want to know about his psychological makeup - the things that make him 
tick. In addition, we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against him."Sl 
Dr. Langer predicted that: 
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• Hitler may die of natural causes - deemed to be a remote possibility, as he was in 
good health aside from a stomach ailment, probably linked to a psychosomatic 
disturbance. 
• Hitler might seek refuge in a neutral country - unlikely, as it would cast doubt on 
his myth of immortality ifhe fled at the critical moment. 
• Hitler might get killed in battle - a possibility, as he might desire to cast himself 
as a fearless leader, and his death might have the adverse effect of binding the 
German people to his legend. 
• Hitler might be assassinated - another plausible outcome, which he himself 
speculated over. 
• Hitler might go insane - he was believed to exhibit many characteristics of a 
borderline schizophrenic, and if faced with defeat, it was likely his psychological 
constitution would collapse. 
• German military might revolt and seize him - an unlikely event because of the 
unique position he enjoyed in the eyes of the German people, but he might be 
confined in secret should he become unstable. 
Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report, 19 (1972). 
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• Hitler might fall into Allied hands - the most unlikely eventuality as this would be 
the scenario he personally would do his utmost to avoid. 
• Hitler might commit suicide - the most conceivable conclusion due to his 
inordinate fear of death, which he had already envisaged, stating "Yes, in the hour 
of supreme peril I must sacrifice myself for the people,,52. 
Dr. Langer's profile was seen to be correct, as Hitler committed suicide in a bunker when 
he found out that the Allies were winning. Langer's work and contribution has been well 
received by many scholars. Holmes and Holmes maintained that: 
Despite its Freudian psychoanalytic orientation, Langer's profile 
proved to be amazingly accurate as far as the scenarios for the 
war's end were concerned. Hitler did commit suicide in a bunker 
with Eva Braun. He never married, perhaps because he never 
found anyone he felt was enough like his mother. Hitler's writings 
from the time near the end of the war indicate that he appeared to 
be on the fringe of mental illness. He also left many documents 
that pointed toward some unusual sexual leanings: coprolagnia and 
urolagnia (sexual excitement gained from eating feces and drinking 
urine) and others. Langer's work was not in vain. It proved to be a 
worthy attempt at the use of profiling as a tool to understand an 
aberrant personality. 53 
Commenting also on the work of Dr. Langer, Norris maintained that "although Langer 
details each circumstance and its likelihood of occurrence, perusal of the document 
indicates the tenuos nature of the profile in general. Although there is some level of 
psychiatric assessment - for example, describing Hitler as a borderline schizophrenic or a 
hysteric - significant interpretation of his actual behavior relies on Hitler's own 
52 
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assertions, gleaned primarily from his writings and speeches. Nevertheless, Langer was to 
pave the way for others to analyze unknown individuals based on their observable 
h 
. ,,54 
be aVlOr . 
In 1949 William H. Sheldon, a psychologist came up with his "Somatotype" theory in 
which he argued that physique or body type is related to certain temperaments. During an 
eight year period, Sheldon tested his theory on delinquent boys and normal college 
students and found out that there is a link between the mesomorphic body type and crime, 
which explained why some juveniles are delinquent. His three body types are as follows. 
(1) Endomorphs: These are individuals who he said are soft, round/fat physiques, and 
plump. 
(2) Mesomorphs: This people are muscular, hard, with heavy chest and heavy bones. 
(3) Ectomorphs: These are people who are thin/lean, fragile, with droopy shoulders 
and small faces. 
Sheldon's three temperaments are as follows: 
(1) Viscerotonia - the individuals with this type of temperament tend to be relaxed, 
comfort-loving, greedy for affection and approval, slow in reaction, even in 
emotions, and tolerant. 
(2) Somatotonia - this type of temperament is associated with individuals who are 
assertive, adventure-loving, psychologically callous, energetic, compulsive, and 
ruthless. 
54 Gareth Norris, "Criminal Profiling: A Continuing History" in Wayne Petherick (ed) Serial Crime: 
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(3) Cerebrotonia - individuals with this type of temperament are tight in posture, 
physiologically overresponsive, emotionally restrained, unpredictable in attitude 
and mentally overintense. 
For Sheldon, endomorphs tend to have viscerotonia temperaments, mesomorphs tend to 
be somatotonic and ectomorphs have cerebrotonia type of temperament. In his study of 
200 delinquent boys (aged 15 - 21) in a rehabilitation center, he found out that delinquent 
youths tend to be mesomorphs. Sheldon used statistical correlations and ranked 
individuals on a subject scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the predominant temperament in each 
individual. Using what he called an "Index of Delinquency" or "Index of 
Disappointingness", Sheldon tried to provide a quantitative account of an individual's 
psychiatric problems, residual delinquency, as well as shortcomings in IQ insufficiency. 
He concluded that delinquents are mainly mesomorphs. 
As we have seen, Sheldon made a great contribution towards the attempts to predict 
criminals and criminal behavior. In fact, his study was later supported by Sheldon and 
Eleanor Gluecks. In 1956, the Gluecks, using Sheldon's somatotype system, studied 500 
boys considered to be persistently delinquent and compared them to 500 non-delinquent 
boys in Boston public schools, Massachusetts, and they also found out that mesomorphic 
boys have higher delinquency level/potential than the other body types. 
The studies by Sheldon and the Gluecks were undoubtedly criticized. Indeed, "the studies 
have been criticized for inadequate sampling and their misuse of control groups. Ideally, 
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the offenders studied should represent all criminals, and the subjects in the control groups 
should represent all noncriminals. Thereby, differences found between the two samples 
would be applicable to the respective populations they were supposed to represent".55 
In 1955, Ernst Kretschmer (1888 - 1964), a German Criminologist, came up with a body 
types theory in which he argued that there is a high degree of correlation between body 
types, personality types and criminal potential. Kretschmer studied 260 insane people in 
Swabia (a southwestern German town), and in his work "Physique and Character", he 
contended that there are four body types and that each is linked to a person's personality, 
character and criminal potential. His four body types are as follows. 
(1) Leptosome or Asthenic: Tall and thin, and mainly involved in fraud and thievery. He 
said that schizophrenics fall into this group. 
(2) Athletic: Very muscular, flat stomachs, and usually involved in violent crimes. 
(3) Pyknic: Short, fat, broad faces, and usually involved in fraud, deception and 
sometimes violent crimes, and that manic depressives fall into this category. 
(4) Dysplastic or Mixed: These are individuals who fit into more than one body type and 
they are generally involved in some violent crimes and indecency. Generally, these 
individuals are very emotional, lack self control and mostly involved in sexual offenses 
and crimes of passion. 
Kretschmer's work attracted a lot of criticisms. "Kretschmer's theories, however, were 
Viewed as extremely dubious because he never disclosed his research, his inferences and 
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descriptions were always incredibly vague, and no specific comparisons were performed 
with non-criminals populations. In short, he would not submit his findings for any form 
of peer review, and his approach was clearly non-scientific. As a result, many argued 
that his theories regarding his findings were nothing more than unfounded inference and 
correction masquerading as science"s6. 
Dr. James Brussel, an American Psychiatrist, is arguably the father of modem offender 
profiling. In 1956, Dr. Brussel who was in private practice and was also the Assistant 
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene for the state of New York was approached by police 
investigators to help them with the investigation of series of bomb explosions in New 
York City. It should also be noted that Dr. Brussel was the Chief of Neuropsychiatry in 
the US Millitary (at Fort Dix) prior to going into private practice. Later he was the head 
of US army neuropsychiatry during the Korean war. 
In 1956, Brussel compiled a psychological profile which led to the identification and 
arrest of George Metesky (known as the New York Mad Bomber) who caused thirty-two 
explosions in New York City between 1940 and 1956. Using crime scene information, 
Brussel was able to make psychodynamic inferences. He studied the crime scene photos 
and the letters that the bomber wrote and he produced a profile of the likely offender. 
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In his psychological profile, Dr. Brussel urged the investigators to "look for a heavy man. 
Middle-aged. Foreign born. Roman Catholic. Single. Lives with a brother or sister".57 He 
also stated that "when you find him, chances are he'll be wearing a double-breasted suit. 
Buttoned".58 In general, Brussel's profile also asked the police to look for: 
Single man, between 40 and 50 years, introvert. Unsocial 
but not antisocial. Skilled mechanic. Cunning. Neat with 
tools. Egostical of mechanical skill. Contemptuous of 
other people. Resentful of criticism of his work but 
probably conceals resentment. Moral. Honest. Not 
interested in women. High school graduate. Expert in 
civil or military ordinance. Religious. Might flare up 
violently at work when criticized. Possible motive: 
discharge or reprimand. Feels superior to critics. 
Resentment, keeps growing. Present or former 
Consolidated Edison worker. Probably case of 
. . 59 
progreSSIve paranOIa. 
Dr. Brussel's profile proved to be accurate. Metesky was a former employee of 
Consolidated Edison, and most interesting of all, when the police went to arrest him at his 
house, they asked him to get changed and he came out dressed in a double-breasted suit, 
just like Brussel predicted. Metesky confessed to having committed the crimes. 
Dr. Brussel was also asked by the police to help them in the case of the "Boston 
Strangler". In Boston, Massachusetts, between June 1962 and January 1964, thirteen 
sexually motivated murders occurred and the police had no suspects. In what became 
known as the 'Boston Strangler' case, Dr. Brussel was asked to produce a psychological 
profile of the likely offender. Initially, the investigators believed that the murders were 
57 
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....... 
committed by two killers. This was based on the fact that the victims were of two age 
groupS - young women and older women. Dr Brussel believed that only one person was 
responsible for the thirteen murders, and he produced a profile. Albert DeSalvo was 
arrested in November 1964 in connection with another rape and murder known as the 
"Green Man Sex Crimes". He fitted the profile drawn up by Brussel. He was detained 
and he later confessed to his psychiatrist that he was the 'Boston Strangler'. While in 
person, awaiting trial for the other murders, DeSalvo was stabbed to death by a fellow 
inmate. Hence, he was not tried for the 'Boston Strangler's murders. Therefore, the 
accuracy or otherwise of Dr. Brussel's profile cannot be evaluated on this case. 
Suffice it to say however, that Brussel used his practical psychiatric 
knowledge/experience, personal intuition and police and medical records to come up with 
the profiles. Such approach is therefore subjective and should be used with caution. In 
fact, Brussel admitted that he made mistakes in some of his cases, and he wrote: "The 
only thing that I have done to get my name in the papers has been to apply some common 
psychiatric principles in reverse, using my own private blend of science, intuition, and 
hope. With this approach, I've been able to help the police solve some bizarre criminal 
cases and I've been summoned as an expert witness in some famous criminal trials".6o 
Furthermore, Brussel maintained that, "I haven't chosen the cases to show what a clever 
fellow I am. I made mistakes in some of them, as I will admit. I analyzed facts incorrectly 
or incompletely, I made deductions I had no right to make. Some of the cases earned me 
60 
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accolades, but others did not. In one of them, the police and courts didn't even listen to 
me. In another, the major questions were not answered and the persons will never be 
ght,,61 cau 
Following the work of Dr. Brussel, the FBI in the 1970's started to expand on offender 
profiling and they established the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI training academy in 
Quantico, Virginia in 1974, with the aim of studying serial rape and homicide cases. 
Howard Teten and Pat Mullany were the first instructors at this unit. However, in 1975, 
Robert Ressler, Dick Ault and John Douglas joined and expanded the unit. It should be 
noted that in 1983 Pierce Brooks founded the FBI's VICAP (computer reporting system) 
and the unit was made up of Anna Boudea, Ken Handtland, David Icove and Jim 
Howlett. In 1984, the NCA VC (National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes) was 
created. This unit was charged with the responsibility of identifying and tracking serial 
killers. 
During the 1970's there were several murder cases that the FBI were unable to solve. 
They became increasingly frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when 
present at the scene of crime could not provide clues as to the sort of person they should 
be looking for. The FBI needed a technique that would help them focus on the most 
likely offenders rather than focusing on a large number of suspects. The FBI conducted 
indepth interviews with thirty six convicted serial killers and found that their crimes were 
all almost sexually motivated. Their main aim of carrying out the interviews was to 
identify the personality and behavioral characteristics of these offenders. 
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Following the interviews, the FBI then came up with the idea of organized and 
disorganized offenders.62 As Ainsworth has pointed out: 
The FBI believed that this classification into organized and 
disorganized murders was helpful as they claimed that the two 
different types of offenders typically had very different 
personality and demographic characteristics. In the case of 
organized murderers, a typical offender would be intelligent (but 
possibly an underachiever), socially skilled, sexually competent, 
and be living with a partner. This mask of 'normality' however 
often hid an antisocial or psychopathic personality. Such an 
individual may have been experiencing a great deal of anger 
around the time of the attack and have been suffering from 
depression. He would also be likely to follow news reports about 
his offence and to leave the area following the attack.
6 
Ainsworth further argued that "such characteristics are in sharp contrast to the 
disorganized murderer who is more likely to live alone and quite near the scene of the 
attack. He would be socially and sexually inept, of low intelligence and to have had some 
quite severe form of mental illness. He was also likely to have suffered physical and 
sexual abuse as a child. In the case of these disorganized offenders, the offence would 
tend to be committed when in a frightened or confused state,,64. 
The first case in which the FBI used offender profiling occurred in June 1973 when a 
seven year old girl, Susan Jaegar went missing while on a camping holiday with her 
parents. She was abducted from her tent while her parents were sleeping. For a year, the 
Montana Police could not find the missing girl. Then in January 1974, police discovered 
62 Th' IS has been discussed in more details in chapter 2 under the CSAlFBI approach to offender profiling, 
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the charred body of an eighteen year old girl in the woodland near the camp where Susan 
Jaegar was abducted. Police suspected that one killer was responsible for both murders 
and they decided to call in the FBI to assist them with the investigation. The FBI drew up 
a profile of the likely killer, which among other things stated that :-
(1) the offender was a young white male. 
(2) A loner. 
(3) Lived near the camp. 
(4) Likely to have been arrested before. 
(5) Likely to have kept souvenir from the victims. 
Their profile fitted David Meirhofer who was already on the FBI suspects list. He was 
named by an informant. He was arrested, questioned but released as there was no 
physical evidence linking him to the murders. As part of their investigation, the FBI kept 
a telephone recorder at Susan Jaeger's mother's house .... as predicted, an anonymous 
caller telephoned and said that he has abducted Susan, her mother was able to record his 
voice. It was identified as that of Meirhofer. A search of his home revealed the gruesome 
body parts, kept as 'souvenirs'. He later admitted to both murders as well as two others of 
local boys, before hanging himself in his cell. 65 
It should be noted that the FBI in the 1970's carried out another interview with 41 
convicted serial rapists and they came up with four types of rapists - power reassurance, 
power assertive, anger-retaliatory and anger excitation. These initial groupings of 
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murderers and rapists eventually led to the development of the Crime Classification 
Manual (Ressler, Douglas, Burgess and Burgess). This is a classification system for the 
types of crimes in which the behaviour of the perpetrator plays an important role.
66 
In Britain, on the other hand, Paul Britton, a British criminal psychologist was 
approached by the police in 1984 to assist them with the case of a 33 year old woman -
Caroline Osborne, from Leicesterhire, England. Caroline's body was found with seven 
stab wounds and her hands and feet were bound with string. There were no signs of 
robbery or sexual assault. It should be noted that a piece of paper containing a drawing of 
a pentagram in a circle was found at the crime scene. This image is usually linked to 
black magic or satanism. In order to draw up a profile of the likely killer, Britton studied 
the crime scene photographs and autopsy reports and he predicted that the killer was :-
66 
(1) Male in his mid-teens to early twenties. 
(2) Sexually immature. 
(3) Lacked social skills to maintain relationships. 
(4) Lived at home with both parents or one parent. 
(5) Likes to keep to himself. 
(6) Probably lives near the area where the body was found. 
(7) Was a manual worker. 
(8) Strong and athletic build. 
(9) Had forensic awareness or kept souvenirs. 
Jackson and Bekerian, supra note 17, at 5. 
50 
Another murder occurred fourteen months later in the area, with similar patterns and 
Britton was called in again to assist with the investigation. Britton said that even though 
there were a few differences in the two murders that they were committed by the same 
person. Following Britton's profile, Paul Kenneth Bostock was arrested. Britton 
suggested to the police the interviewing strategies to be used and Bostock later confessed 
to the two murders. In June 1986 he was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Leicester 
Crown Court. Britton believed that there were sexual motives for the murders and he 
wrote: "Caroline Osborne's murder was an expression of a corrupt lust. The bindings, 
control and choice of victim suggested a killer whose sexual desire had become mixed 
with anger and the need to dominate. He would have rehearsed the scene in his mind 
beforehand - fantasizing about a woman being taken, restrained, bound, dominated, 
mutilated and killed with a knife".67 
Paul Britton was also involved in the controversial case of Rachel Nickell, a twenty year 
old model who was murdered on July 15, 1992 on Wimbledon Common, London, while 
walking her dog with her two year old son. Following the initial investigation, police had 
a suspect Colin Stagg, but he was released because there was no physical evidence to 
charge him. The police, on the advice of Paul Britton decided to organize a sting 
operation whereby an undercover policewoman codenamed Lizzie James would begin a 
relationship with the suspect. The aim of the operation was to link their suspect to the 
crime. Lizzie James started to exchange letters with Colin Stagg and swapped sexual 
fantasies. Britton's idea was to see if the suspect would implicate himself. Hence, through 
letters, meetings and telephone calls over seven month undercover operation, Lizzie 
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James encouraged Colin Stagg to develop his fantasies that matched the profile 
characteristics drawn up by Paul Britton. It should be noted that Colin's replies to the 
letters written to him by Lizzie James led to him being charged with the murder of Rachel 
Nickell. In one of their meetings, Lizzie told Colin that she enjoyed hurting people and 
always "wants blood, buckets of it". She also described to Colin how in her teenage years 
she was involved in satanism and had murdered a mother and her baby. She told Colin 
that she was looking for a meaningful and long lasting relationship with a man with 
similar experience and desires. In order to impress Lizzie and carryon with their 
relationship, Colin told her that he murdered a woman in New Forest. Police records and 
investigations showed that there was no such murder and that Colin lied to impress 
Lizzie. Britton at this point advised Lizzie to go back to Colin and tell him that she does 
not believe the New Forest story and that "if only you had done the Wimbledon Common 
murder; if only you had killed her, it would be all right". Colin told her that he was not 
involved in that murder, yet because he fitted some of the characteristics in the profile 
drawn up by Britton, he was charged with the murder. 
During the trial the defense argued that the undercover police operation was unfair and 
constitutes a breach of a defendant's right not to incriminate himself. Gisli Gudjonsson, a 
psychologist representing the accused, argued that Britton's profile was mere speculation 
and based only on his own personal intuition. It was also argued that the offender 
profiling used is an unreliable technique that had not achieved general acceptance as a 
science. 
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On September 14, 1994, Mr. Justice OgnaU acquitted Colin Stagg of the murder. The 
judge was very critical of the seven month undercover police operation and the role of 
Paul Britton in the case. The judge ruled that the whole operation was unfair, a breach of 
a defendant's right not to incriminate himself and was "misconceived", and he said: "I 
am afraid this behaviour betrays not merely an excess of zeal, but a blatant attempt to 
incriminate a suspect by positive and deceptive conduct of the grossest kind. Any 
legitimate steps taken by the police and the prosecuting authorities to bring perpetrators 
to justice are to be applauded, but the emphasis must be on the word legitimate. A careful 
appraisal of the material demonstrates a skilful and sustained enterprise to manipulate the 
accused, sometimes subtly, sometimes blatantly". 
It should be noted that because of his role in this case, Paul Britton faced charges of 
professional misconduct by the British Psychological Society. However, the Disciplinary 
Committee of the society met on October 29 and 30, 2002 and dismissed the charges. The 
committee maintained that due to the delays which occurred during the process of the 
case, that it believed that Mr. Britton would not receive a fair hearing. The committee 
stated that "the disciplinary process was originally subject to four years delay, due to the 
likelihood of private civil proceedings, then latterly it was delayed by the need to gather 
extensive evidence and agree a date when all parties would be available. All of this has 
had a bearing on whether Mr. Britton could receive a fair hearing after so long". 
Canter and Alison were also very critical of the work of Britton. They described Britton's 
Work as mere intuitive personal opinion, and they wrote: 
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Britton uses an additional device to help convince the 
audience of his profiling expertise - he presents points as 
separate though they are clearly related. For example in 
stating that an individual is sexually immature also implies 
he has few if any previous girlfriends. However, Britton is 
able to give the impression that these are two separate points 
merely by separating them by another point in a list of 
characteristics. It is perhaps more surprising, that nowhere in 
Britton's account are there any references to psychological 
principles or any indication of a process by which he has 
come to his conclusions. Thus despite an advert for Britton's 
book that boasts, 'if you did it he'll get you' we are no 
clearer by the end ofthe book of how 'he will get you. 68 
Paul Britton as we have seen has assisted the police in several cases in Britain, but David 
Canter is undoubtedly the father of offender profiling in Britain. Between 1982 and 1986 
series of rapes and murders occurred in London and the Home Counties and the police 
were not making any progress in apprehending the offenders. Hence, the police sought 
the help of David Canter, a Professor of Psychology, presently at the University of 
Liverpool. In July 1985, three violent rape attacks occurred and the police launched 
'Operation Hart'. In August 1985 John Duffy was arrested and charged with violent 
offences but was released on bail. Immediately after Duffy was released, a nineteen year 
old girl, Alison Day, was dragged from an East London train and taken to a garage where 
she was raped and killed. Another girl, fifteen year old Maartje Tamboezer was also 
raped and killed on her way to the shops in West Horley, three months later. Her body 
was set on fire. However, semen traces were found. Another attack occurred on May 18, 
1986 when Mrs. Anne Lock was abducted on her way to work. 
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Having found semen traces on one of the bodies, the investigations intensified. John 
Duffy was re-arrested, interviewed, but he refused to give blood sample. Duffy was again 
released on bail and he later bribed one of his friends to "mug" him. He reported to the 
police that he has been mugged and voluntarily checked himself into a psychiatric 
hospital claiming that he is suffering from trauma and amnesia as a result of the mugging. 
John Duffy attacked and raped another girl, a fourteen year old girl. The girl survived the 
attack. She was blindfolded during the attack but a caught a glimpse of Duffy when his 
mask fell off. She later identified Duffy as her attacker at the identification parade. 
The profile compiled by Professor Canter matched Duffy'S characteristics and he was 
placed under surveillance.69 A few weeks later, he was arrested at his mother's house 
where physical evidence was gathered. It should be noted that his blood sample matched 
the semen traces found on Maartje Tamboezer's body. Some fibres found on Duffy's 
clothing also matched those found on one of the victims. Strings found at Duffy's house 
also matched the strings used to bind the victims. Thus, there was enough evidence to 
charge Duffy with the murders and rapes. Mr. Justice Farquarson on February 26, 1988 
sentenced Duffy to seven life sentences. 
In this chapter, we have defined offender profiling. A historical account of offender 
profiling has also been discussed. In the next chapter, we discuss the different approaches 
to offender profiling, examining their various strengths and weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Approaches to Offender Profiling 
There are three main approaches to offender profiling - Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical 
approach, Criminal Investigative Analysis or the FBI approach, and the Investigative 
Psychology or Environmental Psychology approach. In recent times however, some 
scholars have developed other 'approaches' such as Geographic Profiling, Behavioral 
Evidence Analysis, and Crime Action Profiling. 
Diagnostic Evaluation (DE) or Clinical Approach 
Behavioral details from crime scenes, reconstructed crime 
activity and witness accounts can offer an additional 
perspective to forensic information gathered by traditional 
investigative methods. This behavioral information can often 
provide insights into the thinking patterns and personal habits 
of offenders that extend beyond the limits of the offence 
itself. The offender's focus of interest, the type of 
relationship that he makes with the victim, the criteria by 
which he chooses the circumstances of the offence, the 
amount of planning he engages in and the risks he is willing 
to run, all help to build up a picture of the offender's mental 
world. This, in tum, can provide useful insights into his likely 
motivations, his personal needs, his lifestyle and his past 
history. The professional who considers these issues is more 
likely to understand the contexts within which the offender 
commits the offence. This broad, contextual information can 
help generate, or support, particular lines of enquiry during 
investigations. This type of information can be particularly 
useful, for instance, where linked series of offences are being 
investigated, where the victim may be a stranger to the 
offender, or where an offence seems bizarre and 
inexplicable.7o 
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Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical Approach is the oldest approach to offender profiling. 
It is an approach mainly adopted by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Diagnostic 
evaluation approach looks at offenders from a mental illness point of view and tries to 
examine crimes and crime scenes from that perspective. Based on their clinical practice 
experience, their knowledge of mental health processes and their knowledge of 
psychological disorders, these practitioners try to predict the type of offenders who are 
likely to be responsible for certain types of criminal behavior. Hence, the diagnostic 
evaluation approach "relies on the clinical judgment of a profiler to ascertain the 
underlying motives behind an offender's actions".7! 
The Diagnostic Evaluation approach is based on the premise that "psychiatrists may be 
able to offer insights into some of the more bizarre forms of clinical activity, or at least 
those which do not fit into the more normal pattern of criminal behavior. In some cases 
the police may be baffled by a particularly unusual crime and might be struggling to 
interpret the significance of some aspects of the incident. In such cases a psychiatrist or 
clinical psychologist may, from their knowledge of many forms of mental illness, be able 
to offer an explanation for behaviour which appears, on first encounter, to make little 
sense. Whilst the media may talk of a 'senseless' killing, the clinician may at least be able 
to offer an explanation of the killing from the offender's perspective"n. Under the 
diagnostic evaluation approach, "the construction of profiles is achieved by diagnosing 
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the probable psychopathology and/or personality type likely to have committed the crime. 
However, such a diagnosis can vary widely among different practitioners,,73. 
There is general agreement that some forms of mental illness may predispose certain 
individuals to commit certain crimes. This is why psychiatrists and clinical psychologists 
playa very important role in offender profiling. Their knowledge of mental disorder, for 
instance, helps them to be in a better position to produce a profile of the individuals likely 
to commit certain types of crime, especially crimes showing elements of 
psychopathology, paraphilias and sadomasochistic behavior. Indeed, Badcock noted that 
"the mental disorders most commonly associated with offending are the psychoses, 
sociopathic personality disorder and drug/alcohol additions,,74. 
Diagnostic evaluation approach was very useful and in fact seen to be accurate in the 
"New York Mad Bomber" case in 1956, when Dr. James Brussel produced a 
psychological profile of the bomber using this approach. 75 This approach was also used 
by Dr. Thomas Bond in profiling Jack the Ripper. Similarly, this was also the approach 
used to produce a psychological profile of US President Woodrow Wilson (this was not 
for criminal investigation). 
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In spite of the above noted successes of diagnostic evaluation, it is not without criticism. 
The scientific basis of this approach is still in question. This is an approach that relies 
heavily on the personal clinical experience and knowledge of an individual practitioner. 
As such it is subjective and cannot be empirically tested. 
Another criticism leveled against this approach is that it is an approach done by 
psychiatrists and psychologists who do not have any law enforcement background. Egger 
argued that diagnostic evaluations are done by psychiatrists and psychologists who "have 
very little experience or knowledge of law enforcement or investigation,,76. Wilson et al 
sees the main problem with this approach as being its individualistic nature, arguing that 
"this individualistic approach also prevents adequate comparative assessments of validity, 
utility and process, and the category of profiling now in the ascendancy is that of crime 
scene analysis,,77. Ainsworth also argued that "rather than studying a large number of 
cases and drawing inferences from those, this approach is more likely to involve multiple 
observations of single cases,,78. Ainsworth further contended that "such an approach has 
some advantages but may also suffer from some disadvantages when compared to 
approaches which involve the study of large numbers of cases. For example, the single 
case study allows for a very detailed consideration of all the aspects of one incident and 
may thus produce information which a less considered examination might reveal. 
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However, information derived from such a single case may be so specific to that incident 
that it is all but impossible to extrapolate the findings to other investigations,,79. 
In the final analysis, it should be noted that all other approaches to offender profiling 
originated from diagnostic evaluation, and as we have seen it has proved very useful in 
several cases. The most important thing about this approach is that it offers a better and 
more authoritative insight into the motivations underlying an offender's criminal action. 
Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA)/FBI Approach or Crime Scene Analysis 
(CSA) 
79 Id. 
Although obviously an oversimplification, the basic 
blueprint for the FBI approach involves considering the 
available aspects of the crime scenes; the nature of attacks; 
forensic evidence; and information related to the victim: 
then classifying the offender and, finally, referring to the 
appropriate predictive characteristics. Results from such 
investigations are incorporated in a framework which 
basically classifies murderers according to whether they are 
'organized' (which implies that murderers plan their 
crimes, display control at scene of crime, leave few or no 
clues, and that the victim is a targeted stranger) or 
'disorganized' (which implies that murders are not planned 
and crime scenes show evidence of haphazard behaviour) 
. f h 80 or a mIxture 0 t e two. 
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The FBI defined Criminal Investigative Analysis as "a process of reviewing crimes from 
both a behavioral and investigative perspective. It involves reviewing and assessing the 
facts of a criminal act, interpreting offender behavior, and interaction with the victim, as 
exhibited during the commission of the crime, or as displayed in the crime scene".81 This 
approach is based on crime scene analysis and involves an examination of the method of 
operation and other behavioral patterns that can be deduced from the crime scene 
characteristics. Having found that the diagnostic evaluation approach proved very helpful 
in apprehending unknown serial killers, and having been influenced by the work of Dr. 
James Brussel, the FBI introduced criminal investigative analysis. It should be noted that 
criminal investigative analysis is done by the Behavioral Analysis Unit (Behavioral 
Sciences Unit) of the FBI based in Quantico, Virginia. This approach is undoubtedly the 
most popular approach. In fact, this approach is fast becoming synonymous with the term 
'offender profiling' itself. This does not mean that this is the most reliable approach. This 
situation exists because those in law enforcement field see offender profiling as their own 
exclusive club, and have virtually succeeded in showcasing themselves as the one and 
only group of people who are better placed to produce the best and most accurate 
profiles. Are they correct? You will found out for yourself after reading this study. 
However, there is no gainsaying the fact that the FBI has given immense popularity to 
this crime investigation technique. In line with Kocsis, "this popularization in itself is a 
significant accomplishment that should not be underestimated or devalued as without 
these efforts it is debatable to what extent, if at all, the practice of profiling would have 
81 
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evolved beyond the classical circumstance of DE,,82. This technique is undoubtedly the 
offshoot of diagnostic evaluation and it was after the work and contributions of Dr. James 
Brussel that the FBI began to embrace and develop this technique. 
In the 1970's the FBI were frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when it 
was present at a crime scene did not provide clues to the sort of individuals that they 
should be looking for. With this in mind, they used data from serious sexual assault and 
murder cases and tried to see if they could identify the behavioral characteristics of these 
sort of offenders. They also carried out in-depth interviews with 36 convicted serial 
killers. As Ainsworth has pointed out, "a careful recording and analysis of the crimes 
which these offenders had committed built up a database. Based on this information, the 
FBI advocated that important information could be gleaned by: (1) a careful examination 
of the various aspects of the crime scene, (2) a study of the nature of the attacks 
themselves, (3) careful consideration of the medical examiners report, (4) the 
identification of the characteristics of the type of victim selected".83 
Under this approach, an offender is classified according to whether the crime scene 
appeared to be organized or disorganized. This classification of offenders into organized 
or disorganized offenders helps investigators to draw conclusions as to the characteristics 
of the likely offenders. The FBI maintained that the organized and disorganized offenders 
have different demographic and behavioral characteristics. According to the FBI, the 
crime scene of an organized offender shows the following features: 
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• Shows signs of some sort of planning. 
• Shows that the offender was in control at the scene. 
• Shows evidence of forensic awareness by the offender (revealed by the lack of 
physical traces at the scene). 
Ressler et al maintained that organized offenders tend to: 84 
* Have a high birth order (often being the firstborn son in a family). 
* Their father's work history is generally stable. 
* Parental discipline is perceived as inconsistent. 
* Have mobility (his car is in good condition). 
* Likely to choose a stranger as the victim. 
* This type of offender is intelligent and possibly an underachiever. 
* Socially skilled. 
* Sexually competent. 
* Likely to be living with a partner. 
* Likely to be depressed and experiencing a great deal of anger around the time of 
attack. 
* Likely to follow news report about the attack and likely to leave the area after the 
attack. 
On the other hand, the FBI maintained that the crime scene of a disorganized offender 
tend to show the following features. 
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• Shows evidence of little or no planning. 
• Shows that the attack was random. 
• Shows that the offender carried out the attack when in a frightened or confused 
state of mind. 
• Shows evidence of disorganized behavior. 
• The offender chooses any weapon that he or she can find at the scene and is likely 
to leave the weapons at the scene. 
• There is little or no attempt made by this type of offender to conceal any clues at 
the scene. 
It has also been noted that the disorganized offender is:
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• Likely to live alone. 
• Lives near the scene of crime. 
• Socially and sexually inept. 
• Likely to be of below average intelligence. 
• Suffers from some form of mental illness. 
• Likely to have suffered physical or sexual abuse as a child. 
• Likely to be oflow birth status in the family. 
• Father's work is unstable. 
• This type of offender has poor work history. 
• Likely to have suffered harsh parental discipline. 
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This classification into organized and disorganized offenders helps to determine at the 
outset whether a series of attacks are likely to be the work of one person or more 
individuals. 
The FBI also classified crime scenes into the organized crime scene, disorganized crime 
scene, mixed crime scene and the atypical crime scene. The organized crime scene as we 
have seen shows elements of planning and premeditation, as well as attempts to conceal 
any physical traces. The disorganized crime scene shows a high level of disorganized and 
disoriented behavior; appears to be unplanned and random, and no attempts are made to 
conceal any physical traces. The mixed crime scene refers to a crime scene that shows the 
characteristics of both the organized and the disorganized. Davies noted that "this could 
indicate the presence of two offenders in the crime, or it could indicate that one offender 
had planned the crime and then abandoned the plan due to unforeseen circumstances, or it 
could indicate that an offender had staged the outcome (made it look like something 
else),,86. The atypical crime scene is one where no classification can be made because of 
lack of available information. This is usually the case where they crime scene was located 
several years later. 
The FBI has done considerable specific analysis of offenders who rape. They classified 
rapists into two - selfish and unselfish rapists. 87 As Ainsworth has pointed out "the 
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distinction refers to the extent to which the rapist showed any consideration towards the 
victim during the act,,88. According to the FBI, the selfish rapist tends to be: 
• Violent, shows a high level of aggression. 
• Shows total sexual dominance. 
• Shows self-confidence. 
• Makes no attempt to establish any form of intimacy with the victim. 
• Engages in anal sex, followed by fellatio. 
• Tends to use very offensive, threatening, abusive, profane, demeaning, 
humiliating, impersonal and sexually oriented language. 
The unselfish rapist on the other hand is seen to show: 
• Lack of self-confidence. 
• Does not appear to be violent in the attack. Tends to use minimal level of force. 
• Not likely to cause any physical harm. 
• Likes to involve the victim in the sexual act, tries to establish some sort of 
intimacy. 
• Likely to tell the victim to perform certain sexual acts on him. For instance he 
may ask the victim to kiss him, fondle him and so on. 
• Tends to use language that is personal, reassuring, complimentary, non-profane, 
concerned and apologetic. 
88 A' lUsworth, supra note 6, at 103. 
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This classification is useful because it is believed that verbal utterances by the offender 
during the attack will reveal a lot of infonnation about him or her. Above all, this 
classification helps in choosing an appropriate interviewing/interrogation strategy. 
Following the usefulness of the above classification, the FBI made further classification 
of rapists. Hazelwood maintained that there are four types of rapists: 89 
(1) Power Reassurance Rapist or Compensatory Rapist: 
This type of rapist sees rape as a way of showing his masculinity and sexual adequacy, 
and shows the signs of an unselfish rapist. This type of rapist sees rape as a way of 
removing any doubts about their sexual inadequacy. In fact, "the sexual act goes some 
way to reassuring the perpetrator about his insecurity. However, the effect may be short 
lived, and the offender might strike again within a few days or weeks, and probably in the 
same district. It is not uncommon for such a perpetrator to take an item of clothing or 
other possession from his victims as a bizarre 'trophy'. He may also keep careful records 
of his conquests. As the primary motivation is the removal of feelings of inadequacy, this 
type of perpetrator is unlikely to stop offending until he is caught and incarcerated.,,9o 
It has also been noted that this type of rapist usually attacks in late evenings or early 
mornings when the victim is likely to be alone or with small children, and that this type 
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of rapist also chooses a victim about his own age and his own race.91 It is also believed 
that this type of rapist likes to think that the victim is 'enjoying' the rape and is most 
likely to ask the victim to undress on hislher own. They appear to be concerned about the 
welfare of the victim and tend to feel some sort of remorse, and likely to apologize to the 
victim. Holmes and Holmes maintained that this type of rapist is likely to be single, lives 
with one or both parents, non-athletic, quiet, passive, social loner, with limited education, 
often employed in a menial job, likes to visit adult bookstores, likely to be a transvestite, 
a fetishist, involved in voyeurism, excessive masturbation and exhibitionism, tends to 
attack in his own neighborhood, and most likely to have been raised by an aggressive, 
seductive and dominating mother. 92 
Furthermore, "for this rapist, the sex act validates his position of importance. He 
perceives himself as a loser, and by controlling another human being he hopes to make 
himself believe that he is important, if only temporarily. For this reason, he uses only 
enough force to control his victim,,93. Holmes and Holmes have suggested that when 
interviewing this type of rapist that the interviewer should adopt the strategy of appealing 
to the rapist's "sense of masculinity", arguing that "the interviewer might indicate to him 
that the woman who was raped in the case under investigation has not suffered "undue" 
trauma, and that the police realize the rapist had no desire to harm his victim; such a 
statement could set the stage for a "sympathetic" relationship that might result in the 
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rapiSt's sharing information, not only about the rape currently under investigation, but 
about other suspected connected rapes".94 
(2) Power-Assertive Rapist or Exploitative Rapist: 
The power assertive rapist sees rape as an expression of his masculinity and superiority. 
This rapist has no doubts or fears about his sexual adequacy and falls under the selfish 
category. Therefore, they tend to use force during the attack. "This type of rapist may 
well tear his victim's clothing and discard it. He may also carry out repeated sexual 
assaults rather than just one, thus adding to his assailant's feelings of virility and 
dominance. If the man has driven the victim to the location of the rape, he may well leave 
her there without her clothing, and as a result the victim will be unable to report the 
assault swiftly,,95. 
This type of rapist is normally athletic and does not see anything wrong with rape. For 
them, raping of women is 'normal'. Date rapes fall into this category and they are 
normally problematic in prosecuting. It has been observed that this type of rapist is likely 
to have been raised in a single parent family, lived in foster homes, suffered physical 
abuse as a child, a high school dropout, has domestic problems, unhappy marriages, likes 
to visit bars, likely to be employed in macho occupations - construction or police work, 
and likely to choose a victim of his own race.96 
94 
Id, at 122. 
95 A' 
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 106. 
96 
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 126. 
69 
Holmes and Holmes have suggested that: 
It is best for the interviewer to approach the interview 
session with all the facts in hand: the placement of the 
suspect at the scene, physical evidence that directly 
implicates him in the rape (or rapes), and other 
pertinent information that shows the interviewer is a 
professional. What the police should communicate is, 
We know you did it, and this is how we are going to 
prove it. If the interviewer is in error about the facts, or 
if there is some other reason for the rapist to discount 
the interviewer's competence as a professional, it is 
unlikely that any cooperation will be gained from the 
rapist through any means, including intimidation, ~leas 
for aid, and appeals based on the victim's welfare.
9 
(3) Anger-Retaliatory Rapist: 
As the name suggests, this type of rapist tend to rape as a result of his anger and distaste 
of women. This rapist is extremely angry, violent and basically hates women. They 
derive sexual excitement by hurting women and see women as the source of their 
troubles, and so seeks revenge. As such "this type of rapist appears to commit his assaults 
as a way of expressing his own rage and hostility. He appears to possess a great deal of 
anger and animosity towards women in general and uses the act of rape as a way of 
expressing or releasing this anger. He also appears to derive pleasure from degrading his 
victims. The style of the rape will be particularly selfish and the perpetrator will use 
extreme amounts of violence,,98. 
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Generally speaking, this type of rapist likes to perform degrading sexual acts on the 
victims, the attack tends to be unplanned, the victim is likely to be someone who closely 
matches the woman the rapist sees as the source of his troubles. The rapist is likely to be 
married, have many affairs, and is likely to choose a victim of his own age. This type of 
rapist tends to come from a broken home, and is likely to have been physically abused as 
a child. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "some 80% have been reared by a single 
female parent or other single female caregiver,,99. They suggested that the interviewer 
should be male as this type of rapist hates women. 
(4) Anger-Excitement Rapist or Sadistic Rapist: 
This type of rapist sees rape as a source of pleasure. The idea of torturing the victims 
provides this rapist with sexual excitement, and he likes to inflict pain on the victims. 
There is general agreement that this is the most dangerous of all rapists. The attack tends 
to be planned, violent and could result in murder. This rapist is likely to have a 'rape kit', 
which he takes to the location of the attacks. Furthermore, this type of rapist falls under 
the selfish category and likes to see the victims suffer; likes to instill fear in the victims 
and most likely to choose the type of victim that will fulfill his inner fantasies/desires. 
This rapist will continue to rape until he is caught. This rapist is likely to come from a 
single - parent family, with divorced parents, lived in foster homes, age range 30 - 39, 
physically abused as a child, raised in a sexually deviant home, married, with some 
college education, employed in white collar jobs, likely to be a middle class family man, 
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has compulsive personality, ritualistic, likely to stalk and eventually kill victims.
loo 
Holmes and Holmes noted that there is no interviewing strategy that is effective with this 
f 
. 101 
type 0 rapIst. 
Having discussed these examples of various classifications of offenders by the FBI, we 
noW move on to discussing how a typical criminal profile is produced. Douglas et al have 
clearly outlined the various stages involved in the criminal profile generating process thus 
_ profiling inputs, decision process models stage, crime scene assessment, criminal 
fil
' .' d h' 102 pro 1 e, mvestlgatlOn an appre enslOn. 
(1) Profiling Inputs: This involves collecting all available information about the 
crime, including physical evidence, crime scene photographs, autopsy reports, 
witness and victim statements, as well as police reports. Detailed background 
information about the victim is noted. It should also be noted at this stage whether 
the crime scene is indoors or outdoors. "In homicide cases, the required 
information includes a complete synopsis of the crime and a description of the 
crime scene, encompassing factors indigenous to that area to the time of the 
incident such as weather conditions and the political and social environment,,103. 
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(2) Decision Process Models: At this stage, the profiler organizes "the input into 
meaningful questions and patterns"IO\ (for example, what type of murder - serial, 
mass or spree murder?). What is the primary intent? The location, pattern and acts 
that took place before and after the offense will also be noted at this stage. At this 
stage, attempt will also be made to ascertain the length of time taken to carry out 
the attack. 
(3) Crime Scene Assessment: This is arguably the most crucial stage and care should 
be taken to note whether the crime scene is staged or not. The profiler at this stage 
tries to reconstruct the behavior of the offender and the victim. The aim here is to 
try to ascertain what kind of weapon was used and the type of injuries. Here the 
profiler also tries to classify the crime scene and the likely offender. Does the 
crime scene appear to be the work of organized or disorganized offender? Also to 
be determined at this stage are the likely motives of the crime. 
(4) Criminal Profile: At this stage, the profiler formulates an initial description of 
the most likely suspects. The actual criminal profile is now created and the best 
methods of apprehending the unknown offender will be suggested. A criminal 
profile usually contains such information as the likely age, race, height, gender, 
marital status, job type, education, location, criminal record, military background, 
social skills, sexual life as well as use of drugs or alcohol. 
104 Id. 
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(5) Investigation: At this stage a written report will be presented to the investigators 
and they will concentrate on the suspects matching the profile. Any new 
information about the crime or other connected crimes will also be put together. 
(6) Apprehension: If any suspect is arrested, an interviewing technique will be 
chosen. The criminal profile is then evaluated to see how it matches the suspect. 
The FBI approach has proved to be very useful in many cases. As Ainsworth has pointed 
out this approach constitutes "the first systematic attempt to classify serial and serious 
criminals on the basis of behavioral characteristics,,105. Furthermore, "the classification 
made it somewhat easier to assess whether a series of crimes which appeared similar in 
many respects was likely to have been committed by the same person. If the police were 
investigating the abduction and murder of two young girls in the same area, the fact that 
one appeared to be the work of a disorganized murderer, and the other the work of an 
organized murderer may prove to be helpful. But, more importantly, the ability to assess 
whether a series of crimes was likely to be the result of a single perpetrator would be 
helpful in allowing the police to pool all the evidence accumulated on each single case in 
order to build up a better picture of the offender" 
1 
06. 
The FBI approach has however, been criticized. It has been argued that their approach is 
not scientific, that the data sample was insufficient, that their approach is subjective and 
the fact that the FBI declines to share information about their methods, so that other 
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scholars can test their hypothesis. In the words of Ainsworth, "one immediate problem 
with this approach was the fact that the classification arose mainly from interviews with 
just 36 American, convicted, serial murderers. It was not clear whether the findings 
applied only to serial murderers, who are after all a type of offender which is still 
statistically extremely rare, even in the USA. The fact that all the interviewees were 
convicted murderers also raises the question as to whether more successful murderers 
(i.e. those who have not been caught) might have provided different information. It is 
also not clear whether any information obtained from this American sample is directly 
applicable to offenders in different countries,,107. Ainsworth also maintained that "to base 
a major classification on such a small number of specialist offenders is somewhat 
questionable" 108. He further argued that the FBI approach lacks clarity, and that "the lack 
of clarity is not helped by the fact that the FBI is reluctant to allow social scientists to test 
their hypotheses in a systematic and objective way. The situation is confused further 
when former FBI employees who have written memoirs of their exploits appear to 
contradict each other. (see for example Douglas and Olshaker, 1995 and Ressler and 
Shachtman, 1992),,109. 
Canter and Alison were also very critical of the FBI approach and they maintained that "a 
careful examination of the content of their profiles shows a severe lack in accounts of any 
systematic procedures or any substantive theoretical models of behaviour. There is no 
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reference to any commonly accepted psychological principles - pathological or 
. 1,,110 
SOCIa . 
Wilson et a1 also argued that "first it is believed that this approach has no real theoretical 
basis. It simply reduces human behavior to a few observable parameters which lead to 
characteristics of the unknown offender. Second, the various descriptors used in the 
classification manual are not weighted or given any order of priority. The typologies 
include an extensive range of crime scene indicators and their associated heuristic 
inferences, but the formulation of profiles is sti111eft to the subjective interpretation of the 
individual compiling them".111 
On a similar vein, Muller contended that this approach "relies heavily on the experience 
and intuition of the profi1er, both of which are difficult to empirically test. One of the 
main problems with a scientific analysis of CSA is that its proponents have never felt the 
need to have it scientifically verified" I 12. Muller further argued that: 
110 
Many of the claims of CSA sound much like those of 
psychoanalysis, with talk of fantasies and sexual motivations, 
and like psychoanalysis, these claims do not seem to be 
falsifiable in most cases. Take, for example, the following 
statement: "Although some of the murderers in our study did 
not report fantasies in conscious way, their descriptions of the 
murders they committed reveal hidden fantasies of violence" 
(Ressler et al., 1988, p.52). We may be left wondering when 
FBI agents became experts in interpreting the unconscious 
fantasies of others. If one claims that a violent murder is a sign 
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of violent fantasies - even if the murderer does not report any 
violent fantasies - then how is one to falsify the hypothesis that 
murderers have violent fantasies? 
As it stands, the CSA approach is not a good candidate for 
falsifiability, primarily due to the nature of the ideas that it is 
based on. A further problem is that those involved have had 
little interest in their work being empirically substantiated. One 
of the problems is that of operationalizing the variables. I 13 
The major problem with the FBI approach relates to the fact that there is no method of 
testing the reliability, validity/consistency of their methods. This approach is subjective 
and needs to be used with caution. It should be noted however, that their classification of 
crime scenes and offenders has been very useful in crime investigations. 
113 
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Id, at 249. 
I quickly realized that 'profiling' lacked any clearly 
articulated or scientifically based set of procedures, 
findings or theories and that many of the people 
following in my footsteps were doing little more than 
attempting to live up to a media created fiction. I 
therefore set about creating a new discipline that I 
named Investigative Psychology that would offer a real 
scientific base for the development of our 
understanding of criminal behaviour in ways that are 
relevant to police investigations. The Centre for 
Investigative Psychology that I have set up at The 
University of Liverpool now provides a framework for 
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Investigative Psychology approach was developed by Professor David Canter, currently a 
professor of psychology at the University of Liverpool. This approach started in 1985 when 
Professor Canter said that he was invited by Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff 
and Detective Chief Inspector John Grieve to Scotland Yard office to discuss the possibility of 
using psychology to assist in police investigations. Canter admitted that at the beginning he had 
no experience of police procedurelinvestigations and had just little knowledge of criminal 
behavior. However, after more contact with the police detectives, and police investigations, 
Canter said that he "felt a start had to be made somewhere to see whether even elementary 
psychological principles could be used to help a major police investigation". 1 IS In 1986, Canter 
wrote a letter to Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff regarding a series of rapes he 
had read about in the local newspaper. In response to the letter, he was invited to Hendon Police 
College where an incident room was set up in connection with the rapes (named the Hart 
inquiry). Canter stated that it was at this meeting that he was formally asked by Detective Chief 
Superintendent Vince McFadden, the head of Surrey CID, to "use whatever skills I might have 
as a psychologist to contribute directly to a major inquiry into rape and murder" 1 16. Canter noted 
that this was in effect the beginning of his "personal journey to see if a criminal's actions in a 
crime really could reveal systematically his key identifying characteristics" 1 I? 
Canter maintained that a criminal leaves not only physical traces at a scene of crime, but also 
Psychological traces, and that by examining these psychological traces, investigators can have an 
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idea as to the sort of person likely to commit a particular crime. I IS Following the footsteps of the 
FBI and drawing from their work, Canter maintained that "the only way open to me to discover 
what profiling could be, and how it might relate to the psychological theories and methods that I 
knew, was by working alongside an ongoing investigation, trying out ideas as they occurred to 
me. This is not the best way to become involved in any area of research, coming up with possible 
results without the time or resources to test them thoroughly, but it was the only way forward". I 19 
Professor Canter came up with what he called a five-factor model of offender behavior. He based 
his work on the five aspects of the interaction between the victim and the offender. According to 
Canter, the five aspects of interaction are interpersonal coherence, significance of time and place, 
criminal characteristics, criminal career and forensic awareness. 
Interpersonal Coherence: 
Canter argued that an offender's criminal activity makes sense to them within their own personal 
psychology. This involves analyzing an offender's criminal actions to see if it is related to the 
way he/she deals with other people in non-criminal situations. It is believed that an offender's 
actions at a crime scene mirror his or her actions in non-criminal day to day activities. As such, 
"the psychologist should be able to determine something about the offender from the victim and 
the way the offender interacted with the victim (where this can be determined, such as with 
118 Id. 
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rape)".120 "For instance, the offender will select victims that are consistent with the important 
characteristics of people who are important to the offender". 121 
Significance of Place and Time: 
Canter believed that an offender will likely choose to attack at a location that has some sort of 
significance to him or her. There is the idea that offenders tend to commit murder and rape in 
familiar locations, where they feel in control and comfortable. "Therefore, if all of the crimes are 
committed in a certain geographic location, there is a high chance that the offender lives or 
works around the area".122 Furthermore, an examination of the place and time of an attack "may 
provide valuable information on the constraints of offender's mobility. Addressing the 
characteristics of the criminal allows researchers to determine whether the nature of the crime 
and the way it is committed can lead to a classification of criminal characteristics. This may lead 
to common characteristics of a subgroup of offender and provide some guidance for the direction 
of the investigation. The development of a person's criminal behavior may allow the police to 
backtrack the probable career of the unidentified offender and narrow the possibilities".123 "A 
rudimentary example of this would be the perpetrator who offends while traveling along a major 
road or highway - this may indicate that travel is a part of the offender's job, such as a courier or 
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trUck driver. Conversely, crime scenes that are proximal may indicate a lack of access to 
" 124 tranSport . 
Criminal Characteristics: 
Here attempt is made to classify offenders, the crimes, and the crime scenes. There are various 
ways of classifying offenders and crimes scenes. For instance, the FBI's classification into 
organized and disorganized offenders, power reassurance rapists, power assertive rapists, anger 
. d . . 125 
retaliatory rapIsts an anger excItement rapIsts. 
Criminal Career: 
It is believed that many offenders do not change their crime patterns. Therefore, attempts should 
be made to determine if the likely offender is a career criminal. This involves looking at the 
possible skills and occupations of the likely offender. 
Forensic Awareness: 
Canter also maintained that if a crime scene reveals that the offender took conscious steps to 
conceal physical evidence, that such offender is likely to have had previous contact with the 
police and knows about crime scene investigation techniques. Therefore, this sort of offender is 
likely to have a criminal record, and so investigators are able to narrow their search to suspects 
with criminal records. 
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Drawing ideas from environmental psychology, Professor David Canter also came up with what 
be called the "Circle Theory of Environmental Range" 126. He maintained that there is some sort 
of relationship between criminal activity range and the home base of serial offenders. Canter 
argued that serial offenders tend to attack and operate in locations where they feel in control and 
comfortable. The circle theory emphasizes the study of offenses to find out the offender's home 
base. It involves the prediction of an offender's residential area by examining the spatial 
distribution of serial offenses. 
In his circle theory, Professor Canter came up with two models - The Marauder and the 
Commuter. The marauder is the serial offender who commits crime within his home base, while 
the commuter travels a distance from his home to commit crime. For Canter, there is a causal 
relationship between the marauder and his home base as opposed to the commuter model where 
there is no causal relationship. 
In order to test the circle theory, Godwin and Canter in 1997 carried out a study in the United 
States involving 54 male US serial killers. 127 These 54 serial killers were only those who were 
convicted of at least 10 murders on different dates and at different locations. Godwin and Canter 
gathered data from various police departments in the US and also studied 540 victims. Their 
study was based on the following hypothesis: 
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(1) The home operates as a focus for the activities of serial killers in apprehending their victims 
and leaving their bodies. The focus is hypothesized as being the most likely center of gravity 
of their actions. 
(2) There will be differences in the distances traveled to apprehend victims and to leave their 
bodies. It is proposed that the dumping of the body carries most evidential implications and 
therefore is likely to be a further distance as well as being more likely to be shaped by 
buffering processes. 
(3) The distances serial killers travel to dump the victims' bodies are likely to change 
systematically over time while the victims' points of fatal encounter locations are not. The 
counter-intuitive possibility that this change relates to an increasing incorporation of all his 
killing activities into his domestic area will also be tested. 128 
Their study showed the home as a focus of serial murder, which implies that serial killers 
are most likely to apprehend nearly all their victims near their home (serial killer's 
home).129 Their study also "indicates that the offenders, on average, tended to make 
initial contact with their victims closer to home than the locations in which they 
eventually place the bodies"13o. This study further showed that "as the number of murders 
increases, killers generally cover a narrower area in which to leave the bodies of their 
victims, until the ninth and tenth offenses where the offender may be disposing of bodies 
quite close to his home. This pattern contrasts markedly with the locations at which the 
128 
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initial contact is made with the victim. All ten of the murders in the sequences studied 
here tended to be close to the home base of the offender, typically less than a couple of 
miles from his residence" 131. In a nutshell, Godwin and Canter concluded that as the 
series of offenses progresses, the sites where the serial offender dumps the bodies of 
victims get closer to the offender's home, and that this could be as a result of the serial 
offender trying to reduce the risks associated with transporting the body, and could also 
be that the offender has gained more confidence. 
Obviously, this study by Godwin and Canter is very useful for investigators in making 
decisions as to the first areas to search for suspects. This however, has to be approached 
with extreme caution. In fact, Godwin and Canter even drew attention to this issue and 
they called for more research to explore this process, arguing that "the systematic 
changing of locations and distances relative to the home base may be a deliberate ploy to 
distract police attention from the killer's home base" \32. Above all, no investigator can 
really be sure of the number of victims and the locations in any serial killing case. 
Godwin and Canter suggested that "investigative efforts should go into interviewing 
people within the neighborhood from which victims go missing in order to pinpoint 
precisely the address or location where the victim may have been last seen.,,133 
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It should be noted at this point that Investigative Psychology approach uses a statistical 
analysis method called Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS). There are different types of 
MDS and IP uses the type called Smallest Space Analysis. "In very simplistic terms 
multi-dimensional scaling is a method of statistically analyzing the relationships between 
multiple variables simultaneously" 134. For a more detailed discussion of the MDS, please 
see the work of Palermo and Kocsis. 135 
Data analyzed using MDS enable the creation of a diagram 
within which the variables under consideration can be 
individually plotted. Where these variables appear within a 
diagram (i.e. plotted) denotes the relationship they hold with 
each other. Consequently, variables that are plotted in a 
region of space close together hold a relationship with each 
other. The closer any variables are plotted together, the 
stronger their relationship or association. The opposite 
applies with variables appearing far apart in a MDS diagram 
indicating that the variables hold few similarities in that case. 
Furthermore, variables that appear in a location between 
other variables can be interpreted as holding some central or 
common relationship. In addition to the relationship plotted 
variables may have with each other in MDS diagram, their 
respective positions also convey some impression of their 
distinctiveness. Thus, variables that appear closer to the 
center of a MDS diagram are typically found to be commonly 
occurring variables, where as those that are plotted in the 
outlying rejions of a MDS diagram, are said to be more 
distinctive. 1 6 
Investigative psychology approach seems to have advantage over the other approaches 
and has been well received by many scholars. Muller, for instance, maintained that 
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"unlike CSA, IP was designed from the beginning with science in mind but this does not 
mean that it is a science in itself. Canter and his colleagues have attempted to use 
established psychological principles and research methodology to create a discipline that 
is empirically sound and open to peer review. IP has a great deal of potential to become a 
science, but it still has a long way to go before it will be recognized as a discipline in 
itself' 137. Muller further noted that IP has the advantage that it falls under the established 
science of psychology or criminology, arguing that "as such, most of the theories that 
have been formulated as part of IP are constructed in such a way that can be easily 
falsified,,]38. This is in fact where IP appears to be of more value and stronger than the 
other approaches. One can safely say therefore, that if any approach is capable of 
becoming genuinely scientific on its own, then it is IP. 
On a similar vem, Ainsworth maintained that "while Canter's work shares some 
commonalities with that developed by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit, he has tried to 
place his approach within an accepted psychological framework. Canter believes that as a 
branch of applied psychology, his work goes beyond what is traditionally thought of as 
offender profiling. Canter's early work tried to understand the type of crime in which any 
one individual might be likely to become involved, and he also considered the way in 
which such a crime might be carried out. Most importantly, Canter tried to establish 
whether the way in which an offender's behaviour while committing a crime mirrored 
their behaviour in everyday life. Canter suggested for example, that in their choice of 
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victims, offenders will only select people who, even within non-offending behaviour, are 
important to them. Canter supports this viewpoint by reference to the fact that the vast 
majority of serial killers target victims within their own ethnic groUp.,,139 
The Investigative Psychology approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Egger argued 
that IP practitioners lack police/law enforcement experience and also that IP does not 
make use of interview data of a wide range of offenders. Egger further argued that this 
approach psychology relies heavily upon victim information. 140 
Petherick was also critical of IP's model of offender behavior. He noted that "there is 
little available to tell the practitioner how to apply this model to an actual investigation. 
The original study that was done to develop the model was retrospective, that is, used 
solved cases where both the location of the offender's home and crimes were known. 
This must bring the practical application of this model into question, as it it would be 
practically impossible to know whether you were dealing with a marauder or a commuter 
with an unknown offender. The distances defined by the criminal range and home range 
are also problematic, as there is no clear relationship between the size or location of the 
criminal range and the distance it is from the offender's home,,141. 
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Similarly, Ainsworth contended that "if one takes Canter's Circle Theory we can see 
some of the difficulties which can be encountered. His theory relies on one being able to 
draw a circle around all of an offender's crimes. Given some of the arguments presented 
... , we must question how feasible this is. Not all crimes will be reported or recorded, and 
even those may be recorded inaccurately. Furthermore, in the real world of police 
investigation it will not be particularly easy to establish whether a series of crimes has 
been committed by the same individual" 142. The statistical analysis adopted by IP can 
only be useful if it is based on accurate data. 
Wilson et al were also highly critical of investigative psychology. They argued that: 
A weakness of Canter's work is that to date it does not 
necessarily offer anything new, although contributions from 
the field of environmental psychology do provide new 
avenues to explore. What it does do is encouch known 
criminological or psychological principles in ways that can 
be useful to the crime investigator. It utilizes the same factors 
as the FBI but places them firmly within psychological 
theory and methodology. It is not yet clear how well Canter's 
theories (especially circle theory) will be adapted for use in 
the United States with its higher rate of serial crime, its 
greater penchant for mobility, and its more vast urban 
. . . 143 
enVIronment In many regIOns. 
Muller did not agree with this criticism by Wilson et al. For Muller "this is probably a 
somewhat extreme view, as applying the application of psychological knowledge to 
criminal investigation potentially has great value. Canter has shown that the application 
of psychological principles and methodologies can, for example, help identify where the 
142 A' lllsworth, supra note 6, at 132. 
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I son, Lincoln and Kocsis, supra note 73, at 6. 
88 
offender might live and what his job might be (e.g., Godwin and Canter, 1997). It is very 
easy for those in academia to remain aloof and remote from the real world, yet this is an 
attempt to make some practical use of psychology by applying it to genuine social 
problems".144 Indeed, the statement by Wilson et al is an overreaction. As we mentioned 
earlier on, if any approach to offender profiling has the potential of being generally 
accepted as scientific, then it is the IP approach. As we can see from the above 
discussion, IP is based on psychological theories. Research in the field of psychology is 
peer reviewed and accepted. 
The mam difference between the FBI approach and the investigative psychology 
approach is that the FBI approach is mainly drawn from crime scene analysis while 
investigative psychology approach goes further with the application of psychological 
theories/principles . 
144 
... whilst sharing some characteristics with the FBI's approach it 
does differ in a number of ways. For example, Canter and 
Heritage used statistical analysis in order to establish connections 
between various elements in rape behaviour. Publication of their 
methods and techniques also allowed other researchers to 
examine their work. Based on this, those who wished to do so 
could replicate the study but perhaps varying the method slightly. 
They may, for example, use different type of statistical analysis 
in order to test whether the conclusions remained the same under 
such conditions. The point is that by disclosing their methods 
and findings in an appropriate journal, researchers such as Canter 
and Heritage allowed the academic community to scutinize their 
work and to comment upon it. One of the reasons why the FBI's 
work has come in for so much criticism is that such an 
opportunity has never been afforded those who might wish to test 
the reliability or validity of their claims. 145 
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In the final analysis, one can safely say that even though Canter's investigative 
psychology approach offers a more scientific basis to offender profiling (based on 
psychological principles, and the use of statistical analysis), it still does not provide a 
way of using the profiles to point to specific offenders. Nevertheless, Canter has made 
and is still continuing to make very important contributions to the understanding of the 
theory and practice of offender profiling. The main strength of investigative psychology 
approach lies in the attempts to predict the location of serial offenders, by analyzing the 
spatial distribution of offenses. 
Geographic Profiling 
Geographic profiling was developed in 1995 by D. Kim Rossmo, a former police officer 
with the Vancouver City Police Department. Rossmo sees geographic profiling as "a 
strategic information management system used in the investigation of serial violent 
crime,,146. He maintained that "this methodology was designed to help alleviate the 
problem of information overload that usually accompanies such cases", arguing that "by 
knowing the most probable area of offender residence, police agencies can more 
effectively utilize their limited resources, and a variety of investigative strategies have 
now been developed to maximize the utility of this process for unsolved cases".147 
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Drawing ideas from environmental psychology and investigative psychology, geographic 
profiling "focuses on the probable spatial behaviour of the offender within the context of 
the locations of, and the spatial relationships between the various crime sites.,,)48 
Geographic profiling uses a computer program to analyze crime scene locations in an 
attempt to predict the likely residence of the offender. This computerized program is 
known as Criminal Geographic Targeting (CGT). Rossmo believed that "by examining 
the spatial information associated with a series of crime sites, the CGT model produces a 
three-dimensional probability distribution termed a 'jeopardy surface', the 'height' of 
which at any point represents the likelihood of offender residence or workplace. The 
jeopardy surface is then superimposed on a street of the area of the crimes; such maps are 
termed 'geoprofiles' and use a range of colours to represent varying probabilities. A 
geoprofile can be thought of as a fingerprint of the offender's cognitive map,,)49. 
Geographic profiling is made up of two components - quantitative or objective and 
qualitative or subjective. "The subjective component of geographic profiling is based 
primarily on a reconstruction and interpretation of the offender's mental map") 50. 
Geographic profiling approach has been criticized on many grounds. Many scholars have 
argued that Geographic profiling is not an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis, for 
instance, argued that "one pertinent issue to consider is the likely efficacy of geographic 
148 
Id, at 161. 
149 
Id at 162. 
150 
Id, at 161. 
91 
profiling in contributing beyond what can be ascertained by common knowledge,,15l. 
Indeed geographic profiling seems to be more of an aid to the investigative psychology 
approach than an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis further maintained that 
"although geographic profiling as a technique appears potentially useful, it is perhaps 
best when supplemented by other investigatory measures that attempt to predict 
information that may assist in the detection and apprehension of an offender". 152 
Petherick contended that Rossmo "claimed that his profiling method requires a 
psychological profile before a geographic profile can be produced, yet he has been noted 
to have produced a geographic profile without a psychological profile,,153. As such "the 
result of ignoring important behavioral and case context and not utilizing fully drawn 
profiles is that geographic profiling does not, and cannot, differentiate between two or 
more offenders operating in the same geographic area,,154. 
Similarly, McGrath argued that "difficulties would include cases with a small number of 
known linked crimes and cases where linked crime scenes have not been identified or 
even discovered,,155. "Also, the underlying theories are mostly drawn from databases 
related to burglaries and other crimes that may not translate well to the serial murderer or 
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rapist, and these theories relate to overall crime patterns, not individual crimes or crime 
series. Research on the connection between spatial coordinates and offender and victim 
variables continues, but at present, geographic profiling is probably best viewed as an 
adjunct to criminal profiling and not as a profiling process in and of itself ,1 56. 
Geographic profiling is clearly a useful aid to crime investigation, but whether it qualifies 
as an approach on its own is a different matter. It does appear however, that geographic 
profiling is best construed as an aspect of the investigative psychology approach. 
Behavioral Evidence Analysis (BEA) 
Behavioral Evidence Analysis also known as the deductive method of criminal profiling 
was developed by Brent E. Turvey, an American forensic scientist. In 1999, and 
following his interview with Jerome Brudos, an American serial killer, Turvey noted that 
police case files differed from Brudo's own accounts, and therefore concluded that it is 
totally wrong to accept the premises on which the earlier profiling approaches based their 
profiles, and he came up with his new approach. Behavioral evidence analysis is 
primarily based on the availability of physical evidence. Turvey was very critical of the 
assumptions and inferences made by the other approaches (i.e. diagnostic evaluation, FBI 
approach and investigative psychology), and therefore argued that "a full forensic 
IS6 Id. 
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analysis must be perfonned on all available physical evidence before this type of 
fil ' b' ,,157 pro 1 mg can egm . 
Fundamentally, Turvey maintained that BEA produces a deductive criminal profile as 
opposed to an inductive one. For him, "a deductive criminal profile is a set of offender 
characteristics that are reasoned from the convergence of physical and behavioral-
evidence patterns within a crime or a series of related crimes. Pertinent physical evidence 
suggestive of behavior, victimology, and crime scene characteristics are included in the 
structure of a written profile to support any arguments regarding offender , 
I ~ 
characteristics" 158. On the other hand, Turvey sees an inductive criminal profile as "any 'I 
method that describes, or bases its inferences on the characteristics of a typical offender 
'I 
" I' 
type. This includes the employment of broad generalizations, statistical analysis, or 
intuition and experience" I 59. 
Turvey maintained that the infonnation used to argue a deductive criminal profile 
includes the following. 160 
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(1) Forensic and Behavioral Evidence (Equivocal Forensic Analysis) 
This involves the examination of any physical evidence that was gathered. It also 
includes an examination of victim and witness statements, crime scene photographs as 
well as crime scene reports. 
(2) Victimology 
This involves a detailed examination of background information about the victim. Here, 
the profiler should look at the victim's occupation, drug and alcohol use, hobbies, family, 
friends, and criminal records. It is believed that by studying the victim characteristics, 
that investigators and pro filers may have an idea as to the motives of the crime. Similarly, 
the risk assessment level of the victim should also be carried out. It is generally accepted 
that prostitutes, for instance, carry a very high risk assessment level. 
(3) Crime-scene characteristics 
Here the profiler examines the crime scene to try and establish such things as the time of 
attack, type of weapons used, method of gaining entry, type of location, and other crime 
scene features. Anything that the offender said or did during the attack should also be 
noted. The profiler should also try to ascertain whether the crime scene is staged. 161 Then 
the criminal profile is produced. 
Turvey further argued that deductive criminal profiling has two phases - investigative 
phase and the trial phase. "The investigative phase of criminal profiling generally 
161 
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involves behavioral analysis of the patterns of unknown offenders for known crimes,,162, 
while the trial phase "involves behavioral evidence analysis of known crimes for which 
there is a suspect or a defendant (sometimes a convicted defendant); this takes place in 
the preparation for both hearings and trials (criminal, penalty, and/or appeal phases of the 
trial are all appropriate times to use profiling technique" 163. 
This approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Kocsis maintained that "there are 
however, some significant limitations in describing BEA as a distinct approach to 
profiling as it does not appear to be informed by a discreet substantive body of original 
empirical research. Instead, what BEA offers in some respects is a fusion of previous 
criminological literature on various forms of violent crime, the forensic sciences and 
philosophical concepts related to modes of reasoning, most notably, inductive vs 
deductive reasoning. BEA seems to hypothesize that a method of analysis is possible, 
whereby crimes may be interpreted for the purpose of profiling by adopting deductive 
reasoning processes as opposed to inductive ones. Given our current understanding of 
how the human mind functions and cognitively processes information in a heterogeneous 
fashion, some inherent difficulties exist with such a hypothesis. 164 
There is still debate as to whether BEA can be properly seen as an approach on its own. 
The point however, remains that BEA still cannot point to a special offender being 
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responsible for a certain crime, and also has not established any scientific basis. Turvey 
even admitted this and he wrote: "any discipline that involves interpreting the multi-
dimensional nature of human behavior cannot be referred to as a hard science with a 
straight face. However, it does demonstrate that the deductive method of profiling can be 
informed by the same thinking strategies,,165. Finally, there is an over-reliance on the 
availability of physical evidence by BEA. 
Crime Action Profiling (CAP) 
In an analogous manner the research strands of CAP have 
studied both the behavioral patterns inherent to violent 
crimes (akin to psychology's study of mental disease) as 
well as the structure, processes, accuracy and skills 
related to constructing profiles (akin to the clinical 
practice of psychology). This is a distinguishing feature 
of CAP as other approaches to profiling have 
predominately focused solely on the study of offender 
typologies and have for the most part, largely ignored 
such issues related to the practical concept of 
constructing a profile. 166 
Crime Action Profiling was developed by Richard N. Kocsis, an Australian forensic 
psychologist. Based on his clinical knowledge and research literature, Kocsis maintained 
that profiling has its foundation in forensic psychology. "As a consequence, this 
conception of profiling assumes knowledge of human behavior and psychology such as 
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personality dynamics and human psychopathologies,,167. Kocsis claimed that he became 
fully involved in offender profiling when he was approached by the Australian Police to 
assist them in a high profile serial murder case. 
Crime action profiling, in the words of Kocsis "is used to describe and signify this 
process relating to the consideration of crime actions and the prediction, or profiling, of 
offender characteristics from those actions" 168 . Basically, crime action profiling tries to 
"examine offense behaviors independent of any inferred motivations,,169. 
In analyzing patterns of crime behaviors, CAP uses the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) 
method of statistical analysis. MDS is made up of various types and CAP uses the type 
called SYST AT. This approach also uses cluster analysis, conical correlation and 
mathematical formulae to "plot the orientation of the offender characteristic vector 
Crime action profiling is the newest 'approach' to offender profiling and as such not a lot 
of reviews and research has been carried out. Nevertheless, CAP has contributed to the 
efforts to find a scientific basis to offender profiling. 
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All the different approaches to offender profiling have their strengths and weaknesses, 
and it is only when they come together as a team that offender profiling will muster a 
scientific basis, gain general recognition in the various disciplines, and easily pass the 
Daubert legal admissibility test/standard. The greatest strength of the diagnostic 
evaluation approach lies in its ability to provide better explanations on the motivations 
underlying certain criminal actions. The FBI approach shows much strength in its various 
classification methods. The FBI's classification of offenders into organized and 
disorganized offenders and their classification of crime scenes and rapists have proved to 
be very useful. Investigative psychology's greatest strength is in its ability to apply 
psychological theories, and using statistical analysis, in trying to predict the residential 
location of serial offenders. 
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Chapter Three 
Expert Testimony: The Conflicting Rules and Standards 
Under virtually all evidence codes, trial courts must 
evaluate the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. 
The manner in which they accomplish this task, 
however, varies greatly among jurisdictions. This 
variability revolves around two basic aspects of the 
admissibility determination. The first concerns the 
nature and rigor of the legal test to be applied. Courts 
differ substantially in the ways they define the judge's 
role concerning scientific evidence, with some adopting 
an active role in screening the evidence and others 
taking little or no responsibility to check the evidence. 
The second concerns the criteria used to assess the 
expertise under whatever legal test is adopted. Some 
courts use criteria that call for deference to the 
professional opinion of experts from the respective 
field, where as others assume the responsibility 
themselves to evaluate the scientific basis of the 
proffered opinion.l?l 
The admissibility of any form of scientific evidence has always been problematic, full of 
controversy and inconsistencies. The introduction of scientific evidence into the 
courtroom can sway a case one way or the other. In fact, Peterson et al noted that "about 
one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific 
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their 
verdicts - from guilty to not guilty.,,172 The courts are fully aware of this and therefore, 
special rules have been adopted by many courts when deciding whether to admit or 
exclude any scientific evidence. New scientific techniques and fields of knowledge 
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emerge and the court must be satisfied, not only that the witness is qualified, but whether 
such evidence should be given. 173 In fact, "admitting unreliable, unproven data can be as 
prejudicial as excluding sound evidence that is merely unfamiliar to the courts and 
society in general. Distinguishing between sound and unreliable evidence is especially 
problematic given the rapid developments in scientific knowledge and the possible 
appearance to those not educated in the area that scientific results are infallible. To keep 
pace with such a progressive area, the courts must be dynamic in their approach and 
accept new developments in these specialized areas.,,174 
Many scholars have put forward the justifications for these special rules and admissibility 
hurdles that have to be overcome before presenting any scientific evidence. Friedland et 
aI, for instance, have given four justifications for these special hurdles as follows: (1) an 
"aura of infallibility" surrounded the evidence so that a jury was unlikely independently 
to evaluate, or to be skeptical of, its worth; (2) scientific evidence relies on such arcane 
information that it will be very difficult for jurors to evaluate its worth, even if they are 
not "overawed" by any view of science as infallible; therefore, jurors just won't try, it 
being easier simply to take the expert's word; (3) the evidence is so unfamiliar to the 
courts that judges will have difficulty guiding juries on how fairly to evaluate it; and (4) 
the evidence "invades the province of the jury in a particularly powerful way, such as lie-
detector test results determining for the jury who speaks "truth" and who does not".175 
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Frye v. United States 
In United States, the decision in Frye v. United States 176 (also known as the General 
Acceptance Rule) was the main rule that governed the admissibility of scientific evidence 
for seventy years (1923 - 1993). Frye is a 1923 decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a case that involved the admissibility of opinion 
evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test. 
In this case, the defendant, James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of the murder of Dr. 
Robert W. Brown, in the second degree. During the trial, the defendant sought to 
introduce testimony based on systolic blood pressure deception test. This is the early 
form of the polygraph lie-detector test. The systolic blood pressure deception test is based 
on the theory that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the 
utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood 
pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise 
produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises 
higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in 
the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the 
beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes as the examination proceeds.,,177 
It should be noted that before the trial, the defendant was subjected to this test and it 
showed that he was telling the truth when he denied that he committed the murder. He 
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therefore, prayed the court to accept the testimony of Dr. William Moulton Martson (the 
inventor of the test), which supported his plea of innocence. The government counsel 
raised an objection which was sustained. The defense counsel further offered to have Dr. 
Martson conduct a new test in the presence of the jury, the government counsel again 
raised an objection, which was also sustained. The trial court excluded the testimony. The 
defendant was convicted and he appealed. 
In their brief, counsel for the defendant, Richard V. Mattingly and Foster Wood, stated 
that: 
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled 
witnesses are admissible in evidence in those 
cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that 
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove 
capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for 
the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes 
of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous 
habit or experience or study of it, in order to 
acquire a knowledge of it. When the question 
involved does not lie within the range of common 
experience or common knowledge, but requires 
special experience or common knowledge, then 
the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular 
science, art, or trade to which the question relates 
d ' 'bl' 'd 178 are a mISSI e III eVI ence. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the 
testimony and held that "the systolic blood pressure deception has not yet gained such 
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as 
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, 
178 Id, 
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development, and experiments thus far made.,,179 Fundamentally, the court stated that 
scientific evidence is admissible if is generally accepted that the methods and principles 
underlying it had achieved widespread acceptance in the relevant discipline. Justice Van 
Orsdel, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses 
the line between the experimental and demonstrable 
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, 
the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs. 180 
The Court in Frye did not cite any authority in formulating the new rule. This decision 
raised several questions. What exactly was the "thing" that must be sufficiently 
established? What is the "relevant scientific community"? Who defines it? How do 
judges determine "general acceptance"? Does Frye require that general acceptance within 
the scientific community be established by disinterested scientists? 181 
The Frye test became the main rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence but 
courts and scholars battled with answers to the above questions. Starrs maintained that 
"the Frye court does not inform us in what way the expert testimony proffered in the trial 
court was defective. Surely it was unacceptable for lack of general acceptance. But what 
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precisely was not generally accepted? Was it the validity of the principle that deception is 
reflected in discernible changes in the blood pressure of the prevaricator? Or was it, 
rather, the validity of the systolic blood pressure test (the sphygmomanometer) to detect 
such alterations in blood pressure?,,182. 
Identifying what relevant community a technique falls also proved very problematic, and 
courts battled to arrive at an acceptable way. The identification of the discipline to which 
the "thing" falls is a very determinative factor in any trial involving scientific evidence. 
Thus, "if the relevant scientific field requirement is construed broadly, the Frye test acts 
as a formidable barrier to admissibility. In Cornet v. State,183 for example, the relevant 
scientific community for purposes of spectrograph (voiceprint) analysis was held to 
include engineers, linguists, and psychologists, as well as those who use voice 
spectrography for identification purposes. Because different disciplines do not share a 
common view of a particular scientific method, the burden of establishing general 
acceptance is undoubtedly onerous. Consequently, the broader the construction of the 
relevant scientific field, the less likely the party will be able to utilize the novel scientific 
evidence,,184. 
On a similar vein, Moenssens noted that "some courts have determined the proper field 
without difficulty, but other courts have had difficulty with this step of the analysis. 
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Occasionally, new techniques compound the problem by combining elements of several 
disciplines, with no discipline claiming the novel process as its own. An imaginative 
expert who develops a new technique may be considered radical by his conservative 
peers, who may reject the technique regardless of its validity. Alternatively, a discipline 
may accept a new technique simply because the technique promotes the overall 
objectives of the discipline. The discipline might accept the new technique, therefore, 
without requiring objective scientific validation of the underlying postulates.,,185 
Moenssens gave the example of sound spectrographic voice identification technique 
where there were arguments as to which field the technique should be generally accepted. 
Is it the field of radio communications, speech and audiology, fingerprint identification, 
or voice examination? 186 
As we mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals in Frye did not cite any authority or give 
any explanations/justifications for formulating the general acceptance rule. Other courts 
however, have defended the decision and offered some justifications. In fact, three major 
court rulings have justified Frye and stated the advantages of the rule. 
First, in United States v. Addison,187 the Court stated that the Frye test ensures that there 
exist a minimal reserve of experts who can examine the validity of any scientific 
evidence. The case involved two defendants - Roland Addison and Henry Raymond, who 
185 Andre A. Moenssens, "Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - An Alternative to the Frye Rule", 25 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 545, 548 (Summer 1984). 
186 
Id, at 549. 
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United States v. Addison, 498 F. 2d 741 (D.C eir. 1974). 
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were both convicted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
They were both convicted of assault with intent to kill while armed, and assault on a 
member of the police force with a dangerous weapon. Henry Raymond was additionally 
charged and convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon. 
During the trial, the government counsel proffered evidence of voice print analysis 
(spectrographic identification) that proved that the defendant, Raymond made the 
telephone call to which a police officer, Sergeant Wilkins was responding when he was 
shot. Lieutenant Ernest Nash, a voice technician at the Michigan State Police 
Department, gave expert testimony that the voice print analysis showed that Raymond 
made the call that led the police officer to the scene where he was shot. It should be noted 
that Raymond raised an objection to the order requiring him to submit his voice sample 
for analysis. He argued that the order violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. He 
also contended that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his 
counsel was denied adequate time to consider the new scientific technique and the 
associated novel issues. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in admitting the voice 
print analysis evidence. The Court also ruled, however, that the jury's judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error and therefore affirmed the conviction. The Court held 
that "spectrographic identification of defendant as maker of telephone call to which 
police officer was responding when shot was not sufficiently accepted by scientific 
community as a whole to form a basis for jury's determination of guilt or innocence, and 
107 
was inadmissible, but erroneous admission of testimony based on spectrogram did not 
fatally infect jury's verdict and did not require reversal, in light of overwhelming 
evidence of guilt.,,188 
Circuit Judge, McGowan, stated that the decision in Frye v. United States was "the 
standard by which questions of admissibility of expert testimony based on new methods 
of scientific measurements are to be resolved.,,189 The Court defended Frye and stated 
that: 
The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific 
community assures that those most qualified to assess the 
general validity of a scientific method will have the 
determinative voice. Additionally, the Frye test protects 
prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal 
reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the 
validity of a scientific determination in a particular case. 
Since scientific proof may in some instances assume a 
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of 
laymen, the ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally 
conversant with the mechanics and methods of a 
. I h . b' I 190 partlcu ar tec mque, may prove to e essentla . 
In People v. Kelly, 191 another case that involved voice print analysis, the Supreme Court 
of California also justified the decision in Frye, stating that the Frye test ensures 
uniformity of judicial decisions. The case involved Robert Emmett Kelly who was 
convicted of extortion by the Superior Court, Orange County, California. The extortion 
arose from several anonymous and threatening telephone calls that the defendant made to 
188 Id. 
189 
Id, at 743. 
190 
Id, at 744. 
191 




Terry Waskin. The police, with Waskin's consent, tape-recorded two of the telephone 
calls. A police informant later identified the defendant as the person whose voice was on 
the tapes. The defendant's voice examplar and the two tape recorded calls were sent to 
Lieutenant Ernest Nash, the voice print analysis technician at Michigan State Police 
Department for analysis. Lt. Nash concluded that the voices on the tapes were that of the 
defendant, and he was allowed to testify. The trial court ruled that voice print analysis has 
achieved sufficient scientific acceptance and therefore the expert's testimony was 
admissible. Kelly was convicted and he appealed. 
The defendant argued that (1) Lieutenant Nash, the VOIce print expert, failed to 
sufficiently establish that the technique has achieved general acceptance in the scientific 
community; (2) that Lt. Nash was not qualified as an expert, and, (3) that the procedure 
was not carried out in a fair and impartial manner. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of 
California stated that voice print analysis had not achieved general scientific acceptance 
as a reliable technique and that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. The Court 
therefore, reversed the judgment of conviction. The Court held that the "testimony by 
police officer who was head of voice identification unit for a state police force and who 
had extensive experience with voice print analysis was insufficient to establish that the 
voice print was generally regarded as reliable in the scientific community; and that error 
. d .. f h' h I ,,192 In a mISSIOn 0 t e testImony was not arm ess. 
192 Id. 
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The Supreme Court of California, in reversing the judgment also stated that, "we have 
expressly adopted the foregoing Frye test and California courts, when faced with a novel 
method of proof, have required a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new 
technique in the relevant scientific community. . .. we are satisfied that there is ample 
justification for the exercise of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of 
evidence developed by new scientific techniques.,,193 
The Court re-stated the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's 
decision in United States v. Addison194 and added that: 
Moreover, a beneficial consequence of the Frye test is 
that it may well promote a degree of uniformity of 
decision. Individual judges whose particular 
conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of a 
particular scientific evidence, may discover 
substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific 
community." 195 
Hence, "for all the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded by the wisdom of, and reaffirm 
our allegiance to, the Frye decision and the "general acceptance" rule which that case 
mandates." 196 
The third major case where a court justified the decision in Frye was in Reed v. State, 197 
where the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that Frye ensures judicial economy, by 
193 
rd, at 1244. 
194 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P. 2d 1244, 1245 (J 976). 
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avoiding the time-consuming examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In this 
case, the defendant James Reed was convicted of rape, unnatural and perverted sex acts, 
robbery, verbal threats, and unlawful use of telephone, by the Circuit Court, Montgomery 
County in Maryland. The facts of the case are that in September 1974, a woman was 
raped outside her home in Montgomery County, Maryland. She reported the rape to the 
police. The following day, she received a telephone call from a man saying that he was 
the person who raped her. She immediately called the police, and it was decided that her 
telephone calls should be tape-recorded in case the assailant called again. As the police 
predicted, the assailant called several times within three days. During one of the 
telephone calls, the assailant told the woman that he would like to have sexual intercourse 
with her again, but the woman said no, and offered to pay the assailant $1,000 dollars so 
that he can leave her alone. The assailant called again to accept the offer and instructed 
her to go and leave the money inside one of the lockers in the locker room of the 
Greyhound Bus Station in the District of Columbia. By this time, the police put the locker 
room under surveillance and when the assailant came to collect the money, he was 
arrested. 
DUring the trial, the defendant was ordered to submit a voice examplar, which was then 
sent to the voice identification unit at Michigan State Police Department for analysis. The 
defendant's voice examplar was compared to those recorded on the tapes, but the results 
were deemed inconclusive. The defendant was ordered to submit another voice examplar 
and the second voice print analysis showed that there is a match. The voice print expert 
Was allowed to testify in court identifying Reed as the person who made the calls. The 
III 
jury could not reach a decision after two and half days of deliberation, and a mistrial was 
declared. However, there was a retrial in March 1976 and Reed was convicted. The 
defendant appealed, arguing that the voice print analysis should not have been admitted 
because the technique is not generally accepted by the scientific community as being 
sufficiently reliable; and also that the second request for his voice examplar is a violation 
of the Best Evidence Rule. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded 
with directions. It was held that "testimony based on "voiceprints" or spectrograph is 
inadmissible in Maryland courts as evidence of voice identification because, at the 
present time, such technique has not reached the required standard of acceptance in the 
scientific community.,,198 The Court went on to justify the Frye test and stated that: 
Without the Frye test or something similar, the reliability of 
an experimental scientific technique is likely to become a 
central issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long 
as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific 
community over its reliability. Again and again, the 
examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses will 
be as protracted and time-consuming as it was at the trial in 
the instant case, and proceedings may well degenerate into 
trials of the technique itself. The Frye test is designed to 
forestall this difficulty as well. 199 
The Frye test standard has been adopted by many states. It should be noted however, that 




any policy justification for the general acceptance standard: the court merely mandated 
the standard as ipse dixit.,,200 
"Another asserted weakness of the Frye approach concerns the difficulty of ascertaining 
when a scientific proposition has been generally accepted. The test does not specify what 
proportion of experts constitute general acceptance. Courts have never required 
unanimity, and anything less than full consensus in science can quickly resemble 
substantial disagreement. In fact, the most rigorous fields with the healthiest scientific 
discourse might fail the Frye test with the greatest frequency. In light of the skeptical 
perspective of good scientific investigation, judges should be cautious when they 
approach a field in which there is too much agreement.,,201 
Moreover, the Frye test requires general acceptance in the 
particular field. But there are no standards defining which 
field to consult. Courts have had considerable difficulty 
assessing scientific information under this standard because 
it often extends into more than one academic or 
professional discipline. Furthermore, each field may 
contain subspecialities. This difficulty leads to paradoxical 
results. General acceptance, often criticized for being the 
most conservative test of admissibility, in practice can 
produce the most liberal standards of admission. The more 
narrowly a court defines the pertinent field, the more 
agreement it is likely to find. The general acceptance test 
thus degenerates into a process of deciding whose noses to 
count. The definition of the pertinent field can be over-
inclusive or under-inclusive. Because the pertinent field can 
200 Edward 1. Imwinkelried, "The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions", 42 Crim. Law Bulletin 5 
(March - April 2006). 
201 F . 
algman, Kaye., Saks. and Sanders, supra note 171, at 8. 
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be so readily manipulated, the test by itself grovides courts 
with little protection against shoddy science. 02 
Faigman et al further argued that "under the Frye variant, because the courts have to rely 
on the standards set within each field, they find themselves accepting more readily the 
offerings of less rigorous fields and less readily the offerings of more rigorous fields. 
Fields that set higher thresholds will place a smaller proportion of their knowledge over 
the threshold. ,,203 
Frye has also been criticized as being conservative. Frye appeared to exclude relevant 
and reliable expert evidence until it has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community. Maletskos and Spielman argued that "a literal reading of Frye v. United 
States would require that the courts always await the passing of a 'cultural lag' during 
which period the new method will have had sufficient time to diffuse through scientific 
discipline and create a requisite body of scientific opinion needed for acceptability. ,,204 
Faigman et al also argued that Frye "imposes a protracted waiting period that valid 
scientific evidence and techniques must endure before gaining legal acceptance.,,205 They 
argued that "this criticism highlights the fact that all significant scientific findings gestate 
before they are accepted by the general scientific community: During this time period 
202 Id 9 , at . 
203 
Id, at lO. 
204 Constantine J. Maletskos., and Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court, 
Law Enforcement Science and Technology, 957, 958 (S.A. Yefsky. Ed. 1967). 
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courts and the parties before them are deprived of this work. Moreover, many critics also 
note the "nature" of the scientific enterprise which sometimes responds negatively to 
revolutionary findings, because they might threaten entrenched "paradigms" and thus 
entrenched scientists. Proponents of this view observe that the opinions of a scientist 
heralded today as brilliant, but dismissed in his day as misguided or worse, would be 
excluded under a general acceptance test. Galileo, for example, or Einstein early in his 
career, would not have been allowed to testify because of the radical nature of his 
views. ,,206 
In a similar vein, Giannelli maintained that: 
206 Id. 
Frye envisions an evolutionary process leading to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. A novel 
technique must pass through an "experimental" stage 
in which it is scrutinized by the scientific community. 
Only after the technique has been tested successfully 
in this stage and has passed into the "demonstrable" 
stage will it receive judicial recognition. What is 
unique about the Frye opinion is the standard it 
establishes for distinguishing between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages. In contrast to 
the relevancy approach, it is not enough that a 
qualified expert, or even several experts, believes that 
a particular technique has entered the demonstrable 
stage; Frye imposes a special burden - the technique 
must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community. 207 
207 Paul C. Giannelli, "The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later", 80 Colum. L. Rev.1197, 1205 (1980). 
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A case in point is Coppolino v. State,208 where the Court of Appeals of Florida rejected 
the Frye test and was critical of the general acceptance rule. The defendant, Dr Carl 
Coppolino, an anesthesiologist, was charged with the murder of his wife Carmela 
Coppolino by poisoning. From the beginning, there was evidence showing that 
Coppolino had bought some quantity of a substance called succinylcholine chloride, 
about three months before the murder of his wife. During the trial, both the defense and 
prosecution offered medical and scientific witnesses regarding the cause of death. The 
expert witnesses for the State included Dr. Helpem (a pathologist), Dr. Umberger (a 
toxicologist), Dr. La Du, and Dr. Cleveland. In his testimony, Dr. Helpem said that his 
autopsy on the victim showed that she was in good health at the time of death. He also 
said that even though the autopsy was inconclusive as to the cause of death, that he found 
a needle injection tract in the left buttock of the deceased. He therefore, called Dr. 
Umberger to perform chemical analysis and tests on the body tissues. 
At the time of the trial, there were no known medical or scientific methods for detecting 
the substance (succinic acid) in body tissues, but Dr. Umberger used various procedures 
and was able for the first time in medical history to detect succinic acid in the body 
tissue. 
Dr. Umberger testified that he first performed a "general 
unknown" test which was designed to disclose the 
presence of certain drugs and poisons in the body tissue. 
The results of this "general unknown" test were negative. 
Dr Umberger then attempted to establish a method 
whereby he could determine if unusual amounts of the 
component parts of succinylcholine chloride were present 
in the body issue. Dr. Umberger testified that some of his 
tests and procedures were standard ones and that some 
208 
Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968). 
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were new. As a result of his tests Dr. Umberger reached 
the conclusion, so testified, that Carmela Co~polino 
received a toxic dose of succinylcholine chloride.2 9 
It should be noted that when Dr. Helpem was recalled, he testified that based on the 
autopsy and on Dr. Umberger's findings that he concluded that the victim died from an 
overdose of succinylcholine chloride. Dr. La Du also testified that he found a minute 
quantity of succinylcholine chloride at the needle injection tract on the victim's left 
buttocks, and therefore, was of the opinion that the victim died as a result of the 
succinylcholine chloride. Dr. Cleveland also testified that based on the negative findings 
in Dr. Helpem's autopsy report and the positive findings of Dr. Umberger, he was of the 
opinion that the victim died as a result of an overdose of succinylcholine chloride. 
It should also be noted that the State called Marjorie Farber to testify. She was Dr. Carl 
Coppolino's lover between 1962 and 1964 during which time the defendant was married 
to the victim. She testified that the defendant made certain incriminating statements 
regarding the death of his wife during the time they had an affair. The defense raised an 
objection but it was denied, and the testimony was admitted. The defendant called several 
expert witnesses who testified that it was "impossible by medical scientists to 
demonstrate the presence of succinylcholine chloride or its component parts in the body". 
The defendant was however, convicted and he appealed. The defendant argued among 
other things that: 
(1) The scientific tests performed by Dr. Umberger were unreliable and scientifically 
unacceptable, that their admission into evidence was error. 
209 
rd, at 69. 
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(2) The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on second and 
third degree murder and manslaughter. 
(3) The trial judge erred by admitting into evidence the testimony given by Marjorie 
Farber. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Second District, affirmed the trial court's 
judgment and held that the defendant had failed to show that the trial judge abused his 
discretion. It was also held that the trial court's instruction of the jury on the second and 
third degree murder and manslaughter was not an error because under the authority of 
Fla. Stat. Ch. 919.14, the jury was permitted to find defendant guilty of the degree 
charged or lesser degree. The Court however, held that the trial court erred by admitting 
the testimony given by Marjorie Farber. The Court stated that "we believe that the 
testimony in question was irrelevant to the proper issues of the case, that its sole effect 
was to attack the character of the accused and that the trial court erred by admitting it into 
evidence. However, the fact that an error was committed in admitting testimony does not 
automatically result in reversal, there must be a showing that such error was harmfully 
prejudiced. ,,21 0 
The Court of Appeal further stated that: 
210 
Id, at 72. 
The tests by which the medical examiner sought to 
determine whether death was caused by 
succinylcholine chloride were novel and devised 
specifically for this case. This does not render the 
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evidence inadmissible. Society need not tolerate 
homicide until there develops a body of medical 
literature about some particular lethal agent. The 
expert witnesses were examined and cross-examined 
at great length and the jury could either believe or 
doubt the prosecution's testimony as it chose.211 
The Frye test has also been criticized for leading to inconsistencies. Moenssens argued 
that "the Frye rule has different meanings for forensic scientists, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges. To forensic scientists and prosecutors, the Frye rule is an obstacle 
that often excludes evidence based on novel scientific techniques. Although the Frye rule 
also prevents the defendants' novel scientific evidence from reaching the jury, defense 
attorneys and the few forensic scientists who work with the defense bar see the rule as an 
ineffective barrier to unreliable prosecution evidence. The meaning of the Frye rule to 
judges is less clear. Many judges do not perceive the rule as a significant issue.,,212 
Another criticism leveled against the Frye test is its inflexibility, confusion of issues, and 
superfluity.213 McCormick argued that "procedures that operate within the framework of 
general relevancy and expert testimony rules offer a more meaningful and effective 
alternative. The values sought to be protected by Frye can be preserved without the cost 
of its disadvantages. Factors that directly address the merit of new scientific 
developments can be identified and delineated. They incorporate concepts that judges 
understand and routinely use. At the same time, the rules allow necessary flexibility by 
211 
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turning the decision on the characteristics of the evidence as well as the characteristics of 
the particular case. The relevant factors sharpen and define precise issues that should 
affect the admissibility decision.,,214 
It has also been argued that by focusing particularly on general acceptance, Frye obscures 
other critical problems in the use of a particular technique.215 Giannelli gave the 
admissibility of neutron activation analysis (NAA) as an example, arguing that "under the 
Frye courts have concentrated primarily on the general acceptance of NAA" and that 
"this approach tends to conceal the most critical aspects of NAA - whether, as 
interpreted, the results of the test are relevant to the issues in dispute.,,216 
Following the criticisms of the Frye test, some scholars have suggested alternative rules 
for admitting scientific evidence. Professor McCormick for instance, argued that the 
"relevancy test" is an appropriate standard. He maintained that: 
214 
Id,at916. 
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition upon 
the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but 
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. 
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a 
qualified expert witness should be received unless there 
are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative 
value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of 
prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise and 
undue consumption of time. On this footing the novelty 
and want of acceptance at that time of the lie-detector 
lessened the probative value of the test and probably 
heightened the danger of misleading the jury. If the courts 
had used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed 
215 G' Iannelli, supra note 207, at 1226. 
216 Id. 
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requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere 
imposed, they might have arrived at some practical way 
of utilizing a technique of investigation which has proved 
so fertile as a means of ascertaining truth.217 
Fundamentally, McCormick argued that any scientific evidence should be admitted if it is 
relevant to the facts of the case and if an expert testifies to its validity. Many scholars and 
courts were very critical of this suggestion. In fact, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Reed v. State218 addressed this suggestion from Professor McCormick. The Court stated 
that judges and jurors are not equipped to assess the reliability of scientific techniques 
when scientists disagree on the issue. The Court stated that: 
This view seems to us unacceptable. It fails to recognize 
that laymen should not on a case by case basis resolve a 
dispute in the scientific community concerning the validity 
of a new scientific technique. When the positions of the 
contending factions are fixed in the scientific community, it 
is evident that controversies will be resolved only by 
further scientific analysis, studies and experiments. Juries 
and judges, however, cannot experiment. If a judge or 
jurors have no foundation, either in their experience or in 
the accepted principles of scientists, on which they might 
base an informed judgment, they will be left to follow their 
fancy. Thus, courts should be properly reluctant to resolve 
the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to experiment 
but for science to do so," State v. Cary, supra, 99 N. J. 
Super. at 332, 239 A. 2d at 684?19 
Professor Richardson also called for the substitution of "general acceptance" by 
"substantial acceptance." "Is the basis of admissibility to be universal acceptance by 
217 Charles T. McConnick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 363 (1954). 
218 
Reedv. State, 283 Md. 371. A.2d 364 (1978). 
219 Id. 
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scientific thought? Is it to be general acceptance by science? Or is it to be substantial 
acceptance which gives a reliable degree of credibility?,,22o Many scholars are not in 
support of substituting "general acceptance with "substantial acceptance'. Murphy argued 
that substantial acceptance is not any less amorphous or difficult to define as general 
221 acceptance. 
The establishment of a "Science Court" has also been suggested by Dr. Arthur 
Kantrowitz, an American Scientist. He called for the establishment of a "Science Court" 
to screen any new scientific technique before it is introduced into the courtroom?22 The 
reasons for creating a science court are the "need for accurate information to serve as a 
basis for deciding basic policy questions,,223 and the need for an institution that will "limit 
to the power exercised by scientists.,,224 The science court will also "eliminate the 
opportunity for policymakers to hide policy decisions behind scientific conclusions,,,225 
as well as helping to ensure that "discredited claims should be identified, especially when 
they arise in the course of public debate. ,,226 
220 James R. Richardson, Modem Scientific Evidence: Civil and Criminal, 2nd ed, 24 (1974). 
221 
Murphy, supra note 184, at 967. 
222 Arthur Kantrowitz, "Controlling Technology Democratically", 63 AM. SCI. 505 (1975). 
223 James A. Martin, "The Proposed "Science Court", 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1058,1059 (1977). 
224 Id. 
225 Id, at 1060. 
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Professor Giannelli maintained that the advantages of such a panel of experts and 
tribunals are that the screening will be done by a group of scientists, that their evaluations 
would be carried out by a group of scientists who have no financial or professional 
interests in the technique, thereby solving the problem ofpartiality.227 
However, the creation of a science court has been described as time consuming and 
inconclusive. 228 Justice Bazelon supports the goals of a science court but finds some of 
the court's features worrying. He maintained that a science court will be time consuming, 
arguing that "a lengthy adversary proceeding, limited solely to factual issues, might well 
exaggerate the importance of those issues, and might tend to diminish the importance of 
the underlying value choices. A factual decision by a Science Court, surrounded by all 
the mystique of both science and the law, might well have enormous, and unwarranted, 
political impact.,,229 "Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me that all disputes among 
either could or should be "resolved." Experts usually disagree not so much about the 
objectively verifiable facts, but about the inferences that can be drawn from those facts. 
And they disagree precisely because it is impossible to say with certainty which of those 
. c 230 mlerences are "correct." 
227 Giannelli, supra note 207, at 1232. 
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In the final analysis, it should be noted that none of these suggested alternatives to Frye 
was adopted. It seems that the Frye test has come to stay. In fact, Frye remained the main 
rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence even after the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. As at today Frye is still the main admissibility rule in 
many states. It is also noteworthy to point out that Frye has been adopted by arguably all 
the highly litigious states like California, New York and Florida.231 
The Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Federal Rules of Evidence goes as far back as 1961 when Chief Justice Earl Warren 
appointed a Special Committee on Evidence, charged with the responsibility of finding 
out how feasible and desirable a uniform code of evidence will be for federal courts. In 
1962, the Special Committee recommended the adoption of federal rules of evidence. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren therefore, appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to draft 
the rules of evidence. In 1969, the first draft was published. A revised draft was also 
published in 1971. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that: 
Unlike prior procedural Rules, however, when the Supreme 
Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on 
November 20, 1972, questions were raised concerning the 
Court's authority to prescribe certain Rules. The Rules 
were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling 
231 For full details of all the states and the rules they have adopted, please see; David E. Berstein., and 
Jeffrey D. Jackson, "The Daubert Trilogy in the States", 44 Jurimetrics 351 (2004).351 - 366., Joseph R. 
Meaney, "From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?", 35 Jurimetrics J. 191 (1995) 191- 199., Heather 
G. Hamilton, "The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where do the States Stand?", 38 Jurimetrics 201 
(1998) 201 - 213. 
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authority granting the Supreme Court the power to 
prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure of 
federal courts, provided that such Rules did not "abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right". Critics closely 
scrutinized several of the Rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court in an effort to determine whether the Court 
had exceeded its authority under the Enabling Act by 
prescribing rules that were outside the scope of "practice 
and procedure". The debate over whether the Supreme 
Court had exceeded its power became moot, however, 
when Congress intervened in the process with legislation 
stipulating that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not 
take effect until they were expressly approved by Congress. 
While Congress thereafter revised the Supreme Court's 
version of the Rules in specific, isolated provisions, it did 
not reconstruct the design of the Rules. Its modifications 
were limited to the revision of the specific text of discreet 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the vast 
majority of the Supreme Court's version of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, as well as the integrity of the structure 
of the Rules, were left intact by Congress when the rules 
became effective on January 1975 ?32 
Congressional hearings took place between 1973 and 1974. The House of 
Representatives completed their hearings in February 1974 and the Senate in November 
1974. It was then sent to President Gerald Ford who signed the Rules into law on January 
2,1975. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect on July 1,1975. 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. 
Rule 702 states that:-
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
232 Glen Weissenberger, "The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence", 53 
Ohio St. L. J. 1307,1319 (1992). 
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by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise?33 
Rules 401, 402, 403, 703, 704 and 705 also affect the admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony. It is therefore, very important to cite them at length.
234 
Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence". "Relevant evidence" means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. ,,235 
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. 
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible.,,236 
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste 
of Time. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the Issues, 
233 Fed. R. Evid. 702 
234 These Rules are also very important to our subsequent discussions. 
235 . 
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misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an 
accused and admitted under Rule 404 (a)(2), evidence of the same trait of 
character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the alleged of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
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prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.,,237 
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. "The facts or data in the particular 
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences, upon the subject, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be 
admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury 
by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect.,,238 
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue. (a) "Except as provided in subdivision (b), 
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(c) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a 
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element 
237 Fed. R. Evid. 403 
238 F d R d e. . Evi . 703. 
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of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for 
the trier of fact alone. ,,239 
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion. "The expert may 
testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to 
the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any 
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.,,24o 
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 raised one key question - did the 
Federal Rules supersede the Frye test? This question was not addressed either in the 
Advisory Committee Notes, the Congressional Hearing Committee Reports or during the 
Congressional hearings. Trial courts were left to decide for themselves. Many courts 
continued with Frye, some adopted the new Federal Rules, and some combined the two 
rules. 
In United States v. Smith,241 for instance, the court continued with the Frye test while at 
the same time recognized the authority of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Delivering the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, Kanne said: "although the validity of the 
judge-made rule in Frye has been criticized by some courts and commentators for 
239 F d . e . R. EVld. 704. 
240 . 
Fed. R. EVld. 705 
241 United States v. Smith, 869 F. 2d 348 (th Cir. 1989). 
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numerous reasons, this circuit has continued to affirm (and to apply) the Frye 
d d 
,,242 
stan ar . 
In United States v. Downing,243 the court rejected Frye and adopted the new Federal 
Rules of Evidence. The Third Circuit Court stated that Frye was inconsistent with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence based upon the Rules' broad scope of relevance. In this case, 
the Court of Appeals, through Circuit Judge Becker, held that, "the balance of this section 
is devoted to a discussion of the perceived evidentiary problems posed by novel forms of 
scientific expertise, generally, and to an analysis of the test announced in Frye v. United 
States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as a way of dealing with those test problems. We 
conclude that the status of the Frye test under Rule 702 is somewhat uncertain, but reject 
that test for reasons of policy. In section 1 Y, we set forth an alternative standard for 
evaluating novel scientific evidence that we believe comports with the language and 
policy of Rule 702.,,244 "We reject the Frye test.,,245 
The Court of Appeals further stated that: 
242 rd, at 351. 
In sum, the Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has 
proved to be too malleable to provide the method for orderly 
and uniform decision-making envisioned by some of its 
proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form the general 
acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the 
spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of 
243 United States v, Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224, 1224 (3d Cir, 1985), 
244 rd, at 1232, 
245 rd, at 1233, 
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Evidence. For these reasons, we conclude that "general 
acceptance in the particular field to which [a scientific 
technique] belong," should be rejected as an independent 
controlling standard of admissibility. Accordingly, we hold 
that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific 
technique within the scientific community is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is, 
however, one factor that a district court normally should 
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon 
the technique.246 
In State v. Kersting,247 it was held that "scientific evidence which is not generally 
accepted may nevertheless be admitted if there is credible evidence on which the trial 
judge can rely in making the initial determination that the technique is reasonably 
reliable." The case involved Dennis Dean Kersting who was convicted of murder by the 
Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Oregon, and he appealed. At the trial, the State 
presented an expert who testified that certain hairs obtained from the defendant were 
indistinguishable from or similar to hairs found on the victim. The defendant argued that 
that this was irrelevant to the case. 
At the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued that the scientific techniques used by the 
State's expert were not generally accepted in the scientific community as being 
reasonably reliable, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting the expert's testimony. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated that "where judicial notice may not be 
taken properly because relatively new scientific techniques are involved, some 
foundation is required as a prerequisite to admission of such evidence; however, only 
246 
Id, at 1237. 
247 State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P. 2d 1095 (1981). 
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foundation required is that there be credible evidence on which the trial judge may make 
the initial determination that the technique is reasonably reliable and, if so, the evidence 
may be admitted and the weight to be given it is for the jury, who may consider evidence 
as to its reliability.,,248 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and 
granted review. 
The case reached the Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc, which affirmed the Court of 
Appeals' decision. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice Denecke, stated that "we 
granted review solely to consider one contention made by the defendant. That contention 
was that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the "reliability" test for the admission of 
scientific testimony rather than the standard that scientific testimony must be based upon 
methods generally accepted in the scientific community. Upon review of the record we 
find that we cannot reach this issue. ,,249 
The above case is quite in contrast to Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,250 where 
both the Frye test and Federal Rules of Evidence were combined. The case involved 
Rosemarie Christophersen (the surviving spouse of Albert Roy Christophersen, 
deceased), and Steven Roy Christophersen, who sued Allied-Signal Corporation, alleging 
that Albert Christophersen's death was as a result of exposure to fumes that contained 
particles of nickel and cadmium, which caused the small-cell cancer that led to his death 
in 1986. Albert Christophersen worked for fourteen consecutive years prior to his death, 
248 Id. 
249 
Id, at 1145. 
250 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F. 2d 1106 (5 th Cir. 1991). 
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for the corporation at their plant based in Waco, Texas, where nickel and cadmium 
batteries were produced. 
During the trial, the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony that exposure to cadmium and 
nickel fumes caused Albert's death. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' expert 
testimony did not meet the Frye test, because the expert did not follow the generally 
accepted methods in reaching his conclusion, and that the basis for the expert's opinion 
was insufficiently reliable. The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas excluded the expert testimony. The Court stated that the plaintiffs' expert 
testimony did not meet the Frye criteria and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. There was an appeal. The issue centered on the appropriate criteria for 
admitting expert testimony. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary 
judgment. The Court of Appeals in its ruling combined the Frye test and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. The Court stated that: 
"The Federal Rules of Evidence, combined with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C 
Cir. 1993), provide a framework for trial judges struggling with proffered expert 
testimony. The signals are not neatly cabined categories, and we disentangle them only to 
accent the independent significance of each. 
(1) whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion, Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are relied upon 
by other experts in the field, Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
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(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded methodology, 
Frye; and 
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the Frye test, 
whether under Fed. R. Evid. 403 the testimony's potential for unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value. 
These four signals or inquiries introduce no new concepts to our jurisprudence. They are 
only guideposts drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence and our cases. We list these 
inquiries, but in doing so we do not intend that they be applied mechanically. At the same 
time, they often will naturally lend themselves to sequential application. The reality is 
that trials are too varied for fixed mold; we construct none today.,,251 
The Federal Rules of Evidence was criticized. As we stated earlier on, the Rule did not 
mention the Frye general acceptance criteria. It did not state whether expert evidence 
must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence is also too loose, too liberal and less stringent than Frye. 
Rule 702, for instance states that an expert can be qualified by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education. This in effect means that almost anybody can qualify as 
an expert witness. 
Many scholars were also concerned about the appropriate interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Should the Rules be interpreted as a statute? Professor Weissenberger, 
251 
Id, at 1110. 
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for instance, argued that The Federal Rules of Evidence is not a statute. He maintained 
that: 
In actuality, the Federal Rules of Evidence have very little in 
common with a typical statute. Most fundamentally, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence originated in, and were designed by, 
the judicial branch and not the legislative branch. In addition, 
the role of Congress in the process that generated the Federal 
Rules of Evidence was largely passive. Congress's primary 
function was to enact into law the will and intent of the 
Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee. Moreover, the 
judicial branch designed the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within the 
federal judiciary, and consequently, the Rules' intended 
function is very much unlike that of most statutes. Based on all 
of these considerations, the primary thesis of this ... is that 
application of the doctrine of "legislative intent" is functionally 
and substantially misplaced in the interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 252 
Professor Weissenberger further argued that "contrary to the typical statutory enactment, 
however, the Federal Rules of Evidence were developed by a multibranch process in 
which the subjective intent of the drafters is predominately traceable to the judicial 
branch. In the case of most of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress's role was 
primarily to review and ratify the intent of a coordinate branch of government in its 
design of rules intended to operate internally within that branch. Only in isolated 
instances, did Congress actually modify the version of the Rules submitted to it by the 
Supreme Court.,,253 He contended that the "principle of legislative supremacy does not 
comport with the unique and extraordinary process which produced the Federal Rules of 
252 W . elssenberger, supra note 232, at 1307. 
253 
Id, at 1309. 
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Evidence",254 arguing that the Rules "were never intended to operate as a statute which 
would have plain meaning. Rather than being designed as specific mandates, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were consciously drawn with a recognition that the federal judiciary 
possess substantial inherent discretion in interpreting, expanding upon, and applying the 
Rules.,,255 
Fundamentally, Professor Weissenberger maintained that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
"should not be interpreted as a typical statute, but should rather be subject to a unique set 
of hermeneutics that reflects the Rules' identity as a codification of the common law.,,256 
"Ultimately, however, treating the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature will result in 
courts abdicating their time-honored role in crafting the law of evidence. If courts treat 
the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature, they will defer to the legislative branch as the 
arbiter of evidentiary policy when confronted with the inevitable indeterminacy of the 
text of the Rules. ,,257 
254 Id. 
255 Id, at 13 10. 
256 Glen Weissenberger, "The Elusive Identity of the Federal Rules of Evidence", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1613 (May 1999). 
257 Glen Weissenberger, "Evidence Myopia: The Failure to see the Federal Rules of Evidence as a 
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On the other hand, Professor Imwinkelried argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence is a 
statute and should be interpreted according to moderate textual principles of statutory 
. 258 I 'nk I . d . . d h constructIOn. mWl e ne mamtame t at: 
In most of the cases construing the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
a majority of the justices have adopted a moderate textual 
approach. On the one hand, the justices have rejected a strict 
textual approach that would allow a judge to consider extrinsic 
legislative history material only if the judge cannot discern a 
"plain meaning" on the face of the statute. Instead, the justices 
routinely consider extrinsic material such as the Advisory 
Committee Notes and relevant congressional committee 
reports. On the other hand, a majority of the justices also have 
abandoned the traditional "legal process" approach to statutory 
construction. Under that approach, a judge should not only 
consider the extrinsic material; more importantly, he or she 
should attach great weight to the material. The legal process 
approach often yields the conclusion that an intent expressed 
only in the extrinsic material trumps any apparent plain 
meaning of the statutory text. In contrast, textualists assign 
great primacy to the specific language of the statute. They 
argue that the text is "all that Congress enacts into law" and 
that the extrinsic material is subject to manipulation by special 
interest groups. Moderate textualists thus recognize a strong, 
albeit rebuttable, presumption that the text prevails over any 
contrary meaning suggested by the extrinsic material. I have 
written in defense of this brand of moderate textualism?59 
This argument amongst scholars as to the proper interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and whether the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test continued 
until the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 26o In Daubert,261 the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Rules 
258 Edward J. Imwinkelried, "Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be Conceived as a Perpetual 
Index Code: Blindness is Worse than Myopia.", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1595, 1596 (1999). 
259 Id. 
260 
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of Evidence is a statute. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun said: "we 
interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.,,262 
The Supreme Court also stated that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of 
E 'd 263 VI ence. 
It should be noted that on April 17, 2000, United States Chief Justice, William H. 
Rehnquist, wrote to the speaker of the United States House of Representatives proposing 
an amendment of Rule 702. Thus, on December 1, 2000, Rule 702 was amended and 
three crucial requirements were added:-
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 264 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Following the criticisms of Frye and the confusion on whether the Federal Rules of 
Evidence replaced Frye, The United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
262 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 Us. 579 S. Ct. 2794 (J 993). 
263 
Id, at 2793. 
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Pharmaceuticals,265 overturned the Frye test and stated that it had been superseded by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The facts of the case are that the petitioners, two minor 
children (Jason Daubert, Eric Schuller were born with severe birth defects) and their 
parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceutials Company, alleging that the birth defects were 
caused by the mothers' use of Bendictin, an anti-nausea drug marketed by the company. 
At the trial, the respondents offered expert testimony to prove that the use of Bendictin 
during pregnancy does not cause birth defects in humans. They called Dr. Steven H. 
Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist who testified that "he had reviewed all literature 
on Bendictin and human birth defects, more than thirty published studies involving over 
130,000 patients, and that none of them found any link between Bendictin and 
malformations in fetuses.,,266 Dr Lamm therefore, concluded that based on these, that the 
mothers's use of Bendictin during the first trimester of the pregnancy did not cause the 
birth defects. 
The petitioners on the other hand, called eight experts who testified and concluded that 
Bendictin can cause birth defects. Their experts included Dr. Shanna Helen Swan and Dr. 
Stuart A. Newman. The experts drew their conclusions from (1) "in vitro" (test tube), 
and "in vivo" (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendictin and 
malformations, (2) pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendictin which 
found similarities between the chemical structure of Bendictin and that of other 
SUbstances that cause birth defects, (3) they carried out a "reanalysis" of previously 
265 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 u.s. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). 
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published epidemiological (human statistical) studies, which also found a link between 
Bendictin and birth defects. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in their ruling, 
granted company's motion for summary judgment. The District Court stated that 
scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is 
"sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.,,267 
The Court held that the testimony given by the petitioners' expert witnesses did not meet 
the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert testimony. It 
was also held that expert opinion not based on epidemiological (human statistical) studies 
is not admissible to establish causation.268 "Thus, the animal-cell studies, live animal 
studies, and chemical-structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise 
by themselves a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Petitioners' 
epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously 
published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were 
ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer 
review.,,269 The District Court therefore, granted company's motion for summary 
judgment and the petitioners appealed. 
267 . Daubert v. Merrell Dow PharmaceutIcals, 727 F. Supp. 570, 572, (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
268 
Id, at 575. 
269 Id. 
140 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's 
decision and stated that "expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible 
unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific 
community. ,,270 The Court of Appeals also stated that expert opinion based on a 
methodology that diverges "significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized 
authorities in the field cannot be shown to be 'generally accepted as a reliable 
technique' . ,,271 
The Court of Appeals rejected the "reanalysis" of the epidemiological studies presented 
by the petitioners' experts and stated that "reanalysis is generally accepted by the 
scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in 
the field.,,272 In affirming the District Court's decision, the Court of Appeals further 
stated that the reanalyses was "unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review 
process and generated solely for use in litigation,,,273 and that the petitioners' experts 
provided insufficient foundation to prove that Bendictin caused the birth defects. 
The case reached the United States Supreme Court. Michael H. Gottesman, counsel for 
the petitioners, argued that Frye's "general acceptance" criteria has been superseded by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court in its ruling, agreed with the 
petitioners and stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye provide the standard 
270 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F. 2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991) 
271 rd, at 1130. 
272 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F. 2d 1128, 1131 (9th Or. 1991) 
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for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal tria1.274 The Supreme Court stated 
that Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.275 It was held that "nothing in the Rules as a whole or in the text and 
drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any 
indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' 
liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion 
testimony. ,,276 
The Supreme Court further stated that: 
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under 
Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make 
a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's 
underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid 
and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many 
considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the 
theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, 
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, 
its known or potential error rate and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and 
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a 
relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, 
and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge 
should also be mindful of other applicable Rules.277 
274 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 Us. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2792 (1993). 
275 Id, at 2793. 
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Justice Blackmun stated that trial judges have the function to act as "gatekeepers" and 
determine whether the testimony being presented is reliable and scientifically valid. On 
the issue of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence is a statute, the Supreme Court stated 
that, "we interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any 
statute. Rule 402 provides the baseline: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these 
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.,,278 
The Supreme Court went on to say that "given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their 
inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general 
acceptance", the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. 
Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific 
testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. ,,279 
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.28o 
278 Id, at 2794. 
279 Id. 
280 
Id, at 2799. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert has been criticized extensively. The opinion in 
Daubert created difficult burdens for trial judges, the opinion is still ambiguous, it did not 
address crucial questions, and did not provide specific guidelines to trial courts. Above 
all, it did not state whether the Daubert criteria also applied to nonscientific evidence. 
Under Daubert, trial judges became "gatekeepers" who have to decide what is a reliable 
or an unreliable scientific technique. As Justice Feldman has pointed out "judges are 
trained lawyers and only rarely trained scientists, which explains their failure to provide 
coherent guidelines on how to accomplish this task. ,,281 In fact, "the dilemma for the trial 
judge is how to separate the accurate, reliable testimony that aids the fact-finding process 
from the so-called "junk science" that contorts the fact-finding process. But whether 
Daubert does much to help is another challenge for the trial bench and bar.,,282 Justice 
Feldman further argued that "the impact of the Court's newly elaborated standard is 
unclear. Daubert could be viewed as something of a disappointment. The Court declared 
that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and thereby 
outwardly relaxed the standard for admission of scientific evidence. However, the fact 
that the four Daubert criteria are substantially similar to the factors commonly employed 
by those courts that applied Frye suggests that the practical impact of Daubert could be 
minimal and confusing. Indeed, one critic has predicted that the Daubert standard will 
suffer the same problems that critics directed at Frye.,,283 Justice Feldman therefore 
concluded that: 
281 Justice Martin L. C. Feldman, "May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?", 69 Tul. L. Rev. 793 (February 
1995). 
282 Id. 
283 Id, at 802. 
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At best, Daubert offers an awkward analytical model. 
The Court failed to provide trial judges with a well-
defined standard for separating unreliable scientific 
evidence from reliable scientific evidence. Perhaps none 
exists. Daubert specifically ruled out the general 
acceptance standard as a precondition of admissibility, 
but offered only "general observations" in return. The 
Court failed to clarify whether Daubert expands or 
contrasts the role of the trial judge in considering the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. After all, we all 
already knew that we are the "gatekeepers". Moreover, 
the Court sent conflicting signals to trial courts by 
abandoning Frye's general acceptance test, only to 
resurrect it as one consideration under the new 
standard. 284 
On a similar vein, Professor Milich maintained that Daubert "requires nonscientist trial 
judges to evaluate science in a way that may exceed their scientific abilities" and also that 
"it is too vague on the degree of reliability that the trial judges are supposed to be looking 
for. ,,285 
Professor Jonakait was also highly critical of the Daubert decision which he also 
described as being unclear. He contended that Daubert is based on unarticulated 
assumptions.286 "The opinion commands trial courts to determine whether something is 
"scientific", not whether it is physics, chemistry, biology, epidemiology, psychology, 
accidentology, clinical ecology, or forensic science. This can be done only if there are 
general standards and methods applicable to all fields of science that distinguish genuine 
284 
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science from pseudoscience. Furthennore, the court's command can only be followed if 
trial courts can understand those standards and use them to identify real science. These 
premises, however, were not stated. It would have been better if they had been to help 
insure that trial courts would begin their analyses at the proper starting point.,,287 
Professor Jonakait further argued that Daubert failed to address crucial questions; "for 
example, what if the error rate is unknown? Does it matter if it is ascertainable, but no 
one has bothered to ascertain it? What does it mean for the reliability of a scientific 
technique if its error rate is not knowable? If the error rate is known, does it matter? If the 
error rate is less than fifty percent does it satisfy a preponderance of the evidence notion 
of reliability? Or does the error rate have to be small enough to confonn to "scientific" 
notions of confidence? Is there a connection between error rates and the statistical tests 
that nonnally require scientists to reach a ninety-five percent confidence level?,,288 These 
questions and many more were left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Daubert. 
Professor Jonakait cautioned that courts should not reach a conclusion on a scientific 
method or technique simply because it has been peer reviewed or published, arguing that 
"peer review is hardly a perfect system - it is often less than demanding because 
scientists are busy or because of conflicts of interest.,,289 "Furthennore, strict scrutiny 
287 Id. 
288 Id, at 2106. 
289 Id, at 2111. 
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does not necessarily follow from the fact of publication. Too much scientific literature is 
published for scientists to scrutinize most of it.,,29o 
Polentz also maintained that Daubert is ambiguous and full of confusing contradictions. 
He argued that the "Daubert decision did not resolve how to correlate the Federal Rules 
of Evidence with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did Daubert ameliorate the 
conflict between the Frye test and the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, Daubert's 
ambiguity created new splits among the lower courts because of the potential for multiple 
interpretations of the decision. In short, the decision in Daubert is flawed, as it breeds 
confusion rather than clarity.,,291 
It has also been argued that "the Supreme Court provided only abstract, general guidance 
about how the lower courts should handle admissibility of scientific evidence under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court did not apply the general guidelines it outlined to 
the facts of the case. Instead, it chose to remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for a 
determination of whether the testimony was grounded on a reliable foundation and was 
relevant. ,,292 
Moenssens was also very critical of the Daubert decision. He argued that Daubert 
"rather than protecting the fact finding process from contamination by unreliable expert 
290 Id. 
291 Michael C. Polentz, "Post-Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony", 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1187, 
1202 (1996). 
292 Nancy S. Farrell, "Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A Mischievous 
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opinion, may have actually increased the likelihood of such contamination, especially in 
criminal cases.,,293 Moenssens contended that "the Supreme Court in Daubert did not see 
fit to create distinctions between proof in criminal versus civil cases, as far as reliability 
is concerned, even though literature and case law frequently cautioned that in criminal 
cases, where a person's freedom is at stake, courts ought to be more reluctant to admit 
evidence based on new, as yet unproven, techniques when such evidence is being offered 
by the prosecution. ,,294 He suggested extra judicial caution, and the reasons for extra 
judicial caution include the following - most witnesses are not truly scientists but are 
technicians, pro-prosecution bias may impair scientific impartiality, experts tend to testify 
beyond their expertise, experts prevaricate on their credentials, there are doubts as to the 
proficiency of crime laboratories, human errors which can result in reaching wrong 
I . h 295 conc USIOns, among ot er reasons. 
Some states rejected Daubert and continued with Frye. In People v. Leahy,296 for instance 
the Supreme Court of California rejected Daubert stating that Kell/ 97/Frye remained the 
standard for the admissibility of new scientific evidence. The case involved William 
Michael Leahy who was convicted by the Municipal Court, West Orange County Judicial 
District, of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with blood alcohol level in 
excess of 0.08 percent. On the day he was arrested, the police officer gave the defendant 
293 Andre A. Moenssens, "Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution", 84 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 4 (Spring 1993). 
294 Id. 
295 
Id, at 5-20. 
296 P h eople v. Leahy, 8 Ca1.4' 587, 882 P.2d 321 (1994). 
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some field sobriety tests, including the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) test. "An 
inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they turned from side to side (in other 
words, jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN".298 At the 
trial, the court admitted the HGN test without a Kelly/Frye hearing. The defendant was 
convicted and he appealed, arguing that the HGN test should not have been admitted 
without a Kelly/Frye hearing. 
At the Court of Appeals, the issue centered on whether HGN tests are admissible without 
a Kelly/Frye hearing. In their ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
judgment of conviction because the court failed to apply the Kelly/Frye standard. The 
Supreme Court of California granted review to decide whether the Kelly/Frye standard 
should be modified in view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert. 
Delivering the opmIOn of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas stated that "the 
Kelly/Frye formulation (or now more accurately, the Kelly formulation) should remain a 
prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony regarding new scientific methodology 
in this state. We further conclude, consistent with the Court of Appeal's conclusion 
herein, that the HGN test is a "new scientific technique" within the scope of Kelly, and 
that the trial court improperly admitted police testimony regarding that technique without 
first requiring compliance with Kelly".299 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "Daubert 
298 h 
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affords no compelling reason for abandoning Kelly in favor of the more "flexible" 
approach outlined in Daubert".30o 
The Supreme Court of California held that: 
In sum, Kelly sets forth the various reasons why the more 
"conservative" Frye approach to determining the reliability 
of expert testimony regarding scientific techniques represents 
an appropriate one. Daubert, which avoided the issue of 
Frye's "merits", presents no justification for reconsidering 
that aspect of our holding in Kelly. Thus, we conclude that 
the Kelly formulation survived Daubert in this state, and that 
none of the above described authorities critical of that 
formulation persuades us to reconsider or modify it at this 
time.30) 
Therefore, "our Kelly doctrine survived Daubert and continues to represent the standard 
by which new scientific techniques should be measured before evidence derived 
therefrom may be admitted in court.,,302 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "general 
acceptance" under Kelly means a consensus drawn from a typical cross-section of the 
relevant, qualified scientific community".303 
300 
Id, at 594. 
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner 
It should be noted that in General Electric v. JOiner,304 the United States Supreme Court 
restated the function of the trial judge to determine when to admit or exclude scientific 
evidence. It was held that the abuse-of-discretion is the proper standard for appellate 
review regarding trial court decisions on the admissibility of evidence. Robert Joiner, an 
electrician and his wife, sued General Electric and Westinghouse Electric, where Joiner 
worked, alleging that his lung cancer was "promoted" by his exposure to polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) and their derivatives - "furans" and "dioxins". PCBs are hazardous 
substances that were banned by Congress in 1978, with limited exceptions. 
Joiner called expert witnesses (Dr. Arnold Schecter and Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum), who 
testified that PCBs, furans and dioxins can "promote" lung cancer and therefore, 
concluded that Joiner's lung cancer was likely to have been caused by his exposure to 
PCBs at his workplace. The experts based their conclusions on the following. 
(1) studies that showed that an infant mice developed cancer after being injected with 
massive doses of PCBs. 
(2) an epidemiological study that involved workers who were exposed to PCBs at an 
Italian electrical plant. The study by Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori, Radice and 
Zocchetti (1987), found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-workers at the 
Italian plant were higher than expected. It should be noted however, that these 
304 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 u.s. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). 
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authors were unwilling to state that PCBs had caused the lung cancer in the ex-
workers. 
(3) an epidemiological study that involved ex-employees at Monsanto's PCB 
production plant in Sauget, Illinios. The authors of the study (J. Zack and D. 
Musch, 1979), also found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-employees were 
higher than expected. The authors noted however, that their finding was not 
statistically significant and so could not suggest a link between the increase in 
lung cancer deaths and exposure to PCBs. 
(4) an epidemiological study involving workers at a Norwegian Cable manufacturing 
company, who were exposed to mineral oil. The authors of the study -
(Ronneberg, Andersen and Skyberg (1988)), found a statistically significant 
increase in lung cancer in the workers, but the study did not mention PCBs. 
(5) an epidemiological study involving workers exposed to PCBs in Japan. The 
authors - (Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda and Hirohata 1987), found a statistically 
significant increase in lung cancer among the workers, but the workers were 
exposed to numerous potential carcinogens. The workers were also exposed to 
toxic rice oil. 
Based on the above studies, Joiner's expert witness, Dr Schecter testified that it is "more 
likely than not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking and 
PCB exposure.,,30S Dr. Teitelbaum also testified that Joiner's lung cancer was caused by 
305 
Id, at 518. 
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or contributed to a significant degree by his exposure to the substances at the plant where 
he worked. 
The petitioners on the other hand argued that the experts' conclusions were mere 
speculation, not supported by appropriate epidemiological studies, and was based on 
studies with laboratory animals. 
In its ruling, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
excluded the experts' testimony and stated that the animal studies that the experts relied 
on, did not support his contention that the PCBs promoted his small cell cancer. 306 The 
District Court stated that the study involving infant mice that was injected with highly 
concentrated and massive doses of PCBs was different from the case of Robert Joiner, 
who is an adult human, and who was only exposed to PCBs on a small scale. The Court 
also rejected the four epidemiological studies presented by Joiner's experts. It was held 
that the studies did not provide a sufficient basis for an expert's opinion, since the authors 
of the studies were unwilling to suggest a link between increases in lung cancer and 
exposure to PCBs. The Court stated that the third epidemiological study that involved 
workers who were exposed to mineral oil was not relevant to the case. Similarly, the 
District Court also rejected the fourth study that involved workers exposed to many 
carcinogens, plus PCBs. The study was not specific to PCBs. The Court therefore, 
granted summary judgment to the petitioners and stated that "there was no genuine issue 
as to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and his experts' testimony had 
306 
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failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer 
and was therefore inadmissible because it did not rise above "subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation. ,,307 
There was an appeal. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals308 reversed the judgment 
and ruled that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of the respondent's 
expert witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that "because the Federal Rules of Evidence 
governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly 
stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony.,,309 
The case reached the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine "what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's 
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert.,,3l0 The Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, said: "we hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard. We apply 
this standard and conclude that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion 
when it excluded certain proffered expert testimony.,,3ll Chief Justice Rehnquist further 
said that "we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of 
Joiner's experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent" review to that ruling, it 
307 
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failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion 
. ,,312 
reVIew. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that: 
Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus, 
of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on the conclusions that they generate." ... He claims 
that because the District Court's disagreement was with the 
conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the 
District Court committed legal error and was properly 
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and 
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. 
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. 
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence 
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of 
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too 
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered .... That is what the District Court did here, and 
we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 313 




Id, at 146. 
314 Id. 
We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper 
standard by which to review a district court's decision to 
admit or exclude scientific evidence. We further hold 
that, because it was within the District Court discretion to 
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied 
were not sufficient, whether individually or in 
combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner's 
exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their 
testimony. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of 
this entire case. 314 
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The Supreme Court therefore, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case for "proceedings consistent with this opinion.,,315 The Supreme 
Court's decision in this case has been criticized. Professor Giannelli, for instance, argued 
that the decision "seems to support the theme of liberal admissibility.,,316 "The Court 
ruled that the proper standard for reviewing a trial court's admissibility decision under 
Daubert was an abuse-of-discretion, a standard adopted without even considering the 
principal alternative standard: de novo review. This standard suggests that admissibility 
decisions would not be second guessed on appeal - i.e., giving the trial court more 
leeway in admitting evidence. In contrast, a de novo review standard would have given 
appellate courts more authority to control junk science. ,,317 
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael 
As we mentioned earlier on in this chapter, the Daubert decision was criticized on several 
issues. There was the unresolved issue of whether the Daubert criteria also applied to non 
scientific testimony. Thus, on March 23, 1999, the United States Supreme Court in the 
case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,318 stated that the function of trial judges to act as 
315 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 u.s. 136, 147 (1997 
316 Paul C. Giannelli, "Daubert Revisited", 41 No.3 Crim. Law Bulletin 5, (June 2005). 
317 Id. 
318 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 u.s. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). 
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"gatekeepers", reqUITIng an inquiry into both the relevance and reliability of expert 
testimony, "applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony.,,319 
On July 6, 1993, Patrick Carmichael was driving his minivan when the right rear tire on 
the van blew out and the van overturned. One passenger died while others sustained 
serious injuries. Carmichael and the others sued the tire manufacturer and distributor 
(collectively called Kumho Tire Co.), for the death and the injuries. They claimed that the 
tire failed because it was defective. They called a tire failure analyst, Dennis Carlson, Jr., 
who testified that he had examined the failed tire, and was of the opinion that a defect in 
the tire's manufacture or the design caused the tire to blowout. He said that his analysis 
of the failed tire showed that the tread of the tire separated from the steel-belted carcass, 
which means that the separation was caused by either a defect or from overdeflection, 
which is a type of tire abuse. Carlson based his conclusions on (1) a visual and tactile 
inspection of the failed tire, and (2) on his own theory that "in the absence of at least two 
of four specific, physical symptoms indicating tire abuse, the tire failure of the sort that 
occurred here was caused by a defect. ,,320 According to Carlson, "these symptoms include 
(a) tread wear on the tire's shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire's 
center, (b) signs of a "bead groove", where the beads have been pushed too hard against 
the bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim, (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of 
deterioration, such as discoloration, and/or (d) marks on the tire's rim flange.,,321 
319 Id 138 , at . 
320 Id, at 137. 
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During his testimony, Carlson noted that (1) the failed tire was made in 1988 and was 
installed before Carmichael bought the van in March 1993, (2) the Carmichaels had 
driven the van approximately 7,000 additional miles in the two months that he owned the 
van, and (3) that the tire tread had at least two punctures that had been repaired 
inadequatel y. 322 
Counsel for Kumho Tire Co., argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded 
because the methodology used by the expert in reaching his conclusion was unreliable. 
Kumho Tire Co. also argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 which requires expert testimony to be both relevant and reliable. They also 
argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Daubert criteria. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama,323 excluded the 
expert's testimony and granted summary judgment for defendants. In excluding the 
testimony, the District Court stated that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "imposes a 
special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is not only 
relevant but reliable. The District Court also recognized the fact that Daubert required 
trial judges to act as "gatekeepers" and should consider four factors when deciding 
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. In the Court's view, Carlson's testimony 
did not satisfy Daubert's four factors - testability, peer review and publication, error rate 
and general acceptance. 
322 
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The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the Daubert factors 
should be applied flexibly. The District Court granted their motion for reconsideration 
and agreed that "Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were simply 
illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility.,,324 The District 
Court however, affirmed its earlier decision, stating that it "found insufficient indications 
of the reliability of Carlson's methodology. ,,325 The plaintiffs appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded. The 
Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred as a matter of law in applying the 
Daubert standard. Following a de novo review of the District Court's decision to apply 
the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals stated that Daubert only applied to "scientific" 
testimony, and that Carlson's testimony was not scientific and therefore falls outside the 
scope of Daubert. 326 
The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed 
the Court of Appeals decision. The issue centered on whether the Daubert factors also 
applied to nonscientific expert testimony. The Supreme Court held that the District 
Court's decision to exclude Carlson's testimony was within its discretion and was lawful. 
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no reference to any articles or papers that 
validates Carlson's methodology. The Supreme Court stated that: 
324 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 u.s. 137 (1999). 
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The Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to 
"scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Rule 702 
does not distinguish between "scientific" knowledge and 
"technical" or "other specialized" knowledge, but makes 
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of 
expert testimony. It is the Rule's word "knowledge", not 
the words (like "scientific") that modify that word, that 
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Daubert 
referred only to "scientific" knowledge because that was 
the nature of the expertise there at issue. Neither is the 
evidentiary rationale underlying Daubert's "gatekeeping" 
determination limited to "scientific" knowledge. Rules 702 
and 703 grant all expert witnesses, not just "scientific" 
ones, testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on 
the assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable 
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. 
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for 
judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a 
"gatekeeping" obligation depended upon a distinction 
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other 
specialized" knowledge, since there is no clear line 
dividing the one from the others and no convincing need to 
make such distinctions. 327 
The Supreme Court further stated that a trial judge may consider one or more of the 
Daubert factors when deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. The 
Supreme Court therefore, held that "the Court of Appeals erred insofar as it ruled those 
factors out in such cases. In determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable, 
the trial court should consider the specific Daubert factors where they are reasonable 
measures of reliability.,,328 
327 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 Us. 137,138 (1999). 
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Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, also stated that "a court of 
appeals must apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it reviews a trial court's 
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.,,329 Justice Breyer further stated that: 
We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's 
holding that a trial judge may ask questions of the sort 
Daubert mentioned only where an expert "relies on the 
application of scientific principles", but not where an 
expert relies "on skill - or experience-based observation". 
We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that 
segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of 
questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal 
cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so 
definitive a match.
33o 
In a nutshell, the Supreme Court recognized the fact that not all the Daubert factors 
applied to all fonns of expert testimony; and that the Daubert factors did not constitute 
mandates but are flexible guidelines, and that trial judges must look at other factors 
bearing in mind the circumstances of each case. 
The Supreme Court's decision in this case has faced some criticisms. Professor 
Weissenberger, for instance, argued that "a closer examination of the reasoning m 
Kumho, however, reveals limits to the applicability of the more specific holdings m 
Daubert to non-scientific expert testimony. The court declined to limit the trial court's 
detennination of the reliability of expert testimony to the celebrated (or notorious, 
depending upon one's adversarial posture), list of factors set forth in Daubert, and the 
329 Id. 
330 Id, at 151. 
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court also stated that an application of those factors was not necessary in every case. 
After Kumho, it is clear that factors other than those listed in Daubert may be considered 
by trial courts in determining the reliability of proffered testimony, and certain Daubert 
factors may simply be inapplicable to certain kinds of expert testimony.,,33! 
In summary, this chapter has revealed the confusion, controversy and inconsistencies 
surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony. We have discussed the three main 
rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony, bringing out their various strengths 
and weaknesses. The Frye test emphasizes general acceptance of a technique in the 
relevant discipline. The Federal Rule of Evidence 702 emphasizes relevance and 
reliability of a technique. The Rule also stresses that a method or technique can be 
scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Rule 702 further stresses that 
if a method or technique can assist judges and jurors, then an expert qualified by 
knowledge, skill, experience or training should be allowed to give expert testimony. 
Daubert emphasizes relevance, reliability, and validity. Daubert stresses that trial judges 
have the function to act as "gatekeepers." Above all, Daubert also emphasizes that there 
are four factors that trial judges should be looking at when deciding to admit or exclude 
expert testimony (testability, peer review, error rate and general acceptance). In essence, 
this chapter has revealed the problems resulting from the adoption of the three rules. In 
the next chapter, we discuss the admissibility of offender profiling and the impact these 
three rules have on the trial outcome of cases involving offender profiling. 
331 Glen Weissenberger, Weissenberger's Federal Evidence: 2006 Courtroom Manual, 227 (2005). 
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Chapter Four 
Offender Profiling in the Courtroom 
Though courts have generally rejected testimony concerning 
profiling frankly so offered, they have often bent over 
backwards to admit profiling-based testimony, or testimony 
by profilers, when it could be labeled differently. 332 
Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique based on probabilities, stereotypes, 
suspicion and assumptions. It does not point to a specific offender as being responsible 
for a specific offense. Offender profiling only generalizes. As such it is not a method 
sufficiently reliable to prove the guilt or innocence of an accused. There are no questions 
as to the usefulness of offender profiling in crime investigations. Where there are 
question marks and problems are when it is being introduced into the courtroom as 
evidence. The reliability and validity of offender profiling cannot be ascertained at the 
moment by any objective method. 
The nature of offender profiling does not lend this technique to any form of reliable 
testing. There is the problem of replicating a crime scene. No one can state with certainty 
that one offender will commit all crimes in the same manner or exhibit the same 
characteristics at subsequent crimes. Offenders, especially serial offenders, will learn 
from experiences, media, from victim responses, and then may change their method of 
operation. They may also develop new fantasies; hence the signature aspects of their 
crime may change. 
332 R' 'd 4 3 ISlnger an Loop, supra note 3 , at 25 , 
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The current position in United States courts is that offender profiling and its derivatives 
have been admitted in many cases and also have been excluded in many others. There has 
been a lot of inconsistencies. Hence, in this chapter, the central problems of offender 
profiling evidence are discussed. In some of the cases where offender profiling or its 
derivatives were admitted, it is surprising that the reliability of this technique was never 
questioned. Some of the courts appeared to have been taken in by the credentials of the 
profilers at the expense of assessing the reliability and validity of this technique. The fact 
that a technique is useful in crime investigation does not render it a reliable tool for 
courtroom use. Utility does not equal/amount to reliability. 
Is Offender Profiling Impermissible Character Evidence? 
There are many problems with the introduction of offender profiling in the courtroom. 
The first relates to whether offender profiling constitutes impermissible character 
evidence. There is general disagreement amongst scholars and courts as to whether 
offender profiling is impermissible character evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 404 deals with character evidence and provides the guideline. Rule 405 and 406 also 
affects character evidence. It is therefore, important to cite the Rules at length. 
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Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other 
Crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or trait of character 
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. - In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if 
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an 
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of 
the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. - In a criminal case, and subject to the limitations 
imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim 
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. - Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 333 
Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
333 Fed. Evid. R. 404. 
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reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or trait of character of a 
person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be 
made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 334 
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether 
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove 
that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with the habit or routine practice. 335 
In general terms, offender profiling deals with the character traits of individuals. As such 
it is character evidence. However, whether it will be seen as permissible or impermissible 
character evidence largely depends on two things. First, for it to be admissible the 
defendant must first put his character at issue. If the prosecution offers character evidence 
before the defendant, it will be ruled inadmissible. Second, whether it will be ruled 
admissible or inadmissible also depends on the purpose of its introduction. By purpose, 
we mean - is it being introduced to show criminal intent, criminal propensity or is it 
simply to assist the fact-finders? It is generally permissible where it is being used to show 
criminal intent as opposed to where it is being offered to show criminal propensity. 
334 Fed. Evid. R. 405 
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Cleary et al maintained that "when the plaintiff or the government offers evidence that 
the defendant fits an incriminating profile, it may be excluded under the rule that 
prohibits evidence of character to show conduct on a particular occasion. Yet, arguably 
the rule should not bar admission in all such cases. After all, the rule rests on the premise 
that the marginal probative value of character evidence generally is low while the 
potential for distribution, time-consumption and prejudice is high. If it were shown that 
the profile was both valid and revealing - that it distinguishes between offenders and 
non-offenders with great accuracy - then the balance might favor admissibility. It is far 
from clear, however, that any existing profile is this powerful. ,,336 
Thus, "when the profile evidence is used defensively (to show good character, to restore 
credibility, or to prove apprehension in connection with a claim of self-defense), it falls 
under an exception to the rule against character evidence. Admissibility then should tum 
on the extent to which the expert testimony would assist the jury viewed in the light of 
the usual counterweights. The qualifications of the expert, the reliability and validity of 
using the profile, and the need for the evidence thus affect the admissibility and of course 
the weight of the profile evidence.,,337 
In State v. Haynes,338 the expert testimony of a criminal profiler was seen as 
impermissible character evidence, and therefore inadmissible. Richard Haynes was 
336 Edward W. Cleary., Kenneth S. Brown., George E. Dix., Ernest Gellhom., D.H. Kaye., Robert 
Meisenholder, E.F. Roberts., and John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, 3rd Edition, 635 (1984). 
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charged with murder and grand theft of a motor vehicle, and was convicted by the 
Common Pleas Court, County of Lorain, Ohio. Richard Haynes claimed that on October 
20, 1986, he went to Douglas Fauver's horne to fill out a job application form and was 
offered some drinks and some pills (speed). He claimed that at 11.30 pm he woke up 
from sleep and found out that he was still at Fauver's horne and that Fauver was sitting 
across from him, stark naked. 339 Fauver then told him that he had sexual intercourse with 
him and wanted to know if he enjoyed it. 340 Haynes said that he then went to the 
bathroom to clean up. Then Fauver carne at him with a small knife and they engaged in a 
fight. Haynes also stated that he stabbed Fauver twice in the chest and once in the back, 
after Fauver had cut his (Haynes) wrist. Haynes claimed that he then waited for two hours 
for the police to arrive, but they did not. He said that he thought the neighbors had called 
the police when they heard the noise during the fight. Haynes later used a stolen car to get 
away and was arrested in Arizona for another crime. It should be noted that Fauver died 
in his horne and his body was discovered the next day. 
At the trial, the State called Robert Walter, a psychologist and criminal pro filer, to testify 
in support of the State's argument that the murder was anger-retaliatory and "not a 
homophobic murder done out of panic after an unsolicited homosexual encounter.,,341 
The State believed and argued that the timing of the events, along with other factors, 
implied that Fauver's murder was anger-retaliatory.342 Walter testified that there is what 
339 Id. 
340 Id, at 1. 
341 Id, at 2. 
342 Id. 
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he called homophobic murder and anger-retaliatory murder and that each type has 
distinctive patterns. He stated that his analysis of the crime scene characteristics and 
reports revealed patterns consistent with anger-retaliatory murders. Therefore, he was of 
the opinion that the murder was not committed as a result of panic. Haynes claimed that 
he acted in self-defense and that the State "set up the theory of homophobic murder as a 
strawman argument and then set out to attack it.,,343 The expert's testimony was however, 
admitted. 
Haynes was convicted and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life for the murder and a 
consecutive term of two years for the theft. He appealed his conviction. The defendant 
argued that Walter's theory was not generally accepted and was not scientifically reliable 
and should not have been admitted. The defense also argued that the prejudicial effect of 
the expert testimony far outweighed its probative value. Furthermore, the defendant 
argued that "the State has overlooked the principle that unless scientific evidence and/or 
theory can be considered reliable, it cannot be of assistance to the trier of fact. ,,344 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District., Lorain County, ruled that the "admission 
of Walter's testimony conflicts with several evidentiary rules,,345 and therefore its 
admission was error. The Court did not see offender profiling as being reliable and stated 
that "although this testimony may indicate that profiles may be a reliable investigative 
343 rd. 
344 rd, at 3. 
345 rd, at 2. 
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tool, there is little indication in the record that they can be said to be reliable for the 
purposes for which they were used by the state in the instant case.,,346 
On the issue of whether the criminal profiling testimony assisted the trier of fact, the 
Court of Appeals stated that "the relevancy/admissibility analysis of novel scientific 
evidence also requires that the expert's testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact in issue. If the subject of the testimony is within the 
understanding of the jury, it is inadmissible. It appears that the main point made by expert 
testimony in the instant case was well within the understanding of the average juror, as 
demonstrated by the following colloquy on direct examination.,,347 
Delivering the judgment, Justice Cacioppo, stated that the expert testimony was more 
prejudicial than probative, and stated that: 
346 
Id, at 3. 
347 
Id, at 4. 
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The issues of timing and sudden panic are directly related 
to the distinction between voluntary manslaughter and 
murder. From the defendant's confession, a jury could 
decide for themselves that he did not kill Fauver 
immediately after discovering that he had been assaulted, 
but that a period of time had elapsed in which he could 
have "cooled off'. The use of expert testimony for this 
purpose was improper; the prejudicial impact outweighed 
probative value, as it tended to "sensationalize" the facts 
and issues.348 
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony relating to "timing and panic 
embraced the ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. ,,349 It was also held that 
the expert's testimony confused the issues and/or misled the jury, by setting up the 
strawman argument. 350 
Interestingly, the Court of Appeals also held that the admission of the expert testimony 
violated Evid. R. 404(A)(l), regarding character evidence. Justice Cacioppo stated that 
"in the instant case, Walter testified that the appellant's version of the killing and his 
subsequent actions were classically typical of an anger-retaliatory murder. In fact, Walter 
testified at great length and in great detail as to the traits and characteristics of such a type 
of murderer, and found that the appellant's actions and motivations matched that 
profile.,,351 Hence, "the possibility of stereotyping also brings up the possibility that 
admission of the expert testimony violated Evid.R. 404(A)(1).,,352 
The Court of Appeals further stated that since the defendant did not testify, he did not 
put his character in issue. 353 The Court also stated that "Walter's testimony on anger-








accused that matched the profile of a deliberate killer. The testimony therefore, can be 
considered inadmissible solely on the basis ofEvid.R. 404(A)(1).,,354 
The Court also held that the expert testimony was inadmissible based on the hearsay rule. 
Walter testified on cross-examination that he based his 
opinion on police reports, the autopsy report, and 
conversations with the prosecutor and the police. Only 
the autopsy report was admitted into evidence. "Pursuant 
to Evid.R. 703, an expert may not base his opinion on 
hearsay but must rely upon his own personal knowledge 
of facts and data submitted as evidence in the case." ... 
The conversations Walter had with the police and the 
prosecutor are clearly hearsay.355 
The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that "there exists a reasonable possibility that 
the admission of Walter's expert testimony contributed to the appellant's conviction, and 
therefore the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable.,,356 Haynes's conviction was 
therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
In State v. Roquemore,357 the opinion testimony of an offender profiler was ruled 
inadmissible. It was seen to be impermissible character evidence. The court stated that 
such testimony which stereotypes the defendant violates the Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(A)(1).358 The defendant, Dennis Roquemore was convicted of two counts of rape 
354 Id. 
355 Id 6 ,at . 
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and one count of involuntary manslaughter by the Franklin County Court of Common 
Pleas, Ohio. The defendant knew the victim (Yvonne Mathis) for ten years and they lived 
together for one year in 1990. Roquemore claimed that on September 1, 1990, they both 
went to a friend's house where they drank and socialized with other people and that on 
their way back to their home, Mathis was angry because of certain jokes at the friend's 
house. Roquemore claimed that later on he 'wrestled' with Mathis and they had 'rough' 
sexual intercourse, and that afterwards he noticed that Mathis was unconscious. He also 
claimed that "he attempted to revive her and then carried her into the bathroom and 
placed her in the bathtub to run water over her. He began to panic and left the house.,,359 
Roquemore further claimed that he then went to an ex-girlfriend's house but there was no 
answer. He therefore, telephoned her and told her what happened and she called the 
police. Roquemore said that the police went to the wrong house and he went to Alum 
Creek Reservoir to kill himself but he could not, and then he went back to the house and 
called the police. 
At the trial, the State argued that Roquemore raped Mathis and that Mathis died as a 
result of rape trauma. The State therefore, called a criminal profiler, Richard Walter, who 
testified that his review of the crime scene, the crime scene photographs, police reports 
and pathological reports showed that rape occurred. The main reason that the State called 
the profiler was to give testimony on the crime scene assessment which will bolster their 
argument that the defendant raped the victim and that the victim died as a result of heart 
stoppage from the rape trauma. Walter testified that the crime scene showed patterns of 
359 
Id, at 112. 
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violent rape behavior. In his testimony, Walter stated that the crime scene fell into 
patterns of known violent behavior that he had studied in the past. 360 It should be noted 
that during cross-examination, Walter was asked if he was going to give an opinion on 
whether rape occurred and he answered in the affirmative. 361 
The defense argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded. The defendant 
acknowledged that they had rough sex that night and that they have had rough sex in the 
past, and that he did not rape Mathis. The State argued that Walter'$ testimony should be 
admitted because he was testifying about the patterns of violent behavior that occurred, 
and not to the conduct of the defendant. The State further presented the medical 
examiner, who testified that Mathis's death was "related to the rectal and vaginal trauma 
that she had suffered and subsequent, due to pain, emotional disability from this 
abnormality, that she had sudden cardiac stoppage on the basis of a neurogenic response 
to the trauma that she suffered and this caused her heart to stop beating and she 
subsequently expired because it did not start beating again.,,362 The medical examiner 
further stated that "if the nerve response had not occurred, the injuries received by the 
victim would not have caused death.,,363 
The expert's testimony was admitted. The defendant was convicted and he appealed. 
Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the 
360 Id. 
361 
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profile testimony. He argued that the testimony was inadmissible because it violated 
Evid. R. 402, 403, and 703. Hence, he was denied due process of law. The defendant 
also argued that the profile testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, held that even though the 
expert's testimony was relevant, it ought to have been excluded because it violated other 
evidence rules. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Whiteside said: "the witness's 
testimony appears to be relevant, since it indicates a pattern of violence and makes the 
determination that a rape occurred more probable than without the evidence. However, 
even though the evidence may be relevant, it must be excluded, since it conflicts with 
other evidence rules which provide that it must be excluded. For example, excludable 
hearsay is inadmissible because it is relevant but unreliable.,,364 
Justice Whiteside went on to say that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "establishes the 
requirement that expert testimony is admissible only if it will assist the trier of fact. This 
means that the expert testimony must have both a sufficient basis and a sufficient factual 
foundation in the record that can reasonably be relied upon.,,365 Justice Whiteside 
therefore, ruled that "although the witness stated that the assessment is probability based, 
he does not keep files on all the cases he reviews (only approximately twenty-five percent 
of them), nor does he keep statistics about them. He stated that he used statistics from 
364 
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other sources, including the FBI, but there is no indication as to how he reaches his 
1 · ,,366 conc uSlOns. 
Hence, the Court of Appeals held that "in this case, there is a distinct possibility of 
stereotyping the defendant. The witness testified only concerning the "typical" crime 
scene pattern and the "typical" violence associated with such a crime scene. The witness 
did not interview or evaluate the defendant or "profile" a specific person. He profiles for 
a type of person who would do a particular crime that has been assessed as a member of 
that group. This stereotyping of the defendant has several problems. First, the 
stereotyping can prejudice the jury.,,367 The Court therefore, ruled that assuming aguendo 
that the testimony satisfied the relevancy requirement it must still be excluded if its 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. 368 The Court concluded 
that "these generalities and typical facts rather than specific facts tend to place the 
defendant into a stereotype. ,,369 
The Court of Appeals held that the profile testimony, which stereotypes the defendant 
violated Evid. R. 404 (a)(l) on character evidence. The Court of Appeals restated the fact 
that, "this rule does not allow the prosecution to procure testimony about character traits 
of the defendant unless the defendant first put his character in issue in the case. In this 
case, the witness discussed anger, revenge, hostility and difficulty in relationships with 
366 






women, all in relation to the motivational structure on which he classified this case. This 
type of character evidence is inadmissible at least unless the defendant has first put his 
character at issue and probably not even then.,,37o 
Justice Whiteside further stated that the profile testimony has to be excluded as it is in 
conflict with Evid. R. 703, which provides that "the facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or 
admitted in evidence at the hearing.,,371 Justice Whiteside said: 
In this case, the witness based his opinions on the crime 
scene photos, the police reports and the pathological 
report. When a direct opinion based solely on the police 
report was about to be given, the court instructed the jury 
not to accept or consider the opinion of this witness 
based on the police report in this case. This instruction is 
a curative one and we assume the jury followed the 
instruction. However, to the extent any other opinions of 
this witness, such as how he determined in which 
classification these events belonged, were based on the 
police report, these opinions are inadmissible based upon 
Evid. R. 703, since the police reports were not admissible 
. 'd 372 mto eVl ence. 
It was also held that "since the witness purported to base his opinion on his own "studies" 
rather than upon an accepted scientific basis, the opinion testimony is not admissible.,,373 
In the Court's view: "without the witness's testimony, the evidence admitted is far short 
of being overwhelming of defendant's guilt. It may be reasonable to find either that a 
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rape did or did not occur that evening, but it is for the jury to decide which version of the 
events to believe. The weight given to and the credibility of the witness are questions for 
the trier of fact to determine .... There exists a reasonable possibility, actual probability, 
that the witness's testimony contributed to the defendant's conviction, thereby 
prejudicing him. This prejudice affected a substantial right and the error is not harmless. 
Since admission of the opinion evidence was prejudicial error, defendant's first 
assignment of error is well taken.,,374 
The Court of Appeals therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. 
Offender profile evidence was also ruled to be impermissible character evidence in State 
v. Parkinson,375 where sex offender profile testimony by a psychologist, and by a former 
FBI agent, was ruled inadmissible. The experts offered expert opinion that the defendant 
did not fit the profile of a sex offender. Kelly Parkinson was charged and convicted of 
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. On March 28, 1992, Parkinson's niece, 
E.F. (13 years) and her brother, B.F. (12 years), visited Parkinson and spent the night at 
his house. The two children and their cousin slept in one of the bedrooms; E.F. slept in 
the bed, while her brother and her cousin slept on the floor. It was reported that Parkinson 
went into the bedroom where the three children were sleeping three times that night and 
each time he sexually abused E.F. E.F. said that first, she woke up and found Parkinson 
374 rd, at 117. 
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rubbing her buttocks. 376 About two hours later, Parkinson came back and was "rubbing 
her breast and pulling at her nightgown.,,377 That Parkinson came back around 6.30 am 
and again came to the bed and began rubbing her buttocks. E.F said that her brother B.F. 
was awaken and was stirring at what was happening and Parkinson then left the bedroom. 
E.F. then started crying and told her brother what happened that night. On March 31, 
1992, they told their mother what happened and she called the police. 
At the trial, Parkinson called two expert witnesses, Dr. Marcel Chappuis (a psychologist) 
and Mr. Peter M. Welch (a former FBI agent). The defendant sought to introduce the 
experts to testify that he did not fit the psychological profile of a sex offender, and 
therefore, would not have committed the crime. 
The trial judge denied the motion to introduce the testimony by the two experts. The trial 
court stated that; (1) the profile evidence was offered to bolster Parkinson's credibility 
and was thus impermissible because veracity is not a "fact in issue" subject to expert 
opinion; (2) the evidence at issue would not assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence; and (3) the expert opinion evidence would constitute a direct comment on the 
guilt or innocence of Parkinson and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,378 The 
trial court also stated that an adequate foundation had not been made for the admission of 
the testimony.379 
376 
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Parkinson was convicted by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison 
County, Idaho. He appealed. Among many issues, the defendant argued that the trial 
court erred by excluding the testimony by Dr. Chappuis and Mr. Welch. In its ruling, the 
Court of Appeals of Idaho stated that there was no error in the exclusion of the testimony 
by the two expert witnesses. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Lansing stated 
that "it was not error for a trial court to exclude from evidence testimony dealing with a 
scientific theory for which an adequate foundation has not been laid.,,38o The Court of 
Appeals held that there was no showing of the reliability of Dr. Chappuis' assessment 
technique sufficient to meet standards for admission of the testimony under Rule 702. 381 
"Dr Chappuis did not: describe the personality or psychological characteristics that made 
up the profile; describe the methodology by which the profile was derived; state whether 
or how the technique had been tested; describe the profile's level of accuracy in 
distinguishing between offenders and non-offenders; or state whether the profile and the 
assessment technique utilized by Dr. Chappuis had attracted widespread acceptance 
within the psychological community.,,382 On Agent Welch's testimony, Justice Lansing 
also stated that: 
380 Id. 
381 
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Mr. Welch's proffered testimony suffers from similar defects 
in foundation. Mr. Welch acknowledged that the F.B.I. sex 
offender profile which he utilized was developed for use by 
law enforcement officials and that its application was more 
of an art than science. He did not identify the components of 
the profile or explain how it was developed, other than 
noting that its development involved interviews with 
convicted sex offenders. Mr. Welch did not state whether or 
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how the resulting profile had been tested for accuracy or 
identify the technique's error rate. Although Mr. Welch 
testified that the profile is widely used in the law 
enforcement community, it is not apparent whether that use 
is primarily for devising profiles of perpetrators of unsolved 
crimes or for the purpose for which it was offered in the 
present case - to determine whether an accused identified by 
the alleged victim did in fact commit the crime. In short, Mr. 
Welch's testimony did not provide information from which it 
could reasonably be ascertained that the profile technique 
was trustworthy, that it was based upon valid scientific 
principles, or that it could properly be applied in the manner 
advocated by Parkinson. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Welch's testimony.383 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 
In Penson v. State,384 offender profiling testimony was also ruled to be impermissible 
character evidence. Allen Wayne Penson was charged with burglary and two counts of 
arson, for entering and setting fire to the Walker County Rescue Building and a vehicle. 
The prosecution stated that a person carrying a sandy-colored bag and fitting the 
description of the defendant was seen loitering near the building before the fire outbreak. 
When the police went to search Penson's house, which was about 500 feet from the scene 
of the arson, they found a sheet of notebook paper (which belonged to one of the 
members of the rescue building). This member identified the sheet and stated that it must 
have been taken by Penson at the time of the arson. A sandy-colored bag was also found 
at Penson's house. Penson also had cuts and scratches on his arm. 
383 Id. 
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At the trial, the State introduced a State fire investigator, Ken Palmer, who testified as an 
expert on arson. Palmer based his testimony on an FBI serial arsonist profile, titled 
"Record on Essential Findings of the Study of Serial Arsonists.,,385 "Palmer testified that 
serial arsonists share certain common characteristics including the following: white males 
between 18-27, loners, educational failures, homosexuals, or bisexuals, history of 
criminal activity, medical or mental problems, poor employment records, alcohol and 
drug abuse, and dysfunctional family backgrounds. According to the profile, serial 
arsonists are mainly walkers who set fires within two miles of their home and act on the 
spur of the moment, usually for revenge.,,386 
The defense raised an objection to this testimony. The defendant argued that the 
prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value. The defendant also 
contended that the testimony should be excluded because he was not charged as a serial 
arsonist and that the profile was not used during the investigation. The motion to exclude 
Palmer's testimony was denied. The trial judge however, instructed the State not to apply 
the profile to the defendant, and that the expert should not give an opinion that the 
defendant was a serial arsonist. 
Penson called two witnesses. Daphne Young, who testified that Penson was at her 
birthday party on the night of the arson. Jeffrey Cameron also testified that Penson was at 
his house after the party and was there when they heard the fire alarm. 
385 
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At the Walker Superior Court, Georgia, Penson was convicted of burglary and two counts 
of arson and he appealed. The defendant argued that the trial judge erred by admitting the 
FBI serial arsonist profile. The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that the trial court erred 
by admitting the serial arsonist profile. In the opinion delivered by Justice Harold R. 
Banke, it was held that the profile evidence was impermissible character evidence. Citing 
Sanders v. State, 387 Justice Banke stated that: 
Unless a defendant has placed his character in issue or 
has raised some defense which the profile is relevant to 
rebut, the state may not introduce character evidence 
showing a defendant's personality traits and personal 
history as its foundation for demonstrating the defendant 
has the characteristics of a typical arsonist." ... In this 
case, the profile did not rebut Penson's alibi defense that 
he was attending a birthday party at the time the fire 
originated or aid the jury in determining whether Penson 
was at the birthday on the night of the fire. Nor had 
Penson placed his character in issue. 388 
Justice Banke further stated that "the trial court's directive to the State that it not apply 
the serial arsonist profile to Penson was meaningless given the State's extensive 
exploration of Penson's personal history and personality traits and the State's transparent 
efforts to subtly correlate this information to the serial arsonist profile. Even before the 
State's expert testified, the prosecutor acknowledged that certain seemingly irrelevant 
exhibits would later become relevant in light of the profile. The admission of the serial 
arsonist profile was plainly error, and Penson's conviction must be reversed unless it was 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.,,389 
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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Justice Banke 
stated that they were "unable to conclude that it is highly probable that the profile 
evidence did not contribute to the verdict.,,39o 
One thing about this case is that the prosecution did not have overwhelming evidence to 
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision to reverse the trial court's 
judgment was warranted. 
Finally, it should be noted that many states have statutes that provides additional 
guidelines on the use of character evidence in cases involving sexual offenses. For 
instance, the California Evidence Code provides that: 
390 
(a) Except as provided in this section and in sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an 
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his of her 
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified 
occasIOn. 
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person 
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact 
(such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an 
unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in 
Id, at 107. 
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good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to 
commit such an act. 
(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or 
attack the credibility of a witness.391 
Who is Qualified to give Expert Offender Profiling Testimony? 
As we mentioned in chapter two, offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice. 
Profilers come from different backgrounds, different academic areas, with varying 
degrees of experience and knowledge. Hence, there is general disagreement amongst 
scholars as to who is qualified to give offender profiling testimony. Ultimately, it is the 
judge who decides who is qualified to give evidence. In United States, the Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 provides the guideline for the trial judges. Rule 702 states that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and method 
reliably to the facts of the case. 392 
The problems with this Rule have been discussed in the previous chapter. The main 
problem being the fact that the rule is too loose that almost everybody can qualify as an 
391 CAL. EVID. CODE s 1101 (West. Supp. 1992). 
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expert, either by knowledge, skill, expenence, training, or education. There is no 
acceptable professional body for profilers. This is as a result of the uneasy relationship 
amongst profilers. Each segment thinks that offender profiling is their exclusive club. 
Hence, it has been difficult for the different segments to come together as one and move 
the field forward. Hence, the difficulty with establishing a professional body that will be 
acceptable by all the different segments. 
There are two issues to be borne in mind when discussing the question of who is qualified 
to give expert profiling testimony. The first is the fact that offender profiling is a multi-
disciplinary practice that cuts across many disciplines. The second is the fact that the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has created a huge dilemma for trial judges. As trial 
judges have been given the ultimate responsibility to decide who is qualified as an expert 
testimony, we need to assist them in making that difficult decision. Allowing an 
unqualified expert to give testimony will/may result in a reversal, plus other dangers 
associated with that. Therefore, it is important to get it right from the onset. 
Brunson v. State393 is one of the cases that highlight the problem with admitting expert 
testimony by an unqualified expert. This case also highlights the need to assist trial 
judges in this regard. Furthennore, this case clearly reveals and supports my argument 
that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is too loose, too liberal. In this case, the defendant, 
Larry Darnell Brunson was charged with two counts of first-degree murder of his wife 
(Gloria Brunson) and her lover (Frankie Shaw) in 1999. The State presented several 
393 
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witnesses - Gloria's children, law enforcement officers, Gloria's friends and co-workers. 
The State also presented Barbara Ann Neiss, who was qualified by the trial court as an 
expert on predictability that a batterer would become a murderer. 394 During her 
testimony, Neiss stated that she is an expert on profiling batterers and can determine 
when they are likely to tum into murderers. She testified that there are ten risk 
factors/characteristics of these sorts of individuals. "She stated that she had taken the ten 
risk factors from the work of a police officer, Anne O'Dell, who surveyed 70,000 cases 
and assembled what she thought were ten warning signs that a domestic-violence 
offender would commit murder.,,395 The article by Ms. O'Dell was entitled "Assessing 
Whether Batterers Will Kill." Ms. Neiss used a three page summary of this article 
prepared by an attorney, Barbara Hart, and obtained from an internet, in used it in her 
testimony.396 Ms. Neiss testified that if more than three of the factors are met, then there 
is an "incredible duty" to warn a woman of the threat to her safety.397 According to Neiss, 
the ten risk factors are as follows: 
(1) Threats of homicide against his spouse or children or threats of suicide. 
(2) Fantasies of homicide or suicide. 
(3) Depression. 
(4) Access to weapons. 
(5) Obsessive behavior about his wife or family. 
(6) Centrality of the battered woman to the batterer's life. 
394 Id. 




(7) Rage against the battered woman. 
(8) Drug or alcohol consumption 
(9) Abuse of the battered woman's pet animal. 
(10) Access to the battered woman.398 
Neiss gave her qualifications as: 
(1) A bachelor's degree in political science and journalism. 
(2) A master's degree in public administration. 
(3) Studying for a second master's degree in social work. 
(4) Have attended several seminars on domestic violence. 
(5) Worked for one year with the Arkansas Commission on Child Abuse, Rape and 
Domestic Violence. 
(6) Almost three years employment as an Executive Director for Advocates for 
Battered Women. 
(7) Ten years voluntary work with the Battered Women's Shelter. 
(8) Worked at a Mediation Center for battered women and their husbands. 
(9) Other work experiences in the domestic violence center. 
(10) That she had testified once in a circuit court, several times in a chancery court in 
f . d b 399 support 0 protectIve or ers, ut not as an expert. 
398 Id, at 307. 
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Neiss testified that her analysis showed that the defendant met eight of these ten risk 
factors. The defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony, arguing 
that (1) Ms. Neiss was not qualified to render an opinion that he has the 
characteristics of batterers who may eventually kill, (2) that the testimony embraced 
the ultimate issue, and (3) that the testimony was unduly prejudicial. 
In his ruling, Justice Berlin C. Jones, for the Circuit Court, Jefferson County, 
Arkansas, qualified Ms. Neiss as an expert, and stated that "she was qualified under 
Ark.R.Evid. 702, because she possessed specialized knowledge that would assist the 
jury in understanding the evidence in this case.,,400 Neiss's testimony was admitted. 
The defendant was convicted for the murders and sentenced to two terms of life 
imprisonment. 
The case reached the Supreme Court of Arkansas, where the defendant argued that 
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Neiss's testimony as an expert. That 
the testimony placed him within the characteristics ofbatterers who kill, and therefore 
it was unduly prejudicial. The defendant also argued that the testimony fell into the 
ultimate issue. 
Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Justice Robert L. Brown, 
agreed with the defendant that Neiss was not qualified to render an expert opinion on 
the predictability that a batterer will become a murderer. Justice Brown said: 
400 Id. 
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The State responds that Ms. Neiss's testimony was 
helpful to the jury and thus, it qualifies as expert 
testimony. Yet, in doing so the State only addresses one 
facet of Rule 702 and never squarely addresses the other 
facet of whether Ms. Neiss was qualified by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education to give an 
opinion that was helpful to the jury. The problem we see 
with the State's argument is that testimony may be 
helpful to a jury but still may be properly excluded if that 
testimony is offered by a person who is not qualified to 
render the opinion. The trial court, in its ruling, appears 
to have similarly conflated the issue of a person's 
qualifications and the "helpfulness of the testimony".401 
The Supreme Court, citing its prior decision in Dillion v. State,402 reiterated the fact 
that "while a proffered expert's experience might have been beyond that of persons 
who had no experience at all in the general area to which he would testify, it was not 
error to refuse to qualify him as an expert when his knowledge was below the 
standards of most recognized experts in the subject field.,,403 
The Supreme Court also stated that: 
We have no doubt that predicting human behavior, and 
specifically whether a person has a proclivity to murder 
based on certain risk factors, requires a highly 
specialized psychological expertise. Ms. Neiss, while a 
bona fide expert on domestic abuse, exceeded her 
expertise by profiling batterers who kill and by 
conveying to the jury that Brunson fell within that 
profile. A case in point of Ms. Neiss testifying far 
beyond her range of expertise was her conclusion that 
Brunson suffered from depression - one of the ten risk 
factors. Ms. Neiss did not possess the necessary 
401 Id, at 310. 
402 Dillion v. State, 317 Ark. 384, 394, 877 S. W 2d. 915, 920 (1994). 
403 
Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 310, 79 S. W 3d 304 (2002). 
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psychiatric background to render such a diagnosis. The 
trial court abused its discretion in qualifying her to so 
testify.404 
The Supreme Court further ruled that Neiss's testimony violated Rule 403 of the 
Arkansas Rules of Evidence because its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative 
value, and also fell on the ultimate issue.405 
Justice Brown stated that "we believe that her testimony both mandated a conclusion 
and was unduly prejudicial. After a description of each one of the ten risk factors 
Mrs. Neiss borrowed from the article by Ms. O'Dell, the prosecutor elicited an 
opinion from her regarding whether she thought that Brunson met the factors in this 
case. For eight of the ten factors, Ms. Neiss answered affirmatively.,,406 "It is true that 
the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Neiss specifically whether Brunson killed the victims. 
Nevertheless, her profile about abusers-turned-murderers and Brunson in particular 
placed Brunson squarely in the murderer category. This is particularly concerning, 
since the State's only proof in this case was circumstantial and its theory centered 
around Brunson's history of domestic abuse and his motive to kill an unfaithful wife 
and her lover. Ms. Neiss's testimony, in effect, was clear indication to the jury that 
Brunson was the culprit.,,407 
404 Id. 
405 





In reversing the judgment and conviction, the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded 
that "the profiling of batterers likely to become killers and then placing Brunson 
within that category was unduly prejudicial to his case and, thus violated Rule 
403.,,408 
The above case has highlighted the problem that arises when profilers testify beyond 
their expertise. This is because offender profiling is not well understood by many 
people including judges. This is compounded by the fact that many criminal profilers 
have what Professor Risinger and Loop described as "intimidating credentials from 
the F.B.I.,,409 Judges and Jurors seem to be seduced by impressive qualifications. The 
reliability of such testimony is thereby overlooked. Judges therefore, need 
assistance/further guidelines when deciding to qualify a criminal profiler as an expert. 
Professor Risinger and Loop have suggested that a pro filer with intimidating 
credentials should "not be allowed to reveal his "pro filer credentials" to the jury 
beyond saying that he had worked for many years for the FBI (or other organization) 
as a specialist in the investigation of sexually driven crimes like rape and sexual 
homicide, and that in the course of his career, both through research and through 
involvement in actual cases, he or she had seen the details of many cases.,,410 Risinger 
and Loop also maintained that "such a witness would only testify in regard to 
Id, at 315. 
409 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 257. 
410 
Id, at 284. 
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characteristics which In his expenence were truly rare In the type of crime 
involved.,,411 
In deciding whether an expert is qualified to give offender profiling testimony, it is 
submitted that trial judges should first examine closely the purpose why the expert is 
being called. From there the judge will have better idea as to whether such expert is 
qualified in the area, assuming the testimony is relevant, and will assist the trier of 
fact. For example, if an expert is needed on crime scene characteristics, or on modus 
operandi, then a profiler with law enforcement background will be the best qualified 
person in this area. If expert testimony is needed to show elements of motives and 
fantasies, especially in sexual offenses, a forensic psychologist or a clinical 
psychiatrist will be better placedlbest qualified to give testimony in this area. A 
forensic psychiatrist, forensic psychologist or a criminologist is also better qualified 
to give expert testimony on victimology. Similarly, a profiler with forensic science 
background will be better placed to testify in cases where there were physical traces 
and inferences can be drawn from them. However, as we suggested in chapter two, a 
profiling team made up of the different segments provides the best alternative. In fact 
this was the case in the early days when DNA profiling was being introduced into the 
courtroom. Many experts, including geneticists, microbiologists, statisticians, 
biologists, all came together, and courts began to accept DNA. 
It is submitted that in all cases where offender profiling testimony is involved, the 
trial judge should give a jury directive. The trial judge should inform the jury about 
411 Id. 
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the level of reliability and validity of offender profiling. This will assist them in 
determining the weight (if any) to be accorded to the testimony. 
Is Offender Profiling too Prejudicial than Probative? 
As we mentioned earlier on, offender profiling is a technique based on probability, 
suspicion, assumption and stereotypes. Stereotyping in particular creates prejudice. 
Offender profiling involves creating a list of characteristics or character traits and 
then an individual is placed within that category. This invariably leads judges and 
jurors into reaching a certain conclusion. Hence, the prejudicial effect usually 
outweighs its probative value. 
Indeed as Professor Ormerod has pointed out, "profile evidence generates great 
prejudice for the accused who possesses the stated characteristics, yet it is 
insufficiently probative to point to the accused as being the guilty man rather than 
someone who has the characteristics of the perpetrator.,,412 Professor Ormerod further 
argued that: 
This clear potential to generate great prejudice triggers 
some familiar alarm bells. Jurors could choose to convict 
a defendant who is a paedophile for that reason alone. 
They may assign a disproportionate weight to the 
evidence of the paedophilia, or deny the accused the 
benefit of the doubt and convict on less than the full 
standard of proof. There is also a very real and even 
412 David C. Ormerod, "The Evidential Implications of Psychological Profiling", Crim. L. Rev. 873 (1996). 
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more sinister danger: that the evidence of such traits 
leads the police to "round up the usual suspects". If the 
profiler relies on a statistic that, say, paedophiles who 
murder are usually Caucasian and aged between 45 and 
55, there is a risk that the police will only direct their 
enquiries towards such people, therefore leading to 
proportionally higher conviction rates of people who fit 
the bill. This in tum feeds back into and distorts the 
statistical data from which we began.413 
It has also been argued that "evidence of discreditable traits of the offender will be 
transposed in the minds of the jury to the accused. We know that previous 
convictions, or other discreditable conduct not amounting to a crime, also create in 
the minds of the jury sinister prejudices.,,414 In fact "the most important of these 
prejudices have recently been described as 'moral prejudice' and 'reasoning 
prejudice' .,,415 Professor Ormerod concluded that the prejudicial effect of profile 
evidence will in almost all cases substantially outweigh its limited probative value.416 
Courts are divided on this issue. While many courts have ruled that offender profiling 
is too prejudicial and therefore inadmissible, many others believe that even if it is 
prejudicial, that the prejudicial effect does not far outweigh its probative value. It is 
submitted that the prejudicial effect of offender profiling far outweighs its probative 
value and therefore, should be ruled inadmissible. 
413 Id, at 874. 
414 David C. Ormerod., and Jim Sturman, "Working with the Courts: Advice for Expert Witnesses," in 
Alison, L, (eds), The Forensic Psychologist's Casebook: Psychological Profiling and Criminal 
Investigation, 185 (2005). 
415 Id. 
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In State v. Roquemore,417 offender profiling testimony was ruled to be too prejudicial 
to the accused. The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated that profile evidence is based on 
generalities and typical facts, and that these generalities and typical facts tend to place 
the defendant into a stereotype.418 It was held that this stereotyping causes the jury to 
be prejudiced.419 Hence, jurors "could decide the facts based on typical, and not the 
actual, facts.,,42o 
Similarly, in Brunson v. State,421 the Supreme Court of Arkansas, ruled that "allowing 
expert to give profiling testimony both improperly mandated a legal conclusion 
before jury, and constituted prejudicial error.,,422 The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
further stated that "even assuming that profile testimony is in some degree relevant to 
the issues at trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused has generally been 
found to outweigh the probative value.,,423 
In People v. Robbie,424 the Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California, also 
held that rapist profile testimony resulted in unfair prejudice. Walter Vincent Robbie 
417 State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App.3d 448, 620 NE.2d 110(1993). 
418 supra at 172. 
419 State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App. 3d 448, 620 N.E.2d Jl 0, Jl5 (1993). 
420 Id. 
421 supra at 186. 
422 Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S. W3d 304 (2002). 
423 
Id, at 314. 
424 P . th eople v. RobbIe, 92 Cal.App.4 1075 (2002). 
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was charged with and convicted by the Superior Court, Contra Costa County, 
California, of kidnapping Jane Doe, for sexual purposes, oral copulation and 
penetration with a foreign object.425 
At the trial, the defendant called witnesses who testified that he is an honest and non-
violent man. The defendant also called Jane's ex-boyfriend and Jane's three 
classmates who testified that Jane was untruthful. Two other witnesses also testified 
that Jane used drugs. On the other hand, the prosecution called Sharon Pagaling, a 
special agent with the violent crime profiling unit, in the California Department of 
Justice, to testify that the defendant's conduct was consistent with a certain type of 
rapist (the type alleged in this case). The defense raised an objection to the admission 
of this testimony. The defense argued that the testimony must be "limited to general 
misconceptions about sex offenders, and that an expert cannot render an opinion as to 
whether a defendant committed the charged crimes.,,426 Pagaling informed the court 
that her testimony was "to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions about 
conduct of a rapist. ,,427 
The trial judge ruled that the testimony was admissible. It is noteworthy to point out 
that during her testimony, Pagaling acknowledged the fact that the behaviors and 
conduct that she stated were typical of rape cases, may also be found in non-rape 
425 Id. 




cases. Robbie was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate term of fifteen years 
to life and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Pagaling's testimony was profile evidence and that 
profile evidence is generally inadmissible to prove guilt. Justice Corrigan, in the 
opinion, stated that: 
... profile evidence is inherently prejudicial because it 
requires the jury to accept an erroneous starting point in 
its consideration of the evidence. We illustrate the 
problem by examining the syllogism underlying profile 
evidence: criminals act in a certain way; the defendant 
acted that way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal. 
Guilt flows ineluctably from the major premise through 
the minor one to the conclusion. The problem is the 
major premise is faulty. It implies that criminals, and 
only criminals act in a given way. In fact, certain 
behavior may be consistent with both innocent and 
illegal behavior, as the People's expert conceded here. 
This flawed syllogism lay at the heart of Pagaling's 
testimony. She was asked hypothetical questions 
assuming certain behavior that had been attributed to the 
defendant and was allowed to opine that it was the most 
prevalent kind of sex offender conduct. The jury was 
invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in the 
conduct described, he was indeed a sex offender. 428 
The Court of Appeals further stated that "profile evidence is unfairly relied upon to 
affirmatively prove a defendant's guilt based on his match with the profile. The jury 
is improperly invited to conclude that, because the defendant manifested some 
characteristics, he committed a crime. ,,429 The Court ruled that the trial court erred by 
rd, at 1085. 
429 rd, at 1086. 
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admitting the expert testimony. That profile evidence was inadmissible. It was held 
that the erroneous admission of this testimony was not harmless. Therefore, the Court 
of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. In 
reversing the judgment, the Court of Appeals stated that "given the highly prejudicial 
nature of the expert's testimony and the prosecutor's argument, we must conclude 
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a result more 
favorable to defendant had the court excluded Pagaling's testimony.,,43o 
In the above cases, profile evidence was inadmissible because of its unfair prejudice. 
However, in several cases, some courts have admitted such evidence even though it 
was clear that the prejudicial effect far outweighed the probative value. For instance, 
in United States v. Webb,431 expert testimony on modus operandi was admitted and 
ruled not prejudicial. The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California convicted Marty Webb of possession of ammunition by a felon. Following 
an informant's tip off, the Los Angeles Law enforcement officers, on October 17, 
1995 arrested the defendant. When the officers searched the defendant's car, they 
found a loaded gun wrapped in a shirt and concealed in the car's engine 
compartment. 432 Webb claimed that he did not know that the gun was there. 
The State presented a police expert at the trial, who testified on modus operandi, 
"regarding the reasons people typically hide guns in the engine compartment of 
430 Id, at 1088. 
431 United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711 (J 997). 
432 
Id, at 713. 
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cars.,,433 The expert testified that people typically conceal guns in the engme 
compartment of a car so that they have ready access to them, but police would not 
easily find them and also to disclaim knowledge of the gun when the police find it. 
The defendant objected to this testimony, arguing that it was improper and unduly 
prejudicial and was also inadmissible based on the Evid.R. 704(b), which prohibits an 
expert's opinion on the ultimate issue. The trial judge permitted the testimony and 
stated that the police expert witness used the word "people" instead of the word 
"criminals", hence it was not prejudicial. Furthermore, the trial judge ruled that the 
expert did not give an opinion on whether the defendant knew that a gun was in his 
car. Therefore, he ruled that the testimony was admissible. Webb was convicted and 
he appealed. 
At the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Webb contended that the trial 
court erred by admitting the expert testimony. The defendant also argued that the 
testimony ought to have been excluded because it was similar to a drug courier profile 
evidence and also was an opinion on the ultimate issue. 434 The defendant also argued 
that the trial court ought to have applied the Daubert criteria, which would have ruled 
that the testimony was inadmissible because it was unreliable. 
The Court of Appeals, through Justice Trott, ruled that the testimony on modus 




Moreover, the testimony explained evidence about the gun's whereabouts that easily 
could have been beyond the knowledge of an average jurOr.,,435 Justice Trott further 
stated that: 
In addition, the trial court and the Government took 
steps to mitigate the testimony's potential prejudicial 
effect. The Government focused its questions on the 
practices of "persons" rather than criminals or gang 
members. Moreover, even if the jury drew the adverse 
inference that Webb was a criminal, that inference 
would not prejudice him because the jury already knew 
that Webb was a criminal: Webb had stipulated that he 
had been convicted of three prior felonies. 
In light of the above, the district court properly 
determined that the testimony'S prejudicial effect did 
b . 11 . h' b' 1 436 not su stantla y outwelg ItS pro atlve va ue. 
On the defendant's contention that the testimony was similar to a drug courier profile 
evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that "none of the expert testimony in this case 
was admitted to demonstrate that Webb was guilty because he fit the characteristics 
of a certain drug-courier profile. Instead, the expert testimony was properly admitted 
to assist the jury in understanding the reasons why a person would conceal a weapon 
in the engine compartment of a car.,,437 Justice Trott also stated that the testimony did 
not violate Evid.R. 704(b) which prohibits expert opinion on the ultimate issue. 
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion 







testimony in this case constitutes specialized knowledge of law enforcement, not 
scientific knowledge, the Daubert standards for admission simply do not apply.,,438 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting the testimony on modus operandi and therefore, affirmed the judgment of 
conviction. It should be noted that this case took place before the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. in 1999, where it was held that the 
Daubert criteria applied to all forms of expert testimony. 
In Simmons v. State,439 offender profile testimony by a crime scene analyst was also 
ruled not prejudicial. In this case, Clarence Leland Simmons was convicted of 
intentional murder and capital murder by the Circuit Court, Jefferson County, 
Alabama. On January 3, 1996 the nude body of a sixty-five year old woman (M.A.) 
was discovered by a security guard at Highland Manor Apartments in Alabama. The 
security guard, Alma Underwood, was instructed by the victim's daughter to check on 
her because she had not heard from her and was worried. When the police arrived, 
they discovered that M.A. had been stabbed to death and disemboweled.44o Police 
investigation revealed that the last person seen with the victim was the defendant and 
he was arrested for the murder. 
Id,at716. 
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A piece of human tissue found on Simmon's pants was analyzed and the DNA from 
the tissue matched M.A. 's blood sample.,,441 Several items were also collected from 
the defendant's home. The autopsy was carried out by Dr. Robert Brissie. 
According to Dr. Brissie, M.A's body had been cut by the 
offender from the upper part of the abdomen, down the 
front of the abdomen, down across the pubic bone, with 
several extensive slicing wounds between the legs, then 
upward on the back of M.A's buttocks, to the back. 
Additionally, M.A. had been stabbed 73 times; these stab 
wounds were approximately an inch and half in depth and 
had marks indicating that the knife used to stab M.A. had a 
hilt. He testified that six of these incised wounds extended 
across the front ofM.A's neck. Many of these wounds had 
been inflicted before M.A. died and, according to Dr. 
Brissie, were probably intimidation wounds and not fatal. 
Twenty-three of these wounds were concentrated in the 
chest area, at least five of these wounds did not penetrate 
the chest cavity and Dr. Brissie opined that some of these 
wounds were inflicted while M.A. was alive. 442 
Dr. Brissie also testified that "most of M.A's internal organs had been removed from 
her body. Her left lung was separated into two pieces; her spleen and liver had been 
cut; most of her large and small intestines were missing.,,443 
At the trial, the State called several witnesses. First, Jack Neely testified that he met 
the defendant and the victim the day before her murder at the South Place Pool Hall, 
where he had an argument with the defendant and that the defendant threatened to cut 
him into pieces. Loretta Chambers, a bartender at the Pool Hall, also testified that she 
witnessed the confrontation and that Simmons was with the victim on that day 





(January 2, 1996). Betty Harper also testified that she saw Simmons and M.A. getting 
into the elevator at M.A's apartment on January 2, 1996. Jerry Trousdale and Alma 
Underwood who were the maintenance person and security guard at the apartment 
building respectively, also testified that they saw Simmons enter the apartment with 
M.A. the day before her murder and that Simmons was the last person seen with M.A. 
In order to bolster their claim that the defendant should be convicted of capital 
offense of murder committed during sexual assault, the prosecution decided to call 
FBI agent Thomas Neer, who testified that the crime scene analysis showed that the 
murder was sexually motivated. Neer was qualified by the trial court as an expert on 
crime scene analysis and victimology. Neer testified that his analysis of the crime 
scene and the autopsy report showed that the "offense was sexually motivated and 
that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification.,,444 The 
defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony but it was denied. 
Simmons was convicted of intentional murder and capital murder and sentenced to 
death by electrocution. He appealed. Among other claims, the defendant argued that 
the admission of Neer's testimony by the trial court was error. The defendant argued 
that Neer's testimony was a novel scientific evidence and therefore, failed to meet 
Frye criteria, which required such testimony to have gained general acceptance in the 
rd, at 1150. 
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relevant scientific community.445 The defendant also contended that the testimony 
was unduly prejudicial and violated the ultimate issue rule. 
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Alabama disagreed with the appellant. 
Delivering the opinion, Justice Fry said: 
We reject Simmon's argument that Neer's testimony 
was based on novel scientific evidence. Crime scene 
analysis and victimology do not rest on scientific 
principles like those contemplated in Frye; these fields 
constitute specialized knowledge. Specialized 
knowledge offers subjective observations and 
comparisons based on the expert's training, skill, or 
experience that may be helpful to the jury in 
understanding or determining the facts. Crime scene 
analysis which involves the gathering and analysis of 
physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of 
specialized knowledge. ... Therefore, because crime 
scene analysis is not scientific evidence, we conclude 
that we are not bound by the test enunciated by Frye.446 
Justice Fry further stated that Rule 702, Ala.R.Evid., was the proper standard for 
admitting Neer's testimony. Justice Fry went on to say that: 
445 Id. 
446 Id, at 1151. 
Alabama Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Fairness to a party 
seems to dictate that before evidence based on 
specialized knowledge can be admitted against a party 
at trial, the party is entitled to a determination that the 
specialized knowledge is reliable and that it is relevant 
to a material issue. Once the trial court determines that 
the testimony involves a legitimate specialized 
knowledge, that the witness is an expert in that field, 
and that the expert testimony would assist the jury, a 




subject witnesses to cross-examination and to attack 
the basis and methods used in developing the opinion. 
Therefore, with the principles enunciated in Daubert 
and Kumho in mind, we must determine whether the 
fields of victimology and crime-scene analysis 
constitute reliable specialized knowledge; whether 
Neer is an expert within these fields; and whether the 
subject matter of his testimony is relevant and assists 
the trier of fact in this case.447 
"During defense counsel's cross-examination of Neer, Neer testified that crime-scene 
analysis of homicides that appear to be sexually motivated began developing as a 
specialized field in the late 1970s and that the research has been published within the 
field and subjected to peer review. Neer established the general acceptance of 
victimology when he testified that numerous law enforcement agencies relied upon 
crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations. Neer 
detailed the theories supporting crime scene analysis and victimology, the way the 
theories are applied by others with the same "specialized knowledge," and the way 
the specialized knowledge was applied in this particular case. He further explained 
the method in which he conducted his investigation and the factors considered in 
reaching his determination. We recognize that through interviews, case studies, and 
research a person may acquire superior knowledge concerning characteristics of an 
offense. Thus, based on the record before us, adequate evidence was presented to 
establish the reliability of crime-scene analysis and victimology as fields of 
specialized knowledge.448 
rd, at 1154. 
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The Court of Appeals further held that "the jury in this case was presented with a 
homicide trial at which no eyewitnesses testified. M.A.'s body was discovered in a 
horrifying, mutilated condition. The method and motivation for killing an elderly 
female presented serious questions for the jury to resolve. Whether the offender 
received sexual gratification while committing the offense was a critical issue of the 
case, and Neer's testimony was probative on that issue. Inferences had to be drawn 
from the physical evidence presented at the crime scene. Neer offered observations of 
the crime scene and the elderly female victim that would assist the jury in evaluating 
the circumstances surrounding the murder and the reasons for the method employed 
by the offender. "A homicide and its crime scene, after all, are not matters likely to be 
within the knowledge of an average trier of fact" (United States v. deSoto, 885 F.2d 
354,359 (ih Cir.1989). ,,449 
In a nutshell, the Court of Appeals ruled that the expert testimony assisted the jury 
and so its admission by the trial court was not error. The Court also ruled that the 
testimony was more probative than prejudicial, and did not violate the ultimate rule 
issue. The Court of Appeals stated that "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the 
limitations of his testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that 
Simmons committed the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from 
the crime scene and from M.A.' s body indicated that the offense itself was sexually 
motivated. Neer did not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not 
449 Id, at 1156. 
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identify the offender; thus, we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the 
ultimate issue. ,,450 
Justice Fry concluded that even if the admission of the expert testimony was error, it 
would still be ruled as harmless error.451 The Court of Appeals affirmed the death 
sentence on the capital murder charge, but "remanded with directions as to sentencing 
for count 111; and reversed as to conviction and sentence imposed pursuant to count 
11. ,,452 
This case clearly demonstrates my argument that the outcome of any trial involving 
offender profiling testimony to a great extent is determined by the admissibility 
standard applied by the trial court. In this case, the Court of Appeals stated that Rule 
702 Ala. R.Evid., was the appropriate standard and applied it in this case. On the 
other hand, the defendant/appellant contended that the Frye test standard, which 
presumably would have excluded the testimony, was the proper standard that ought to 
have been applied. In this case, the reliability of the testimony seems to have been 
loosely interpreted by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Courts 
placed more emphasis on relevance and assistance to the trier of fact, without much 
enquiry into whether the basis of such testimony was generally accepted by the 
relevant community. The trial court particularly believed that crime scene analysis 




and victimology were reliable because "numerous law enforcement agencies relied 
upon crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations.,,453 
This is a dangerous basis to guage the reliability of any technique. The trial court 
simply took the expert's words ipse dixit and seemed to have been seduced by Neer's 
impressive qualifications. The usefulness of a technique in assisting in crime 
investigation should not be taken as an indication that the technique will be 
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible in the courtroom. 
State v. Sorabella454contrasts with the above case. In Sorabella, the court recognized 
the fact that profile evidence is prejudicial, but believed that the prejudicial effect can 
be minimized by limiting the scope of the testimony. In January 2000, the New 
Britain Police Department, in Connecticut, decided to launch an undercover operation 
in an attempt to stop the increased violations of the state's child pornography laws via 
the internet. Detective James Wardwell was one of the detectives assigned to the 
operation, and on January 4, 2000, he logged onto the America Online (AOL) chat 
room and posed as a thirteen year old girl, under the screen name "Danutta333.455 He 
received an instant message from a man with a screen name - "JoSkotr.,,456 They 
started to exchange instant messages during which "JoeSkotr" asked the thirteen year 
old girl to meet up with him for sexual relations, telling the girl how she should dress 
and what he wanted her to do to him and vice versa. He told the girl that he lived in 
453 Id, at 1155. 
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State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 891 A.2d 897 (2006). 
455 
Id, at 163. 
456 Id. 
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Massachusetts but will come to Connecticut to meet her at a donut shop. "JoeSkotr" 
sent pornographic materials to the girl within this time. On March 8, 2000, they 
agreed to meet up at a donut shop, but "JoeSkotr" went to the wrong shop. He 
arranged another meeting on March 14, 2000 at a shopping mall. On arrival at the 
shopping mall, he was arrested by the police. 
"JoeSkotr" was identified as John Sorabella, and he was charged with (1) two counts 
of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree, (2) two counts of attempt to 
commit risk of injury to a child by sexual contact, (3) three counts of attempt to 
commit risk of injury to a child, (4) one count of attempt to entice a minor to engage 
in sexual activity, (5) one count of importing child pornography, and (6) one count of 
b 
. 457 o scemty. 
At the trial, the State called Kenneth Lanning, a former FBI agent, who testified that 
the defendant possessed the psychological and behavioral characteristics of child sex 
offenders. In his testimony, Lanning stated that Sorabella falls under the category of 
sex offenders called "preferential offenders". Lanning testified that there are what he 
referred to, as the "customs and habits" of preferential sex offenders and situational 
sex offenders.458 
According to Lanning, situational sex offenders take 
advantage of opportunistic situations to engage in sex 
offenses and are typically thought-driven, undertaking 
action without consideration of getting caught. Lanning 
457 rd, at 160. 
458 
rd, at 212. 
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testified further that preferential sex offenders are 
individuals who have specific sexual preferences for 
certain activities or victims and whose behavior is 
normally need-driven or fantasy-driven. Preferential 
sex offenders typically collect pornography, erotica and 
mementos relating to their sexual interest or preference 
and spend a great deal of time and money in fulfilling 
their sexual needs or fantasies. With respect to 
preferential sex offenders with an interest in children, 
they may use child pornography to rationalize 
abhorrent behavior, fuel and reinforce their sexual 
arousal or lower a potential victim's inhibitions by 
conveying the message that other children are doing it. 
Preferential sex offenders typically will engage in a 
prolonged and elaborate grooming or seduction process 
that is designed to exploit and manipulate vulnerable 
children. Preferential sex offenders may lessen the 
grooming time by targeting a child who is sexually 
experienced. 459 
The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, but it was denied. 
The defense counsel argued that the State failed to demonstrate the admissibility of 
the testimony as required in the decision in State v. Porter,460 when a scientific 
evidence is being presented. The defense also argued that the testimony should not be 
admitted because of its prejudicial effect. Denying the motion, the trial court stated 
that Lanning's testimony was not scientific, and so Porter does not apply. However, 
the court instructed the expert to limit his testimony only to 'customs and habits' of 
preferential sex offenders. That the expert should not state his opinion on the 
459 Id, at 213. 
460 State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57,698 A.2d 739 (1997). Cert.denied, 523 US1058, 118 SCt. 1384, 140 
L.Ed. 2d 645 (1998). 
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defendant's state of mind or whether he fits the characteristics of the preferential sex 
offenders.461 
The trial court admitted the testimony and stated that its probative value outweighed 
its prejudicial effect. The trial court also stated that the testimony was relevant to "the 
defendant's intent in engaging in the behavior, his belief as to the age of Danuta333 
and whether his conduct was corroborative of his purpose as at least the start of a line 
of conduct leading naturally to the crime.,,462 
The defendant was convicted by the jury on all counts and was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment, execution suspended after five years, and fifteen years probation.463 
The defendant appealed and the case reached the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by 
not subjecting Agent Lanning's testimony to a Porter hearing. The defendant also 
argued that the prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the lower court's judgment and stated 
that the expert testimony was not scientific. Therefore, a Porter hearing was not 
required. The Supreme Court stated that: 
The trial court reasonably concluded that Lanning's 
testimony was relevant and likely to assist the jury in 
State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155,212,891 A.2d 897 (2006). 
462 Id. 
463 Id, at 162. 
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light of the nature of the charges and Lanning's 
experience and expertise in matters relating to the 
victimization of children. The court also carefully 
evaluated the potential prejudicial effect of the testimony 
and reasonably concluded that its probative value 
outweighed any such effect. Moreover, the court guarded 
against the possibility of undue prejudice by limiting the 
scope of Lanning's testimony to 'customs and habits' of 
preferential sex offenders in general and by prohibiting 
Lanning from expressing any opinion either about the 
defendant's mental state or about whether the defendant 
fit the profile of a preferential sex offender. We 
conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the probative value of 
Lannin~s' testimony outweighed any prejudicial 
effect.44 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut therefore, affinned the judgment of conviction. 
Is Offender Profiling an Opinion on the Ultimate Issue? 
First, what is ultimate issue rule? The Ultimate Issue Rule is a rule which prohibits an 
expert, lay or expert, from giving an opinion on an issue of law or fact which is for 
the court to decide. Hence, "ultimate issues in criminal trials may be defined as the 
ultimate, sometimes called material facts which must be proved by the prosecution 
beyond reasonable doubt before a defendant can be found guilty of a particular 
offence and those facts, if any, which must be proved by the defendant in order to 
avoid guilt for that offence. ,,465 All witnesses are barred from testifying on the 
464 Id, at 217. 
465 Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 551 (1995). 
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ultimate issue to be decided by the court, which is the issue of guilt or innocence. 
Testifying on the ultimate issue is seen as usurping the function of the trier of fact, an 
invasion of the province/ken of the jury. 
The ultimate issue rule has faced a lot of criticism. McCormick was very critical of 
the ultimate issue rule. He maintained that "this general rule is unduly restrictive, is 
pregnant with close questions of application, and often unfairly obstructs the party's 
presentation of his case.,,466 McCormick further argued that "even the courts which 
profess adherence to the rule fail to apply it with consistency. All such courts, for 
example, disregard the supposed rule, usually without explanation as to why it should 
not be applied, when value, sanity, handwriting and identity are in issue.,,467 
Wigmore also maintained that the phrase "usurping the function of the jury" is "a 
mere bit of empty rhetoric." He contended that: 
There is no such reason for the rule, because the witness, 
in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to "usurp" 
the jury's functions; nor could if he desired. He is not 
attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists 
merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which 
ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he 
would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and 
accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the 
judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness' 
. . . h' ,,468 opmIOn agamst t elf own. 
466 McCormick, supra note 217, at 26. 
467 Id. 
468 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, volume 7, revised by James H. Chadbourn, s 
1920,18 (1978). 
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"Furthermore, the rule if carried out strictly and invariably would exclude the most 
necessary testimony. When all is said, it remains simply one of those impracticable 
and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle.,,469 
Friedland et al argued that the ultimate issue rule "often made it unreasonably 
difficult for advocates to present their cases, forcing the witnesses into verbal 
contortions to avoid the disfavored magic phrasing.,,47o Similarly, Jackson maintained 
that the "the rule is superfluous and that cases which have recently excluded evidence 
on the grounds of the rule can be supported on other grounds.,,471 Keane also argued 
that "the objection of undue influence makes no allowance for cases in which the 
tribunal of facts is a professional judge rather than a jury, overlooks the frequency of 
conflicts in expert testimony and is largely incompatible with the very justification for 
admitting expert evidence, that the drawing of inferences from the facts in question 
calls for an expertise which the tribunal of facts does not possess. ,,472 
Following the criticisms, the ultimate Issue rule has been abolished in many 
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions added certain exceptions to the rule. In United 
States, the Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides the guideline on the ultimate issue. 
The Rule states that: 
469 Id. 
470 Friedland, Bergman and Taslitz, supra note 175, at 262. 
471 J. D. Jackson, "The Ultimate Issue Rule: One Rule Too Many," Crim. L.R. 75 (1984). 
472 Adrian Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, 407 (1985). 
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Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a 
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of 
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier 
of fact alone. 4 73 
Courts have been inconsistent with their decisions on the ultimate issue when it 
comes to offender profiling evidence. In some cases, offender profile evidence has 
been ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate issue, while in many others, it has been 
seen as not an opinion on the ultimate issue. 
In State v. Armstrong,474 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that 
expert testimony regarding the "psychological dynamics" of the defendant was 
"inadmissible expression of opinion as to defendant's innocence." Craigory A. 
Armstrong was charged with aggravated rape of his eight year old cousin. On the day 
of the rape, the girl was sleeping in her mother's house, when the defendant (who 
also lived there), raped her. The victim told her twelve year old sister about the rape 
473 Fed.Evid.R. 704. 
474 State v. Armstrong, 587 So.2d 168 (La. 1991). 
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but they did not tell their mother. It was reported that two days later, the girl 
complained of stomach cramps and was taken to Dr. Gregory Molden's clinic. The 
medical tests showed that the girl had gonorrhea. Dr. Molden therefore, contacted the 
child protection bureau of New Orleans Police Department. Interviews with the 
victim and her sister revealed the rape and Armstrong was arrested. 
During police interrogation, Armstrong admitted having sexual intercourse with the 
eight year old girl, but claimed that the girl initiated it.475 He also claimed that he 
once had gonorrhea, but thought that it had been cured. At trial, he called three 
witnesses who attested to his credibility. He also called a clinical psychologist who 
testified that his "psychological dynamics would not support the view of him being a 
child sexual perpetrator.,,476 
The prosecution objected to the admission of this testimony. In its ruling, the 
Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, excluded the testimony. Justice George v. 
Perez stated that "the testimony of Armstrong's expert would have been an 
expression of opinion as to Armstrong's innocence.,,477 The petit jury convicted 
Armstrong of forcible rape and he was sentenced to twenty-five years, at hard 
labor.478 He appealed his conviction and contended that (1) the trial court erred by 
excluding the testimony by the clinical psychologist which showed that he did not 
475 Id, at 169. 
476 Id, at 170. 
477 Id. 
478 Id, at 169. 
217 
have the 'psychological dynamics' of child sex offenders; (2) that the trial court also 
erred by making his confession known to the jury. 
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that the exclusion of expert 
testimony by the clinical psychologist was not error. The Court of Appeals stated that 
under the Louisiana Code of Evidence Art.704, regarding opinion on ultimate issue, 
that "an expert shall not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused.,,479 Delivering the judgment, Justice Ward said: "In this case, where the 
expert would give an opinion as to the innocence of Armstrong, the trial court did not 
abuse that discretion. As a matter of fact, that testimony was not admissible.,,48o The 
Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence. 
Other cases where profile testimony was ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate 
issue include State v. Haynes,481 where it was held that: 
The testimony as to timing and panic embraced the 
ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. Under 
Evid.R. 704, "opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is 
admissible if it assists the trier of the fact, otherwise it 
is not admissible. The competency of the trier of the 
fact to resolve the factual issue determines whether or 
not the opinion testimony is of assistance." For this 
reason, an ultimate issue opinion by an expert should 
be excluded in extreme cases where that opinion IS 
inherently misleading or unduly prejudicia1.482 
479 Id, at 170. 
480 Id. 
481 
supra at 167. 
482 State v. Haynes, 1988 WL 99189, 3, 4 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.). 
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Similarly, in State v. Parkinson,483 the Court of Appeals of Idaho ruled that the 
admission of expert testimony on sex offender profiles was an opinion on the ultimate 
issue. The Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's ruling that "the expert opinion 
evidence would constitute a direct comment on the guilt or innocence of Parkinson 
and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,484 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Brunson v. State485 also ruled that expert 
testimony on the predictability of batterers who would become murderers was an 
opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that 
the "profile testimony both mandated a conclusion and was unduly prejudicial.,,486 
It should be noted however, that in United States v. Webb,487 the United States Court 
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, ruled that expert testimony on modus operandi, regarding 
the reasons why people conceal weapons in the engine compartment of cars was not 
impermissible opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, the United States Court of 
Appeals said: 
supra at 178. 
Webb next argues that the expert testimony was 
inadmissible because it constitutes testimony on his state 
of mind, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). 
Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating his opinion 
484 State v. Parkinson, 1281daho 29, 32, 909 P.2d 647, 650 (1996). 
485 supra at 186. 
486 Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 312, 79 S. W 3d 304 (2002). 
487 supra at 199. 
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on the ultimate issue of whether a defendant had the 
particular mental state at issue. 
The expert in this case described a typical situation, and 
never offered any opinion about whether Webb knew the 
weapon was hidden in his car. The expert testified about 
a typical way people conceal weapons in cars and the 
typical reasons for their concealment. In fact, on cross-
examination, the expert admitted that he had no 
information that Webb knew the weapon was in the 
engine compartment. Under these circumstances, it was 
left to the jury to determine whether Webb knew the gun 
was hidden in the car. Thus, the expert did not give an 
impermissible opinion under Rule 704(b).488 
In Simmons v. State,489 expert testimony by an FBI agent that the crime scene 
characteristics indicated that the murder was sexually motivated and so the offender 
received sexual gratification from the acts was ruled not a violation of the ultimate 
issue rule. The court said: "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the limitations of his 
testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that Simmons committed 
the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from the crime scene and 
from M.A. 's body indicated that the offense itself was sexually motivated. Neer did 
not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not identify the offender; 
thus we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the ultimate issue.,,49o 
In the final analysis, it does appear that ultimate issue is in-built in all forms of 
offender profile evidence. By that we mean that no matter how or which form or 
shape offender profile is being presented, there is the over-lapping tendency to touch 
488 United States v. Webb, J15 F.3d 7J1, 715 (1997). 
489 
supra at 202. 
490 Simmons v. State, 797 So.2d 1134, 1158 (2000). 
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on the ultimate issue. Offender profile testimony and its derivatives are generally 
geared towards one thing - pointing to the accused as being either guilty or innocent. 
In effect, profile evidence is a 'leading' evidence. It leads to a certain conclusion. It 
should be noted however, that with appropriate jury instruction by the trial judge, this 
problem can at least be minimized. The trial judge should in all cases, limit the scope 
of the testimony and remind the witnesses of their role to testify and not to decide the 
case. We are in support of the ultimate issue rule, at least in cases involving offender 
profiling, as without it witnesses will go beyond their function to assist with their 
testimony, and extend their role into that of final arbiters. The result will then be a 
trial by witnesses rather than trial by judges and jurors. 
Is Offender Profiling Sufficiently Reliable as to be Admissible? 
Offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. Offender profiling 
involves gathering information from various sources - from the crime scene, 
witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports, offender's physical characteristics, age, 
race, criminal records, and so on. The question then is - how reliable is information 
gathered in this manner/from these sources? Should it be tendered in court as an 
indication or proof of guilt or innocence? Offender profiling does not point to specific 
offenders. It cannot determine that a given defendant committed a specific act. 
Offender profiling only predicts, it suggests, but it cannot prove. We should also bear 
in mind the problem posed by crime scene 'staging', which could lead to profiling 
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being based on inaccurate crime scene analysis. Fundamentally, offender profiling is 
very useful in narrowing down the suspects during crime investigation, but it has not 
reached the level of reliability necessary for courtroom use. The modus operandi of 
offenders may assist judges and jurors in understanding the behavioral patterns in 
some cases, but that alone is not a sufficient basis to warrant its admission in court, 
nor is that an adequate proof that the technique is reliable. 
Many scholars agree that offender profiling is not a reliable technique. It is a 
technique whose foundation or scientific basis cannot be ascertained at the moment. 
Godwin maintained that, "Nine out often profiles are vapid. They play at blind man's 
bluff, groping in all directions in the hope of touching a sleeve. Occasionally they do, 
but not firmly enough to seize it, for the behaviourists producing them must 
necessarily deal in generalities and types. But policemen can't arrest a type. They 
require hard data: names, dates, none of which the psychiatrists [or others involved in 
creating profile evidence] can offer.,,491 
Alison et al noted that "there remains no evidence that the scientific community has 
accepted the technique as an accurate or reliable indicator of identification of an 
offender. Therefore, it would probably not be surprising to learn that police officers 
remain relatively unaware of the benefits and limitations of profiling and of the ways 
491 Godwin, 1., Murder USA: The Ways We Kill Each Other, 276 (1978). 
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in which they should or should not be utilized. It is incumbent upon the profi1er to 
outline the expectations that officers had of the account.,,492 
Professor Risinger and Loop maintained that "while still a valuable investigatory tool 
perhaps, the existing data does not indicate that process of offender profiling results 
in sufficiently reliable information to support evidentiary admissibility.,,493 
On a similar vem, Professor Ormerod and Sturman maintained that "the 
psychological profile has serious limitations: it is practiced in an inconsistent manner, 
often from unverified base of material by a body of individuals with diverse levels of 
training and experience, and inadequate independent monitoring and review.,,494 
They concluded that "psychologists face the struggle of demonstrating the reliability 
of the technique and of the people who practice it.,,495 
Snook et a1 carried out a narrative review of 130 articles on criminal profiling and 
meta-analytic reviews and concluded that criminal profiling "appears at this juncture 
to be an extraneous and redundant technique for use in criminal investigations.,,496 
They also concluded that criminal profiling "will persist as a pseudoscientific 
492 Alison, L., West, A, and Goodwill A, "The Academic and the Practitioner Pragmatists' Views of 
Offender Profiling", 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 78 (2004). 
493 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 252. 
494 Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 191. 
495 Id. 
496 Brent Snook., Joseph, Eastwood., Paul Gendreau., Claire Goggin., and Richard M. Cullen, "Taking 
Stock of Criminal Profiling: A Narrative and Meta-Analysis", Criminal Justice and Behavior, vol. 34, No. 
4,437,448 (2007). 
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technique until such time as empirical and reproducible studies are conducted on the 
abilities of large groups of active profilers to predict, with more precision and greater 
magnitude, the characteristics of offenders.,,497 
As we stated in chapter three, the rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony 
in United States, emphasize the reliability of any expert evidence. Yet, in many cases 
involving offender profiling the reliability of the technique was not questioned, as in 
State v. Pennell.498 However, some courts agree that offender profiling is unreliable 
and have ruled it inadmissible. 
In State v. Cavallo499 for instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the 
technique is not generally accepted as being reliable. In this case, two defendants, 
Michael Cavallo and David R. Murro were convicted of rape, abduction and private 
lewdness. On June 16, 1977 the two defendants met the victim (S.T.) at the Pittstown 
bar in Hunterdon, New Jersey. The victim who was two months pregnant at the time 
of the alleged rape, claimed that the defendants abducted her from the bar and took 
her to an empty field where she was raped. The defendants on the other hand, claimed 
that they had consensual sexual encounter with S.T. The two sides gave conflicting 
versions of events that took place that night. There were no eye witnesses. 
497 Id. 
498 State v. Pennell, 602 A.2d 48 (De1.l991). 
499 State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J 508,443 A.2d 1020 (1982). 
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At the trial, Cavallo sought to introduce testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Kuris 
which will show that he does not have the psychological traits of a rapist. 500 The 
defense informed the court that Dr. Kuris was being proffered to testify as to "Mr. 
Cavallo's character which is that he knows right from wrong, that he is a well-
meaning individual, he would not willfully do a wrong, he recognizes the force and 
violence of rape are wrongful acts, he is non-violent, non-aggressive person and he 
will also testify to the fact the physical or the characteristics exhibited by rapists in 
his experience as a psychiatrist are these people are aggressive, violent people and 
that Mr. Cavallo does not fit within this mold.,,501 
The prosecution argued that the testimony should be excluded because it was 
irrelevant and not reliable. The prosecution contended that the expert character 
evidence was irrelevant "since regardless of whether Cavallo has the characteristics 
of a "rapist", he may indeed have committed rape on this particular occasion.,,502 The 
Hunterdon County Superior Court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible. The 
defendants were convicted. Cavallo was sentenced to three to five years for 
abduction, one to two years for lewdness and ten to twenty years for rape. Murro was 
sentenced to three to seven years for abduction, two to three years for lewdness and 
twelve to twenty years for rape. 503 Their request for a new trial was denied. The case 
went to the Superior Court, Appellant Division. 
500 Id. 




The appellate division agreed with the trial court's decision to exclude the expert 
testimony. It was held that the expert character testimony was inadmissible under 
Rule 47, which governs the admissibility of character evidence.so4 The appellate 
division stated that "the rule could not contemplate testimony of the kind proffered in 
this case"sos, and that the admission of such testimony "could divert the attention of 
the jury from factual guilt or innocence to the defendant's propensities."so6 The 
appellate division affirmed the convictions but remanded the trial for re-sentencing, 
as the court deemed the sentences excessive. The defendants each later received ten to 
fifteen years for rape and lesser sentences on the abduction and private lewdness 
charges. 
The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey where the defendants argued that 
the exclusion of the expert character evidence was error. In their ruling, the Supreme 
Court stated that the evidence by Dr. Kuris was not generally accepted as being 
reliable. Delivering the judgment, Justice Pashrnan stated that the "defendants have 
thus failed to persuade us that the proffered evidence has been accepted as reliable by 
other jurisdictions, or for other purposes in the New Jersey legal system. Defendants 
therefore have not met their burden under Rule 56 of showing that Dr. Kuris' 




Id, at 514. 
507 
Id, at 526. 
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Supreme Court noted that "even if psychiatric testimony of this nature were found to 
be generally admissible, we would have serious questions about whether the 
foundation for Dr. Kuris' testimony - only two meetings with Cavallo - is sufficient 
to support the conclusions drawn about his personality and propensities.,,508 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appellate division's judgment and 
concluded that the "defendants have not met their burden of showing that the 
scientific community generally accepts the existence of identifiable character traits 
common to rapists. They also have not demonstrated that psychiatrists possess any 
special ability to discern whether an individual is likely to be a rapist. Until the 
scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not admissible.,,509 
In State v. Lowe,510expert testimony on offender's behavioral motivations was also 
ruled inadmissible. The defendant, Terry Lowe was charged with two counts of 
aggravated murder of Phyllis Mullet and Murray Griffin. On July 5, 1986, Phyllis 
Mullet was at her home in Belle Center, Ohio, when she was stabbed to death, 
multiple times, with her throat cut. 511 Murray Griffin, a Belle Center Marshall was at 
the scene, attending to the victim, when the perpetrator shot him and he also died at 
the scene. When the trial began, the State filed a notice of intention to call FBI agents 
who will testify on crime scene characteristics, which will assist in the identification 
508 Id. 
509 Id, at 529. 
510 State v. Lowe, 75 Ohio App.3d 404,599 NE.2d 783 (Ohio. 1991). 
511 Id. 
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of Lowe as the person who committed the murders. The State informed the court that 
the FBI agents will testify regarding the psychological profile of the offender. That 
FBI Agent John Douglas will testify on criminal investigative analysis and death 
threat analysis. That Agent Douglas will testify regarding the offender's motivation 
for the murder of Mullet, as well as the motivation behind a certain document that 
Lowe had written. S12 It was reported that this document contained a list of women and 
the names of their immediate family members and that the document contained sexual 
languages and that Mullet's name was on the list.S13 
In his testimony, Agent Douglas stated that based on his review of the crime scene 
photographs, autopsy reports, police reports and the document written by Lowe, that 
he was of the opinion that the murder of Phyllis Mullet was sexually motivated. He 
testified that his opinion was based on (1) "the fact Mullet's hands and feet were 
bound with ligatures that had been brought to the scene by the perpetrator of the 
crime," the "presence of the ligatures indicated preplanning on the part of the 
perpetrator," and that preplanning is one of the characteristics of sexually motivated 
murders. Sl4 Agent Douglas further stated that the document written by Lowe was 
sexually motivated and represented the perpetrator's plan or mission for power.SIS It 
should be pointed out that during cross-examination, Agent Douglas acknowledged 





the fact that his testimony on the motivations could not be "stated to a reasonable 
scientific certainty.,,516 
The defendant presented Dr. Solomon Ful ero , a psychologist, to rebut Douglas's 
testimony. In his testimony, Dr. Fulero also acknowledged the fact that "opinions 
based on criminal-investigative analysis do not rise to the level of reasonable 
scientific certainty that is a prerequisite to consideration as expert opinion 
testimony. ,,517 
In its ruling, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress Agent 
Douglas' testimony. The State appealed, after certification of its inability to proceed 
to trial without the suppressed testimony. The State argued that the trial court erred in 
granting the motion to suppress the testimony. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, reiterated the fact that a trial judge has 
the discretion to decide whether any evidence is relevant and will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The Court of Appeals 
said: 
516 Id, at 407. 
517 Id. 
In this case before us, the trial court suppressed the 
testimony of Douglas upon finding, inter alia, that "Mr. 
Douglas' opinion is an investigative tool like a 
polygraph; it might be used to investigate, but it does not 
have the reliability to be evidence." Having given careful 
consideration to the testimony elicited in this matter, we 
conclude that there is evidence in the record to support 
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the trial court's finding that the opinion testimony of 
Douglas is not reliable evidence. 
As a whole, the record reflects that Douglas's opinion for 
the most part is based on the behavioral science of 
clinical psychology, an area in which he has no formal 
education, training or license. In short, the purported 
scientific analytical processes to which Douglas testified 
are based on intuitiveness honed by his considerable 
experience in the field of homicide investigation. While 
we in no way trivialize the importance of Douglas' work 
in the field of crime detection and criminal apprehension, 
we do not find that there was sufficient evidence of 
reliability adduced to demonstrate the relevancy of the 
testimony or to qualify Douglas as an expert witness. 
Accordingl~, the error as assigned by the state is 
overruled. S 8 
The Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress Agent 
Douglas'testimony. 
Similarly, in State v. Stevens,519 the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a trial 
court's decision to exclude expert testimony on crime scene analysis. In excluding the 
testimony, the trial court stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis 
has been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding, 
reliable, scientific principles."s2o In Stevens, the defendant William Richard Stevens 
was charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, Sandi 
Stevens and his mother-in-law Myrtle Wilson. He was also charged with one count of 
aggravated robbery. On December 22, 1997 the defendant called the police and when 
518 Id, at 408. 
519 State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817 (Tenn.2002). 
520 Id, at 831. 
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the police arrived at his mobile home in Nashville, Tennessee, they found the 
defendant, his friend Corey Milliken and the bodies of the victims. It was reported 
that Mrs. Stevens' nude body was "left in a "displayed" position, which is, lying on 
her back with her legs spread apart.,,52J Pornographic magazines and Sandi's own 
nude photographs were also found around her body.522 Wilson's nightgown was 
pulled above her waist. The police found no sign of a forced entry into the apartment. 
The police suspected that the house showed signs of "staging" and so Stevens and 
Milliken were the immediate suspects. While the police were questioning Milliken, 
they noticed blood stains on his shirt, under his nails and gouge marks on his wrist 
and cheek.523 Milliken confessed that Stevens had hired him to kill his wife and make 
it look like a robbery. The medical examination revealed that Sandi Stevens died as a 
result of ligature strangulation. That she also had a tear in her vagina. The medical 
examination showed that Wilson died as a result of stab wounds and manual 
strangulation. 
At the trial, the State presented several witnesses, including Shawn Austin Milliken, 
the junior brother of Corey Milliken, who testified that in 1997 Stevens offered him 
and his brother $2,500 each to kill his wife. He testified that he later decided not to go 
on with the plan and so Corey accepted $5,000 to carry out the murder on his own. 
The State also presented evidence of Steven's conviction in 1997 for second degree 
521 Id, at 826. 
522 Id. 
523 Id, at 825. 
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murder. During the trial, Stevens claimed that Corey Milliken killed Sandi and Myrtle 
during his sexual assault on them. He argued that he did not hire Corey to kill the two 
women. The defense decided to call Mr. Gregg McCrary, a former FBI Agent and an 
expert on crime scene analysis. McCrary was called to testify that "Milliken 
committed sexual murder as an act of aggression precipitated by an argument with his 
mother and step-father the night before the crimes."S24 "Mr. McCrary testified that the 
display of pornographic magazines around Mrs. Stevens could "best be interpreted as 
an attempt to further humiliate or degrade" the victim, which goes to the motive of a 
sex crime." He defined a sex crime as primarily a crime of violence in which the 
perpetrator uses sex to punish, humiliate, and degrade the victim."s2s McCrary 
testified outside the jury. He stated that from his analysis of the crime scene photos, 
the crime scene video tapes, the autopsy report and Sandi Steven's diary, he was of 
the opinion that the crime scene indicated characteristics of a "disorganized sexual 
homicide."s26 As such, that the murders were sexually motivated. In his testimony, 
McCrary also made distinctions between the characteristics of "disorganized sexual 
homicide crime scene" and a "contract murder crime scene."S27 McCrary said: 
524 Id, at 827. 
525 Id, at 828. 
526 Id, at 830. 
527 Id. 
The crime scene is quite sloppy and in great disarray. 
There is minimal use of restraints. The sexual acts tend 
to occur after death; so, there is post-mortem injury to 
the victim ... indication of post-mortem sexual activity. 
The body is left at the death scene and is typically left 
in view. There's a good deal of physical evidence 
that's - that's left at the scene. And, anytime just a 
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weapon of opportunity that the offender uses, and by 
that, I mean a weapon that is contained at the scene, 
uses it and then, it's not uncommon for the offender to 
leave that weapon either at or near-near the scene. 528 
McCrary further testified that "criminals usually commit disorganized violent crimes 
as a result of some "precipitating stressors, or stressful event" in the criminal's life. 
Such an event invokes a lot of anger in the offender, and that anger - transferred onto 
the victim - triggers this violent behavior.,,529 He also stated that his crime scene 
analysis indicated that more than one person committed the murders and that the 
crime scene also showed elements of 'staging.' 
The reliability of McCrary's testimony was questioned during cross-examination. 
On cross-examination, Mr. McCrary testified that the 
FBI had conducted a study to determine the accuracy rate 
of its crime scene analysis. The results of that study 
yielded a seventy-five to eight percent accuracy rate. He 
presented as further evidence of the reliability of crime 
scene analysis the FBI's increased number of trained 
agents in this field from seven to forty. Although Mr. 
McCrary acknowledged that crime scene analysis "is not 
hard science where you can do controlled experiments 
and come up with the ratios in all this," he said that "the 
proof that there is validation and reliability in the process 
is that it's being accepted. It's being used and the 
demand is just outstripping our resources to provide it. 530 
In its ruling, the trial court qualified McCrary as an expert on crime scene staging and 
he was allowed to testify that the murders could be the work of more than one person. 
528 Id. 
529 Id. 
530 Id, at 831. 
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The court however, ruled that McCrary's testimony would not be admitted on the 
issue of the motives for the murders. The trial court stated that "while the expert and 
many of the other FBI profilers are a tremendous asset as an investigative tool in law 
enforcement, the expert's testimony regarding the motivation of the suspect could not 
comply with the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 in terms of substantially assisting 
the trier of fact, because there is no trustworthiness or reliability.,,531 
The trial court also stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis has 
been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding, 
reliable, scientific principles.,,532 Justice Steve Dozier, delivering the judgment, also 
stated that the testimony could not satisfy the McDaniet33 test of scientific reliability. 
It should be noted that Stevens also called other witnesses, including family members, 
co-workers, and neighbors, who testified that he was a good father, a good and 
hardworking employee and always helped his neighbors. 534 
Stevens was found guilty by the Criminal Court, Davidson County, Tennessee, and 
sentenced to death for the murders and also sentenced to life without parole on the 
531 Id. 
532 Id. 
533 McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W. 2d 257,264-65 (Tenn. 1997); which held that the 
Daubert factors also applied to non-scientific testimony. 
534 State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817,828 (Tenn.2002). 
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aggravated robbery charge. Corey Milliken pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and the 
sentence. The case automatically went to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, as it was a 
death sentence for first degree murder. 535 Among other issues, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred by limiting McCrary's testimony. 
The Supreme Court agreed with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
decisions and held that McDaniel applied to both scientific and non scientific 
testimony. 
On the issue of the reliability of the expert's testimony, the Supreme Court stated: 
"Consequently, we are reluctant to measure the reliability of expert testimony that is 
not based on scientific methodology under a rigid application of the McDaniel 
factors. However, we are equally reluctant to admit nonscientific expert testimony 
based on an unchallenged acceptance of the expert's qualifications and an 
unquestioned reliance on the accuracy of the data supporting the expert's 
conclusions. ,,536 
Delivering the judgment ofthe Supreme Court, Justice Barker further stated that: 
This type of crime scene analysis, developed by the FBI as a 
means of criminal investigation, relies on the expert's 
535 In accordance with Tenn. Code. Ann.s 39-13-206(a)(1)(1997). 
536 State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817, 833 (Tenn. 2002). 
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subjective judgment to draw conclusions as to the type of 
individual who committed this crime based on the physical 
evidence found at the crime scene. Although we do not doubt 
the usefulness of behavioral analysis to assist law enforcement 
officials in their criminal investigations, we cannot allow an 
individual's guilt or innocence to be determined by such 
"opinion evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit" of the expert. Essentially, the jury is encouraged to 
conclude that because this crime scene has been identified by 
an expert to exhibit certain patterns or telltale clues consistent 
with previous sexual homicides triggered by "precipitating 
stressors", then it is more likely that this crime was similarly 
motivated.537 
Justice Barker also stated that: 
537 Id, at 835. 
538 Id, at 836. 
Moreover, we find that the FBI's study revealing a seventy-
five to eighty percent accuracy rate for crime scene analysis 
lacks sufficient trustworthiness to constitute evidence of this 
technique'S reliability. Although the frequency with which a 
technique leads to accurate or erroneous results is certainly 
one important factor to determine reliability, equally 
important is the method for determining that rate of accuracy 
or error. In this case, there is no testimony regarding how the 
FBI determined the accuracy rate of this analysis. For 
example, was accuracy determined by confessions or 
convictions, or both? Even then, the absence of a confession 
does not indicate the offender's innocence and thus an 
inaccuracy in the technique. Clearly, the accuracy rate alone, 
without any explanation of the methodologies used in the 
study, is insufficient to serve as the foundation for the 
admission of this testimony. 
Therefore, because the behavioral analysis portion of Mr. 
McCrary's testimony does not bear sufficient indicia of 
reliability to substantially assist the trier of fact, we conclude 
that this testimony was properly excluded.538 
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The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's arguments lacked merit and 
therefore affirmed the death sentence. The Court stated that the exclusion of the 
unreliable expert testimony by the trial court was not error. 
In State v. Fortin,539 linkage analysis, signature analysis and results of the FBI's 
ViCAP program were ruled inadmissible. Linkage analysis was also seen as an 
opinion on the ultimate issue. Steven Fortin was charged with capital murder, having 
killed the victim in the course of a gruesome sexual assault. The victim, Melissa 
Padilla, aged twenty five, was found sexually assaulted, robbed and strangled to death 
on August 11,1994 in Avenel, Woodbridge Township, New Jersey.540 
Padilla's body was naked from the waist down. She was 
wearing a shirt, but no bra. Bags of food, a partially eaten 
sandwich, a store receipt, an earring, debris including 
cigarette butts, and a bloody one-dollar bill were found 
scattered near the body. Padilla's shorts, with her underwear 
still inside them, were found on a nearby shrub. 
Inside the concrete pipe was a large blood stain. The 
assailant had brutally beaten Padilla about her face and head. 
Her face was swollen and bruised, and her nose was broken. 
She had been killed by manual strangulation. The autopsy 
revealed rectal tearing, and bite marks on Padilla's left 
breast, left nipple, and the left side of her chin. 541 
On April 3, 1995, a Maine State Trooper, Vicki Gardner, aged thirty four, was also 
sexually assaulted, beaten and strangled to unconsciousness. She survived. She was 
539 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 745 A.2d 509 (2000). 
540 State v. Fortin, 318 NJSuper. 577, 724 A.2d 818 (1999). 
541 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 510, 745 A.2d 509 (2000). 
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off duty on that day but was traveling in a marked police vehicle, when she saw a car 
parked on the shoulder of Highway 95 in the state of Maine. State Trooper Gardner 
stopped to check what was wrong. The defendant, Steven Fortin was inside the car. 
The defendant had a learner's permit issued in New Jersey. Trooper Gardner noticed 
that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and gave him some sobriety tests. The 
tests showed that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and Gardner placed him 
under arrest. She called her office and requested for an officer to come to assist her. It 
was reported that while she was waiting for back-up to arrive, she was attacked by 
Fortin. She was beaten, sexually assaulted and strangled into unconsciousness.542 It 
was reported that Fortin "then placed Gardner in the passenger's seat of the police 
vehicle, and drove the police vehicle down the highway. Gardner regained 
consciousness and partially jumped, and was partially pushed by defendant, from the 
vehicle".543 Fortin lost control of the vehicle. He fled but was later arrested at a 
nearby rest area. 
Gardner's face was badly battered, and she suffered a broken 
nose; bite marks to her chin, to her left breast nipple and on 
the outer left side of her left breast; and vaginal and anal 
tearing and lacerations. After defendant's attack, Gardner 
was naked from the waist down. Her pants were pulled off, 
with her underwear inside out. When interviewed later, 
defendant said Gardner pulled her own rants off while 
attempting to make sexual advances to him.5 4 
542 State v. Fortin, 318 NJ.Super. 577, 588, 724 A.2d 818 (1999). 
544 Id. 
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At the trial for this case in the State of Maine, Fortin pleaded guilty to seven counts of 
kidnapping, robbery, aggravated assault, assault on an officer, attempted gross sexual 
assault, unlawful sexual contact, and criminal operation of motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol. 545 He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 
The New Jersey police were not making any progress in the investigation into 
Padilla's death, until April 1995 when they were informed by the State of Maine 
Police Department that Steven Fortin had been arrested and charged in Maine for the 
sexual assault of Vicki Gardner. The Maine police contacted the New Jersey police to 
know if Fortin had any prior convictions, since his leamer's permit showed that he 
lived in New Jersey. After analyzing the two cases, Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle who 
was involved with the investigation into Padilla's murder, felt that Fortin might have 
committed the two sexual assauits. He found several similarities between the two 
crimes. Further investigations also revealed that Fortin was indeed at the area where 
Padilla was killed on the day of the murder. This was confirmed by Dawn Archer, 
Fortin's girlfriend. 546 
At trial, the State therefore filed a motion to admit evidence from the Maine incidence 
to the present case in New Jersey, on the issue of identity. The State also informed the 
court of their intention to call a former FBI Agent Roy Hazelwood to testify as to the 
ritualistic and signature aspects of the crimes which will bolster their claim that the 
545 rd, at 589. 
546 rd, at 584. 
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two crimes were committed by the same person. The defense objected to both 
motions and argued that the testimony should not be allowed. 
Agent Roy Hazelwood was called as an expert on modus operandi and ritualistic 
behavior. "He is a former FBI agent, has over thirty-two years experience as a law 
enforcement professional, a seventeen-year affiliation with the National Center for 
the Analysis of Violent Crime, and has consulted on more than 7,000 crimes of 
violence. He has published approximately thirty articles on topics of homicide, rape, 
serial rape, other types of sexual assault, and various other criminal or deviant sexual 
behavior, and has taught at various academies and at a few universities".547 
A pre-trial hearing was conducted on the admissibility of the other-crime evidence 
and on the admissibility of the expert testimony. The Superior Court, Law Division, 
Middlesex County, New Jersey, ruled that the evidence that Fortin sexually assaulted 
a police officer in Maine was admissible as other-crime evidence. The court also 
ruled that Agent Hazelwood was qualified as an expert on ritualistic and signature 
aspects of crime and so his testimony was permitted. The trial court in granting the 
motion to introduce the other-crimes evidence, added that the defendant's guilty plea 
in the State of Maine should be excluded during the State's case-in-chief.548 
In his testimony, Agent Hazelwood stated that he used "linkage analysis" and 
reviewed the two crimes and that the modus operandi of the crimes showed fifteen 
547 Id, at 590. 
548 Id, at 581. 
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similarities. That he was therefore, of the opinion that the two crimes were committed 
by one person. The fifteen similarities according to Hazelwood are as follows: 
1. High-risk crimes; 
2. Crimes committed impulsively; 
3. Victims are female; 
4. Age of victims generally the same; 
5. Victims crossed the path of the offender; 
6. Victims were alone; 
7. Assaults occurred at confrontation point; 
. '1 
8. Adjacent to or on well-traveled highway; 
,,:j 
9. Occurred during darkness; 
10. No weapons involved in assaults; 
11. Blunt-force injuries inflicted with fists, with nose of victims broken; 
12. Trauma primarily to upper face, no teeth damaged; 
13. Lower garments totally removed, with panties found inside the shorts or pants of 
the victims; 
14. Shirt left on victims and breasts free; and 
15. No seminal fluid found inion victims.
549 
Agent Hazelwood also testified that the two crimes "were anger-motivated, and that the 
offender demonstrated anger through the following identified "ritualistic" or "signature" 
behavior in both crimes": 
549 Id, at 591. 
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1. Bites to the lower chin; 
2. Bites to the lateral left breast; 
3. Injurious anal penetration; 
4. Brutal facial beating; and 
5. Manual frontal strangulation.sso 
It should be noted that the defense on the other hand, stated that there were sixteen 
differences between the two crimes. "There are differences in the age, race, weight and 
height of the victims. There is a significant difference in the status of each victim. 
Trooper Gardner is a professional police officer and a potentially dangerous target for 
someone to perpetrate a crime against, particularly when the defendant knew, prior to the 
assault, that his identity was made known to the state police dispatcher by Trooper 
Gardner. There are also differences in the type of assault. Trooper Gardner was anally 
and vaginally assaulted, while Padilla was assaulted anally, but not vaginally".SSl 
Apart from Hazelwood, the State also called other witnesses. Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle 
of the New Jersey Police Department, one of the investigating officers also testified. 
"Nagle described the injuries to Padilla, stating she had trauma to the head, was beat 
about the face, was manually strangled, her pants were ripped down, there was rectal 
tearing and there were marks on her left breast area and on the left side of her chin that 
550 Id, at 592. 
551 Id, at 609. 
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appeared to be bite marks".552 Dr. Marvin Schuster, who performed the autopsy, testified 
that the victim died as a result of "asphyxiation; assault and strangulation".553 Two police 
officers from the Maine State Police also testified as to the events that happened in the 
sexual assault of Vicki Gardner, and the type of injuries that she sustained. Dr. Lowell J. 
Levine, a forensic odontologist also testified. He stated that his review and comparison of 
the autopsy reports, the bite marks on both victims, dental casts and Fortin's bite-mark 
samples, showed that the bite marks found on both victims came from the defendant's 
teeth. Dr. Levine concluded that "based upon the comparison revealing similarities 
among the bite marks, it is my opinion that the bite marks on both women could have 
been caused by Steven Fortin".554 
It should also be noted that DNA samples recovered from Padilla's body, a cigarette butt 
found at the crime scene, fingernail clippings, a dollar bill with blood stain, and blood 
samples from the victim and the defendant were analyzed. Some of the results were 
inconclusive and some could not exclude the defendant as being the source of the 
DNA.555 The court ruled that the other-crime evidence and Hazelwood's testimony were 
admissible. 
The defendant appealed and argued that: 
552 Id, at 584. 
553 Id, at 586. 
554 Id, at 590. 
555 Id, at 587. 
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1. The State should not be allowed to introduce inflammatory and severely 
prejudicial evidence of allegedly similar crime under the provisions of the NJ.R.E 
404(b) to substitute for its "paucity" of evidence. 
2. The admission of evidence regarding the incident in the state of Maine would be 
contrary to the established case law because the State failed to meet its burden to 
prove the two crimes were sufficiently identical and because the prejudicial value 
grossly outweighs the limited probative value. 
3. The proffered testimony of Robert Hazelwood does not meet the standard of 
admissibility for expert testimony as set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
and the trial court's ruling was therefore erroneous.556 
In its ruling, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial judge's decision 
that the other-crime evidence can be admitted on the issue of identity. Delivering the 
opinion of the appellate division, Justice Fall stated that "given our standard of review, 
we are satisfied the trial judge's decision was not "so wide off the mark that manifest 
denial of justice resulted," or that his ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion .... The 
judge carefully applied the four prong test outlined in Codjield in determining whether 
the proffered other-crime evidence was admissible".557 Justice Fall further stated that 
"the potential for prejudice by admission of the other-crime evidence in this crime is 
great. Therefore, while we are in accord with the judge's ruling in permitting its 
admission, at trial the judge must "sanitize" the other-crime evidence by confining its 
556 Id, at 582. 
557 Id, at 597. 
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admissibility to those facts reasonably necessary for the probative purpose of "identity". 
To an extent, the judge ruling inadmissible defendant's guilty plea in Maine, goes to this 
effort of minimizing the prejudicial effect". 558 
The appellate division however, ruled that Hazelwood's testimony using linkage analysis 
is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible as expert evidence.559 Justice Fall said: 
Here, as the judge noted, Hazelwood testified "this analysis is 
not based on science, but based on his training and experience 
with violent crime". While not based on science in the 
technical sense, his linkage analysis methodology is certainly 
founded in the area of behavioral science, in that it analyzes 
the conduct of the crime perpetrator in two or more crimes to 
determine whether there is sufficient consistency of behavior 
to conclude that one person committed both crimes. 
We conclude that the same detailed analysis regarding 
admission of scientific evidence is applicable and necessary in 
determining whether linkage analysis expert testimony is 
admissible. Theories or methods of explaining human conduct 
and behavior have consistently been subject to significant 
scrutiny and analysis by our courts when admission is 
sought. 560 
It should also be pointed out that Hazelwood in his testimony stated that modus operandi 
and ritualistic behavior analysis was accepted by the law enforcement community. On 
that issue, Justice Fall stated that "we have no doubt that these methods are valid and 
have great value in performing the very difficult task of criminal investigation. We are 
not persuaded, however, that these techniques are sufficiently reliable for an expert in 
those fields to testify that the same person who committed one crime committed the other 
558 Id, at 598. 
559 Id, at 600. 
560 Id. 
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under the analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in this case".561Justice Fall 
further stated that: 
Our examination of the authorities and literature authored by 
Hazelwood convinces us that a linkage analysis as a foundation 
for the expert behavior identification testimony proffered in 
this case is wholly inappropriate. In the recent book The Evil 
that Men Do, Stephen G. Michaud with Roy Hazelwood 
(1988), there is significant discussion concerning the 
application of linkage analysis in the identification of serial 
offenders. ... Hazelwood defines therein a serial offender as 
one who has committed three or more offenses. Additionally, 
as described in this book, the use of linkage analysis leading to 
identification of the perpetrator also involves an evaluation of 
the personal history and background of the suspected 
perpetrator, to develop a profile. 562 
The Appellate Division therefore, held that "we are simply not convinced that the State 
has satisfied its burden to establish that "the field testified to is at a state of art such that 
an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable".563 The Appellate Division also saw 
the testimony as an opinion on the ultimate issue. "Further, given the conclusive nature of 
Hazelwood's testimony, we find there is no acceptable limiting instruction that could be 
given to the jury to avoid the prohibition against an expert expressing his opinion in such 
a way as to emphasize that the expert believes the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged under the statute". 564 
561 Id, at 609. 
562 Id. 
563 Id, at 610. 
564 Id. 
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"In summary, we affirm the decision permitting the introduction of other-crime evidence, 
after it is properly sanitized, and reverse the order permitting Hazelwood to give expert 
testimony that the same person who committed the Maine crime also committed the New 
Jersey crime". 565 
The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on appeal and cross-appeal. On one 
hand, the defendant sought a review of the appellate division's ruling that the other-crime 
evidence was admissible. The State on the other hand, prayed the Court to review the 
appellate division's ruling that Hazelwood's testimony was inadmissible. In its ruling, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "for the reasons stated in its opinion, we agree 
with the judgment of the Appellate Division that the proposed expert testimony of 
Hazelwood concerning linkage analysis lacks sufficient scientific reliability to establish 
that the same perpetrator committed the Maine and New Jersey crimes".566 Delivering the 
opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Hern added that linkage analysis is similar to the 
rapist profile evidence which is inadmissible. That Hazelwood's testimony failed to 
"meet the standards for the admission of testimony that relates to scientific knowledge. 
Although Hazelwood possess sufficient expertise in his field and his intended testimony 
is beyond the ken of the average juror, the field of linkage analysis is not at a "state of the 
art" such that his testimony could be sufficiently reliable".567 Justice O'Hern went on to 
say that "as the Appellate Division noted however, the authorities and literature authored 
565 Id. 
566 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 525, 745 A.2d 509 (2000). 
567 Id, at 526. 
247 
by Hazelwood and others do not demonstrate that linkage analysis has attained such a 
state of art as to have the scientific reliability of DNA testing". 568 
Moreover, linkage analysis is a field in which only Hazelwood 
and a few of his close associates are involved. Concerning 
consensus on acceptance of "linkage analysis" in the scientific 
community, the other experts mentioned by Hazelwood in his 
testimony were either current or former co-workers. In this 
respect, there are no peers to test his theories and no way in 
which to duplicate his results.569 
Summing up Hazelwood's linkage analysis, Justice O'Hern stated that if "stripped of its 
scientific mantra, the testimony is nothing more than a description of the physical 
circumstances present".570 Justice O'Hern ruled that Hazelwood would have to prove the 
reliability of linkage analysis by producing a reliable database from which it was based. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the matter 
to the Law Division for further proceedings. At the Superior Court, Law Division, 
Middlesex County, Fortin was convicted of capital murder, aggravated sexual assault, 
first-degree robbery, and felony murder. He was sentenced to death and he appealed. 
The State filed a motion for clarification of certain aspects of the judgment. 571 The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that: 
1. trial court improperly limited voir dire by rejecting inquiry concerning evidence 
of the defendant's sexual assault oflaw enforcement officer in another state; 
568 rd, at 527. 
569 rd. 
570 rd, at 533. 
571 State v. Fortin, 178 NJ 540, 843 A.2d 974 (2004). 
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2. State's expert should not have been permitted to testify on violent sexual crimes 
without producing a reliable database of violent sexual assault cases that he had 
investigated, studied or analyzed; 
3. defendant could waive protection of Ex Post Clause in order to obtain instruction 
on life in prison without parole, if jury rejected death sentence; 
4. convictions for manslaughter several years earlier and sexual assault 
approximately eight months after murder were relevant and admissible at penalty 
phase; and 
5. aggravating factors are elements of capital murder and thus, must be submitted to 
a grand jury and returned in an indictment; overruling State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 
176,619 A.2d 1208.572 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for 
a new trial. 
At the retrial,573 the State presented several witnesses at the pretrial hearing. Dr. Geetha 
Natarajan (the medical examiner who carried out the autopsy on Padilla), testified that in 
more than twenty-five years that she had conducted autopsies that she could not 
remember any other case in which the autopsy revealed bite marks on the chin of the 
other victims.574 Dr. Lawrence Ricci (an expert in emergency medicine and pediatrics) 
572 Id. 
573 State v. Fortin, 189 NJ. 579; 917 A.2d 746; (2007). 
574 Id, at 589. 
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also "testified that both Padilla and Gardner suffered traumatic anal injuries, but could 
not say that those injuries were any more distinctive than similar injuries inflicted on 
other sexual assault victims".575 Dr. Lowell Levine (an odontologist) also testified that in 
more than thirty years that he had been in the field that "he had never seen the 
combination of bite marks on the chin, the left nipple, and the left breast that appeared on 
both Gardner's and Padilla's bodies".576 He said that he compared the bite marks on the 
two victims with Fortin's dental casts/impressions and was of the opinion that there was a 
high degree of probability that the bite mark on Padilla's left breast was caused by the 
defendant's teeth.577The State also called Mark Safarik (FBI Supervisory Agent), who 
testified that the results of a search of the FBI's ViCAP database showed a match 
between the Gardner and Padilla assaults as signature-crime. Hence, he was of the 
opinion that Fortin committed both crimes. It should be noted that the State decided not 




In his testimony, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Mark Safarik 
described the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, more 
commonly known as ViCAP. Created in 1984, ViCAP is a 
national database of approximately 167,000 reported violent 
crimes (homicides, attempted homicides, and kidnappings) 
maintained by the FBI in Quantico, Virginia. The database 
represents about three to seven percent of the violent crimes 
committed since ViCAP's inception. Participation in Vi CAP 
nationwide is voluntary. Law enforcement agencies that 
complete the ViCAP form answer numerous questions about 
the crime for inclusion in the national database. 
The general purpose of Vi CAP "is to identity similarities in 
crimes" through a computer search isolating particular 
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characteristics in the commission of the offense. Through such 
a computer search focusing on specific crime criteria, one law 
enforcement agency can contact and cooperate with another 
agency working on a "similar case with similar 
characteristics." According to Agent Safarik, the "Vi CAP 
system is looking for ... solved or unsolved homicides, or 
attempted homicides, missing persons cases, kidnappings, 
where there is a strong possibility of foul play, or unidentified 
dead bodies, where the manner of death is suspected to be 
homicide.578 
There was a problem with the admission of Safarik's testimony. 
Law enforcement authorities completed the ViCAP form for 
the Padilla murder in a timely manner for inclusion in the 
national database. The Maine State Police, however did not 
complete a ViCAP form for the 1995 Gardner sexual assault. 
In 2004, in preparation for the defendant's trial, the State 
requested that Agent Safarik submit a ViCAP form for the 
Gardner case. He did so with the assistance of a ViCAP 
analyst and the Maine State Police. Agent Safarik then ran a 
series of searches on the Vi CAP for specific criteria common 
to both the Padilla and Gardner crimes, such as manual 
strangulation, sexual assault, and bite marks on the face and 
chest. The searches yielded only three cases - the Padilla 
murder, the Gardner sexual assault, and a 1988 case from 
Washington State. The State argued that the searches showed 
that the similarities between the Padilla and Gardner crimes 
were so unusual as to constitute a signature. Significantly, 
Agent Safarik indicated that the ViCAP database could not 
be released to defense counsel because of privacy concerns 
and that it was exempt from the Freedom of Information 
ACt.579 
On the other hand, the defense offered two expert witnesses. First, Dr. Norman D. 
Sperber (the Chief Forensic Dentist in the San Diego Medical Examiner' s Office), stated 
that there are doubts as to whether the marks on Padilla's breast and chin were indeed 
578 Id. 
579 Id, at 590. 
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bite marks. 58o Dr. Sperber further stated that "even assuming the injuries to the breast and 
chin were bite marks, that they were not caused by defendant's teeth".581 It should be 
noted that Dr. Sperber testified in the original trial and all parties agreed that the 
testimony should be used in this retrial hearing. 
The defense also presented Dr. Grover Godwin, as an expert in statistical evaluation of 
crime scenes. Dr. Godwin stated that the reliability of the ViCAP database was 
questionable because of what he described as "a bias in entering the variables".582 
The motion judge ruled that only the evidence on the bite marks which suggested 
uniqueness, would be allowed. That the other injuries would not be allowed because they 
were common to sexual crimes, and that these other injuries would be unduly prejudicial 
to the defendant. 
580 Id, at 591. 
581 Id. 
582 Id. 
The motion judge also maintained that the ViCAP database 
might have applicability at trial. For instance, "absent the 
insertion of the Maine crime, she found that the ViCAP 
database would be a reliable database upon which the State 
may rely to test the expert opinions." With regard to the 
Gardner ViCAP form, she observed that it was prepared for 
litigation purpose and therefore "failed to provide an 
unbiased generation of data." Alternatively, she suggested 
that "if the ViCAP database could be crafted to report on the 
uniqueness of the human bite mark criteria alone, "the 
database would then be useful in proving "a signature-like 
crime. To be useful, for example, the ViCAP analysis would 
have "to determine how many, if any, cases involve bite 




Vi CAP forms do not contain a box for bite marks to the 
chin. 583 
The State filed a motion appealing the motion judge's decision, but it was denied by the 
Appellate Division. The State therefore, filed an interlocutory appeal at the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey. The State argued that there were three errors in the motion judge's 
ruling. 
1. The motion judge conditioned the introduction of the signature-crime evidence on 
expert testimony explaining the uniqueness of the bite marks in the Padilla and 
Gardner cases; 
2. The motion judge would not admit evidence of the injuries sustained by Gardner 
other than the bite marks, thereby denying the jury the necessary context in which 
to determine whether the two crimes are indeed signature crimes; 
3. The motion judge would not allow the Vi CAP database to be used to show that a 
computer search revealed only three cases with the pattern of bite marks to the 
breast and chin - the Padilla and Gardner cases, and a Washington State case.
584 
In their ruling, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "We did not consider in Fortin 1 
whether, absent expert testimony, the Gardner-other-crime evidence would be admissible 
to establish that the Padilla murder was the distinctive handiwork of defendant. We now 
hold that the comparative analysis necessary to determine whether the Padilla murder and 
583 Id, at 754. 
584 Id, at 593. 
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Gardner sexual assault are signature crimes is outside of the ordinary experience and 
knowledge of jurors and requires the assistance of expert testimony". 585 
Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Albin stated that the motion judge 
did not err by conditioning the signature-crime evidence on the presentation of expert 
testimony.586 Justice Albin further stated that the motion judge did not abuse her 
discretion by asking the State to provide the defense with the database of cases from 
which Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan based their opinion. Additionally, Justice Albin 
stated that "our evidentiary rules provide trial courts with the authority to require pretrial 
disclosure of "the underlying facts or data" that supports an expert's opinion".587 Justice 
Albin also stated that "significantly, although the State presented Agent Safarik to 
explain the functions of ViCAP, neither he nor any other expert witness vouched that a 
ViCAP crime match, such as the one in this case, constituted reliable signature-crime 
evidence".588 Justice Albin said: 
585 Id. 
586 Id, at 597. 
587 Id, at 598. 
588 Id, at 603. 
We share the judge's concern that only relevant evidence 
should bear on the issues that must be decided by the jury. We 
disagree, however, that details of the Gardner assault can be so 
finely parsed. Although the other injuries suffered by Gardner 
do not fall into the category of signature evidence, the bite 
marks were inflicted during a vicious sexual assault. That 
reality cannot be ignored or withheld from the jury without 
seriously distorting the import of the bite-mark evidence. By 
its very nature, signature-crime evidence carries the potential 
for prejudice. Nevertheless, signature-crime evidence may be 




probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. ... 
Therefore, we will allow the State to present the bitemark 
evidence within the general narrative of the sexual assault on 
Trooper Gardner. 589 
It was held that "placing the bite-mark evidence in context will permit the jury to better 
fulfill its truth-seeking function. That approach benefits defendant as much as the State. 
Sanitizing the Gardner assault would keep from the jury the many differences between 
the two crimes that might lead it to reject the signature-crime evidence".59o Therefore, 
Justice Albin stated that allowing all the material details from the Gardner assault was 
fair. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the motion judge's ruling with modifications. 
Justice Albin stated that "the State must be permitted to present the bite-mark evidence in 
context and therefore material details of the Gardner sexual assault cannot be censored. 
Testimony describing that assault, however, is subject to specific jury instructions 
explaining the limited use of "other-crimes" evidence under NJ.R.E. 404(b). Finally, 
because the State's experts have not relied on the Vi CAP database to form their opinions, 
the ViCAP database should not be admissible to bolster those opinions".591 
Justice Albin acknowledged the fact that Vi CAP is a very useful tool of crime 
investigation but stated that "ultimately, in conducting a fair trial, courts must ensure that 
589 Id, at 599. 
590 Id, at 600. 
591 Id, at 585. 
255 
only reliable evidence is submitted to our juries consistent with our evidentiary rules. As 
presented, Vi CAP does not meet the standards for admissibility of evidence".592 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey therefore, remanded the case for further proceedings. 
As we can see from this case, offender profiling evidence, no matter which label it has 
been dressed up in, still need to be based upon reliable facts or data. In this case, we have 
seen the terms linkage analysis, ritualistic behavior, signature-crime analysis, and Vi CAP 
program all being used to show one thing - that bite marks on two victims came from one 
individual. This case clearly supports my argument that some profilers have the tendency 
to dress up their testimony in different labels so that it will be admitted. Offender 
profiling and its derivatives or its other labels should not be admitted as evidence until its 
foundation can be properly and objectively ascertained. The foundations must be proved 
by reliable facts and data. 
At this point, it should be noted that a few studies have been carried out on the 
accuracy of profilers. In 1990, for instance, Pinnizzotto and Finkel carried out a study 
in United States.593 The study was made up of five groups - (1) four pro filers from 
the FBI, (expert/teachers) (2) six police detectives who had been trained by the FBI 
profilers, (3) six experienced police homicide and sex detectives, with no training in 
criminal personality profiling, (4) six clinical psychologists, who according to 
592 rd, at 606. 
593 Anthony 1. Pinizzotto., and Norman J. Finkel, "Criminal Profiling: An Outcome and Process Study", 




Pinizzotto and Finkel were "naive to both criminal profiling and criminal 
investigations,,,s94 and (5) six undergraduate psychology students. 
The five groups were given two real and solved cases - one sex offense case and one 
homicide case. Pinizzotto and Finkel noted that this study was based on the rationale 
that, "given the growing use of the personality profile and the fact that this growing 
use is largely supported by testimonials and accuracy figures that were not obtained 
through controlled studies, this research was undertaken to provide more precise 
answers to both outcome and process questions."s9s The materials given to the 
participants for this study, in the homicide case, included crime scene reports, crime 
scene photographs, autopsy and toxicology reports, as well as the victim report.S96 For 
the sexual offense case, the participants also received victim statement, police reports 
and victim reports. S97 
This study, even though it was based on a very small sample, generated interesting 
and controversial results. First, the study found out that "for both the homicide and 
the sex offense cases, the profiles written by the professional profilers were indeed 
richer than the nonprofiler groups of detectives, psychologists, and students."s98 The 
result also showed that "an analysis of the specific questions for each case shows that 
594 Id,at219. 
595 Id, at 217. 
596 Id, at 219. 
597 Id. 





pro filers achieved higher group scores for the sex offense case in questions dealing 
with the age of the offender, the education of the offender, age, and condition of the 
offender's automobile, and the victim-offender relationship."s99 
Interestingly, the results also showed that "the profilers did not achieve higher scores 
than subjects in the other groups in these same categories for the homicide case.,,600 
In the homicide case, "profilers, however, do not appear to process this material in a 
way qualitatively different from any other groUp.,,601 
In the lineup rankings, the study also showed that "in the sex offense case, the 
expert/teachers were accurate in picking out the offender 100% of the time, and the 
profilers were accurate 83% of the time. As for the other groups, accuracy is lower, i, 
and declines as we move from detectives (67%) to psychologists (50%) to students 
(16%).,,602 
Based on the results of this study, Pinizzotto and Finkel concluded that; "Concerning 
the outcome issue, professional pro filers are more accurate (i.e., more correct 
answers, higher-accuracy scores, more correct lineup identifications) for the sex 
offense case than nonprofilers, but these accuracy differences disipate when we look 
at the homicide case. There were, however, significant outcome differences between 
599 Id, at 223. 
600 Id, at 224. 
601 Id, at 215. 
602 Id, at 224. 
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pro filer and nonprofiler groups for the homicide case in all the analyses of the written 
profile.,,603 
It should be noted that the authors did acknowledge certain limitations of this study. 
On the small sample, the authors noted that they "were unable to locate sufficient 
numbers of expert/teachers who were both actively engaged in profiling and willing 
to cooperate in this study.,,604 This goes a long way in highlighting my argument that 
there is a need for closer cooperation among the different segments involved in 
offender profiling. It is noteworthy to point out that Pinizzotto after this study, joined 
the FBI. 
Finally, Pinizzotto and Finkel also noted that "while the overall outcome superiority 
of the profilers is most likely indicative of greater expertise, it must be kept in mind 
that an "investment" factor could also be invoked to explain these results. 
Psychologists and students may see this task as an interesting exercise, whereas 
profilers, and detectives, perhaps, see it as the "blood and guts" of their professions, 
and therefore generate lengthier profiles and spend more time on the task.,,605 
603 Id, at 227. 
604 Id,at218. 
605 Id, at 227. 
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This study undoubtedly has been criticized. Kocsis et al argued that "only 15 items of 
offender information were processed by Pinizzotto and Finkel, and there was no 
scrutiny of the types of information on which profilers were more accurate.,,606 
Risinger and Loop were also highly critical of this study. They maintained that 
"Pinizzotto and Finkel reanalyzed the results giving half credit for some of the 
inaccurate multiple choice answers based on the judgment of the "expert" profiler 
subgroup that some wrong answers were less wrong than others; however, they never 
set out the results of that reanalysis, simply asserting that for both cases the only 
significant differences that emerged were an advantage of the profiler group 
compared to the student group. ,,607 Risinger and Loop further argued that the authors 
only set out the number of accurate predictions without adding the number of 
inaccurate predictions.608 As such Risinger and Loop concluded that "the profilers got 
one-third of the questions wrong even in the rape case, and two-thirds wrong in the 
homicide case. ,,609 
It should be noted also that in 1995, FBI profilers came up with what they called the 
key attributes of successful profilers. In their work, Hazelwood et al maintained that 
606 Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey 1. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological 
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal ofInterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, 314 (2000). 
607 See footnote 320, in Michael D. Rissinger., and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, 
Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of 
Evidence", 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193,320 (Nov. 2002). 
608 See footnote 322, in Michael D. Risinger., and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, 
Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of 
Evidence", 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193,320 (Nov. 2002). 
609 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 249. 
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the main attributes for successful profilers are knowledge of the criminal mind, 
investigative experience, objectivity, logical reasoning/critical thinking and a high 
level of intuition. 610 
In 2000, Kocsis et al replicated the study by Pinizzotto and Finkel. This study 
involved four groups: 
(1) Five profilers. These profilers were those who had gIVen some form of 
psychological profiling advice to a law enforcement agency. 
(2) Thirty-five active police officers. 
(3) Thirty Australian psychologists with no prior study of forensic or criminal 
psychology. 
(4) Thirty-one Australian science and economics university undergraduates. 
(5) Twenty Australian psychics. These are those psychics who believed that their 
paranormal abilities could be useful in constructing an offender profile.
611 
Kocsis et al chose these groups because they are believed to possess the key attributes 
outlined by Hazelwood et al. Thus, the psychologists were chosen for appreciation of 
criminal mind, police officers for their investigative experience, university students for 
objectivity and logical reasoning and psychics for intuition. Kocsis et al stated that this 
study was aimed at investigating the "skills underlying the effective performance of 
610 Hazelwood, R.R., Ressler, R.K, Duppue, R.L., and Douglas, J.e., "Criminal Investigative Analysis: An 
Overview", in R.R. Hazelwood and A.W. Burgess, (eds) Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A 
Multidiciplinary Approach, 2nd ed. (1995). 
611 Kocsis, Irwin, Hayes, and Nunn, supra note 606, at 316. 
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criminal psychological profiling.,,612 In order to achieve this, the study groups were 
presented with a solved murder case. In this study, the performance of the groups were 
compared in the profiling task. 
In the five-part survey inventory, the groups were given detailed information about this 
solved murder case. They were presented with several materials including the crime 
scene report, crime scene photographs, photos of the victim's body, a forensic biologist's 
report, a forensic entomologist's report, a ballistics report, autopsy reports, and basic 
background information of the victim.613 In this study, the participants were asked 
questions about the physical characteristics, cognitive processes, offense behaviors and 
social history and habits of the offender.614 
The results of the study showed that the "five groups did differ in their total accuracy but 
only marginally.,,615 In order to specifically answer the question of whether profilers were 
more accurate than nonprofilers, Kocsis et al decided to collapse the psychologists, police 
officers, students and psychics into one group (nonprofiliers) and then compared their 
performance with that of the profilers. The result showed that "on every measure of 
accuracy, the profilers answered more questions correctly than the nonprofilers. 
612 Id, at 311. 
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Furthennore, this difference was statistically significant on the total accuracy 
measure.,,616 
The results of this study also showed that "in spite of their training, knowledge, and 
experience, profilers did no better than anyone else in the correct identification of 
features of the offender or offense.,,617 It should be noted however, that "the profilers did 
descriptively outperfonn all other groups on the two omnibus measures of accuracy and 
on two of the submeasures (cognitive processes and social status and behavior). On the 
other two submeasures, the profilers were the second most accurate group with the 
difference between them and the most accurate group (psychologists) negligible and 
easily attributable to sampling error.,,618 
The results also showed that "in comparison to the police and perhaps the psychics, the 
group of psychologists showed superior perfonnance on several components of the task. 
The study's findings therefore might be taken to suggest that specifically psychological 
knowledge is more pertinent to successful profiling than are investigative experience and 
intuition.,,619 
The authors noted however, that: 
616 Id. 
617 Id, at 321. 




In any event, the study does encourage the view that 
an educated insight into human behavior could play 
an important role in the process of psychological 
profiling. At the same time, it must be stressed that 
the psychologists' performance did not differ 
significantly from that of the student group, so it 
remains uncertain whether the psychologists' 
advantage over some other groups was predominately 
in regard to specific knowledge of the behavioral 
science or to a broader capacity for objective and 
logical analysis.62o 
The result also showed that the police officers did not perform well in the profiling task. 
Kocsis et al therefore, disagreed with the earlier work by the FBI profilers which stated 
that investigative experience is a key attribute of successful profilers. The study also 
showed that "the accuracy of the psychics was not high and indeed, unlike all other 
groups used in the project, these participants showed no insight into the nature of the 
offender beyond what reasonably could be gleaned from the prevailing social stereotype 
of a murderer. Notwithstanding anecdotal reports of the successful use of psychics in 
police investigations, this study certainly does not serve to encourage reliance on 
psychics by police services.,,621 
Kocsis et al noted the problem with the small sample of profilers in their study (only 
five), which they correctly noted "not only impeded the chances of statistical significance 




whole.,,622 It should be noted that Kocsis et al invited more than forty pro filers in several 
countries to participate in this study but only five agreed. 
This study has been criticized extensively. It has been argued that the data was a mere 
reflection of the differences in intelligence across the groups. 623 
Kocsis et al carried out other studies in their effort to provide an empirical foundation for 
the key skills and abilities necessary for successful profiling. In 2002, Kocsis et al carried 
out another study involving senior detectives, homicide detectives, trainee detectives, 
police recruits and university students. This study also involved details of a solved 
murder case. The results of the study showed that the university students performed better 
than other groups on all the submeasures except on cognitive processes and offense 
behaviors. 624 The result also showed that groups with post-secondary education 
outperformed those without post-secondary education. Kocsis et al therefore concluded 
that based on this study, investigative experience is not a key attribute of effective 
profiling. 
In 2003, Kocsis carried out another study involving nine groups - profilers, 
psychologists, undergraduate students, specialist detectives, general police officers, 
622 Id, at 327. 
623 Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey J. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological 
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, (2000), at 326, 
citing an anonymous referee. 
624 Kocsis R.N., Hayes, A.F., and Irwin H. J. , "Investigative Experience and Accuracy in Psychological 
Profiling of a Violent Crime." Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, 17 (2002) 811 - 823. 
265 
",I 
police recruits, non-police specialists and psychics.625 In this study, the profilers scored 
highest, followed by undergraduate students and psychologists. Kocsis concluded that 
logical reasoning ability and appreciation of criminal mind are the key attributes. 
In 2004, and using arson cases, Kocsis carried out another study involving detectives 
(specialists in arson), arson investigators from the fire service, professional profilers, and 
undergraduate university students.626 There was a control group of community college 
students. The results of the study showed that profilers were more accurate than 
detectives, followed by undergraduate students, arson investigators, the control group and 
police detectives. Based on the results of this study, Kocsis again concluded that logical 
reasoning ability was the key attribute for effective profiling. 
Many scholars have criticized the studies by Kocsis. Bennell et aI, for instance, argued 
that Kocsis did not provide an operational definition of logical reasoning/critical thinking 
and also failed to "assess whether or not the skills that are supposedly being examined are 
actually possessed by their participants.,,627 Further studies are still needed. 
In this chapter, we have examined the central admissibility problems with offender 
profiling testimony in United States. We have noted the different areas of attacking 
625 Richard N. Kocsis, "Criminal Psychological Profiling: Validities and Abilities', International Journal of 
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47 (2003) 126 - 144. 
626 Richard N. Kocsis, "Psychological Profiling of Serial Arson Offenses: An Assessment of Skills and 
Accuracy', Criminal Justice and Behavior, 31 (1004) 341 - 361. 
627 Craig Bennel!., Shevaun Corey., Alyssa Taylor., and John Ecker, "What Skills are required for Effective 
Offender Profiling? An Examination of the Relationship between Critical Thinking Ability and Profile 
Accuracy", Paper presented at the 3 5th annual conference of the Society for Police and Criminal 
Psychology, Washington/Chevy Chase Maryland, October 26,2006. 
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offender profiling evidence and answered such questions as:- is offender profiling 
impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling 
evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is offender profiling an 
opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be 
admissible? It has also been noted that in some cases, offender profiling is an improper 
subject for expert testimony. This chapter has also highlighted the impact of the three 
rules of admissibility on offender profiling. The Federal Rule of Evidence being loose 
and too liberal has created problems for trial judges in making decisions on offender 
profiling cases. Under the Rule, almost anybody can qualify as an expert, and can give 
testimony either on a scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Under 
a stringent application of Frye, it has to be shown that offender profiling has achieved 
widespread acceptance by the relevant community. A strict application of Daubert 
requires offender profiling evidence to satisfy the four factors, especially the requirement 
that the technique must be based on a reliable data or foundation. In the next chapter, we 
examine offender profiling in other countries. 
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Chapter Five 
Offender Profiling in Comparative Perspective 
England 
The prevIOUS chapter has shown that United States courts are inconsistent in their 
decisions on cases involving offender profiling. In England on the other hand, offender 
profiling evidence is generally seen as inadmissible at the moment. Several reasons 
account for this, but first we examine the rules governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony in England. In general terms, the English law of evidence provides that all 
relevant evidence is admissible so long as it is not excluded by other laws of evidence, 
such as the hearsay rule, opinion on character evidence rule, as well as conduct on other 
occasions rule. 
In England, the main rule governing the admission of expert evidence was arguably laid 
down in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 628 where it was held that: 
The opinion of scientific men upon proven facts may be 
given by men of science within their own science. An 
expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with 
scientific information which is likely to be outside the 
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the 
proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions 
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. 
In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it 
makes judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert 
witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not by 
628 Folkes v. Chadd, (J 782) 3 Doug KB 157. 
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that fact alone make his opmlOn on matters of human 
nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any 
more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is 
a danger that they may think it does.629 
In this case, the issue was whether the embankment erected by the plaintiff for the 
purpose of preventing the overflowing of Wells Harbour caused the decay/silting up of 
the harbour, by stopping the back water. The embankment was erected in 1758 and the 
harbour started to choke/fill up soon after that. The case was tried three times before it 
reached the Court of Appeal. First, at the last Lent Assizes for the County of Norfolk, Mr. 
Milne, an engineer was called by the plaintiffs, and he testified that in his opinion that the 
embankment was not the cause of the decay. The plaintiffs also proffered evidence that 
showed that "other harbours on the same coast, similarly situated, where there were no 
embankments, had begun to fill up and to be choked about the same time as Wells 
Harbour.,,63o At the trial presided over by Mr. Justice Ashurst, the jury ruled in the 
defendant's favor. 
At the Court of Chancery, the plaintiffs called another expert, Mr. John Smeaton, a civil 
engineer. He stated that in his opinion the bank did not cause the choking and filling up 
of the harbor. He also stated that removing the embankment would not solve the problem. 
An objection was raised. It was argued that "the inquiring into the site of other harbour 
was introducing a multiplicity of facts which the parties were not prepared to meet.,,631 
629 Id. 
630 Id. 




"It was also objected that the evidence of Mr. Smeaton was a matter of opinion, which 
could be no foundation for the verdict of the jury, which was to be built entirely on facts, 
and not on opinions.,,632 The testimony was admitted. The Court of Chancery ruled in the 
plaintiffs' favor and the defendants asked for a new trial. At the lower court, Chief Justice 
Gould rejected Smeaton's evidence and stated that the evidence was mere opinion, based 
on speculation and not based on direct observation. 
On appeal, Lord Mansfield permitted the evidence and stated that "this is a matter of 
opinion, the whole case is a question of opinion, from facts agreed upon".633 Delivering 
the judgment, Lord Mansfield noted that; "On the first trial, the evidence of Mr. Milne, 
who has constructed harbours, and observed the effects of different causes operating 
upon them, was received; and it never entered into the head of any man at the Bar that it 
was improper; nor did the Chief Baron, who tried the cause, think so. On the motion for 
the new trial, the receiving Mr. Milne's evidence was not objected to as improper; but it 
was moved for on the ground of that evidence being a surprise; and the ground was 
material, for, in matters of science, the reasonings of men of science can only be 
answered by men of science,,634. 




It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to 
facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced 
from facts which are not disputed - the situation of banks, the 
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course of tides and of winds, and the shifting of sands. His 
opinion, deduced from all these facts, is, that, mathematically 
speaking, the bank may contribute to the mischief, but not 
sensibly. Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of 
harbours, the causes of their destruction, and how remedied. 
In matters of science no other witnesses can be called. An 
instance frequently occurs in actions for unskillfully 
navigating ships. The question then depends on the evidence 
of those who understand such matters; and when such 
questions come before me, I always send for some of the 
brethren of the Trinity House. I cannot believe that where the 
question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an 
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be 
received. Hand-writing is proved every day by opinion; and 
for false evidence on such questions a man may be indicted 
for perjury. Many nice questions may arise as to forgery, and 
as to the impressions of seals; whether the impression was 
made from the seal itself, or from an impression wax. In such 
cases I cannot say that the opinion of seal-makers is not to be 
taken. I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton 
respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the 
decay of the harbour is also a matter of science, and still 
more so, whether the removal of the bank can be beneficial. 
Of this, such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore 
we are of the opinion that his judgment, formed on facts, was 
very proper evidence.635 
The above decision in Folkes v. Chadd, was later supported by Justice Lawton in R v. 
Turner.636 This decision in Turner, also known as the Turner Rule, established the 
boundaries as to the admissibility of expert evidence in England. Under the Turner rule, 
expert evidence is inadmissible unless it provides the courts with such information that is 
outside the common experience and knowledge of the judge or jury. Turner also states 
that expert evidence must be based upon facts which can themselves be proved by 
admissible evidence. 
635 Id. 




In Turner, the defendant, Terence Stuart Turner, was charged with the murder of his 
girlfriend, Wendy Butterfield, by hitting her with a hammer fifteen times. The defendant 
claimed that he was provoked by the victim's statement that while he was in prison that 
she had slept with two other men and that the child she was expecting was not his. After 
killing her, the defendant called the police, admitted the killing and his defence was 
provocation.637 
At the trial, the defendant sought to call a psychiatrist, Dr. Smith, who would give 
evidence that he was not "suffering from a mental illness, that he was not violent by 
nature but that his personality was such that he could have been provoked in the 
circumstances and that he was likely to be telling the truth,,638. The defense stated that the 
psychiatrist's opinion would be based on information from the defendant, his medical 
records, his family and friends. That the psychiatric evidence will help establish lack of 
intent, help establish that Turner was likely to be easily provoked and to show that Turner 
was likely to have told the truth in his statements.639 In the psychiatric report, Dr. Smith 
stated that "from all accounts his personality has always been that of a placid, rather quiet 
and passive person who is quite sensitive to the feelings of other people. He was always 
regarded by his family and friends as an even-tempered person who is not in any way 
aggressive. In general until the night of the crime he seems to have displayed remarkably 
good impulse control".64o 
637 rd, at 838. 
638 rd, at 840. 
639 rd. 




The Crown (prosecution) objected to the admission of this evidence. The Crown argued 
that the psychiatric evidence should not be admitted. Mr. Calcutt, the prosecution counsel 
argued that the evidence should be excluded because, first, the defendant had not put his 
character in issue, and second that the report did not mention the fact that the defendant 
was convicted in November 1971 for unlawful possession of an offensive weapon and 
was also convicted in May 1972 of assault with intent to rob. 641 The Crown argued that 
allowing the psychiatric evidence would "put the defendant before the jury as having a 
character and disposition which in the light of his previous record of violence he had not 
got,,642. 
At Bristol Crown Court, Justice Bridge ruled that the psychiatric evidence was irrelevant 
and inadmissible. Justice Bridge also stated that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay 
character evidence. Turner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He 
appealed, arguing that the judge erred by excluding the psychiatric evidence. He also 
contended that it was error for the trial judge to rule that provocation was not a matter for 
expert medical evidence. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the psychiatric evidence was hearsay 
character evidence and therefore inadmissible. Lord Justice Lawton, delivering the 
judgment, stated that "it is not for this court to instruct psychiatrists how to draft their 
reports, but those who call psychiatrists as witnesses should remember that the facts upon 
641 Id. 




which they base their opinions must be proved by admissible evidence. This elementary 
principle is frequently overlooked".643 
The Court of Appeal held that: 
Before a court can assess the value of an opinion it must 
know the facts upon which it is based. If the expert has been 
misinformed about the facts or has taken irrelevant facts into 
consideration or has omitted to consider relevant ones, the 
opinion is likely to be valueless. In our judgment, counsel 
calling an expert should in examination in chief ask his 
witness to state the facts upon which his opinion is based. It 
is wrong to leave the other side to elicit the facts by cross-
examination. 644 
On the issue of whether the psychiatric evidence was relevant to the facts of the case, the 
Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge's ruling that it was irrelevant. Lord Justice 
Lawton stated that: 
643 Id, at 840. 
644 Id. 
645 Id, at 841. 
In our judgment the psychiatrist's OpInIOn was relevant. 
Relevance, however, does not result in evidence being 
admissible: it is a condition precedent to admissibility. Our 
law excludes evidence of many matters which in life outside 
the courts sensible people take into consideration when 
making decisions. Two broad heads of exclusion are hearsay 
and opinion. As we have already pointed out, the 
psychiatrist's report contained a lot of hearsay which was 
inadmissible. A ruling on this ground, however, would 
merely have trimmed the psychiatrist's evidence: it would 
not have excluded it altogether. Was it inadmissible because 




The Court of Appeal stated that the foundation of these rules was laid down in Folkes v. 
Chadd. It was held "that, since the question whether the defendant was suffering from a 
mental illness as defined by the Mental Health Act 1958 was not in issue, the psychiatric 
evidence that the defendant was not suffering from a mental illness although admissible, 
was irrelevant and had been rightly excluded,,646. Lord Justice Lawton said: 
We all know that both men and women who are deeply in 
love can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage 
when discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their 
loved ones: the wife taken in adultery is the classical example 
of the application of the defence of "provocation"; and when 
death or serious injury results, profound grief usually 
follows. Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how 
ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness 
are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life. It follows 
that the proposed evidence was not admissible to establish 
that the defendant was likely to have been provoked. The 
same reasoning applies to its suggested admissibility on the 
issue of credibility. The jury had to decide what reliance they 
could put upon the defendant's evidence. He had to be 
judged as someone who was not mentally disordered. This is 
what juries are empanelled to do. The law assumes they can 
perform their duties properly. The jury in this case did not 
need, and should not have been offered, the evidence of a 
psychiatrist to help decide whether the defendant's evidence 
was truthful. 647 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the case and concluded that "we are firmly of the opinion 
that psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the common sense of 
juries or magistrates on matters within their experience of life,,648. 
646 Id, at 834. 
647 Id, at 841. 
648 Id, at 843. 
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In England, a technique, method or field of knowledge does not have to be generally 
accepted before it can be admitted. However, it must be sufficiently established to be 
reliable, before it can be admitted. This was established in R v. Robb,649 where it was held 
that general acceptance was not a condition for the admissibility of expert testimony. In 
this case, a phonetics lecturer was allowed by the trial court to give expert opinion on 
voice identification. The expert was qualified by training and experience but in his 
analysis he used a method which was not generally accepted by the majority of the 
experts in the field unless it was supplemented by another form of acoustic analysis based 
on physical measurements of resonance frequency. The defendant objected to the 
admission of this evidence. The trial judge however, admitted the evidence. The 
defendant was convicted and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeal, through Lord Justice Bingham stated that the trial judge did not err 
in admitting the evidence and upheld the judgment. It was also held that expert evidence 
does not have to be scientific to be admitted. Lord Justice Bingham said: 
Expert evidence is not limited to the core areas. Expert 
evidence of fingerprinting, handwriting, and accident 
reconstruction is regularly given. Opinions may be given of 
the market value of land, ships, pictures, or rights. Expert 
opinions may be given of the quality of commodities, or on 
the literary, artistic, scientific or other merit of works alleged 
to be obscene. Some of these fields are far removed from 
anything which could be called a formal scientific discipline. 
Yet while receiving this evidence the courts would not accept 
the evidence of an astrologer, a soothsayer, a witch-doctor or 
an amateur psychologist and might hesitate to receive 
evidence of attributed authorship based on stylometric 
analysis. 65o 
649 R v. Robb, (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161. 
650 Id, at 164. 
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It should also be noted that in R v. Stockwell,651 it was held that "one should not set one's 
face against fresh developments, provided they have a proper foundation,,652. 
Having examined the main rules guiding the admission of expert testimony in England, 
we now examine specifically the admissibility of offender profiling evidence. In contrast 
to United States, offender profiling has not been admitted by any court in England. The 
first case where the prosecution sought to introduce offender profiling evidence was in R 
v. Stagg,653 where the trial judge refused to admit the evidence. In Stagg, Justice Ognall 
stated that there was "no authority in any common law jurisdiction to the effect that such 
evidence has ever been treated as properly admissible in proof of identity,,654. The trial 
judge was highly critical of the manner in which the evidence was gathered. Justice 
Ognall also stated that "it was doubtful that psychological profile evidence is sufficiently 
well established or 'generally accepted' as a scientific method to be received as expert 
evidence. And that such a novel technique must satisfy tests such as those in Frye v. US 
(1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow (1993)". Justice Ognall further stated that he "would 
not wish to give encouragement either to investigating or prosecuting authorities to 
construct or seek to supplement their cases on this kind of basis,,655. Following the 
rejection of the evidence, the case collapsed. There was no full trial. There has been no 
attempt since then by any party to introduce such evidence in the English courtroom. This 
651 R v. Stockwell, (1993) Cr. App.R. 260. 
652 Lord Taylor C.J., in R v. Stockwell, (1993) Cr. App.R. 260,264 
653 supra at 51,52,277. 
654 R v. Stagg, Central Criminal Court, 14 September, 1994 
655 Id. 
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leads us to the question - How will English courts receive offender profiling evidence in 
future? 
Lord Taylor, the Lord Chief Justice of England is not in support of the admission of 
offender profiling in the courtroom. In a lecture delivered to the British Academy of 
Forensic Science on November 1, 1994, Lord Taylor echoed the problems with the 
proliferation of experts in court and was critical of the introduction of offender profiling 
evidence in courtS. 656 Lord Taylor called on experts to maintain integrity and clarity, and 
he said: 
Sometimes, however, although helpful in criminal 
investigation, a technique may not produce admissible 
evidence. So-called 'personality profiling' is an example: 
used properly, this technique can be of great assistance in 
helping the police to target their investigative work upon a 
limited number oflikely suspects. 
But we must not confuse such techniques, or their results, 
with evidence admissible in a court of law. The rules of 
criminal evidence have grown up gradually over many years. 
Some of them, particularly the embargo on hearsay, are now 
of dubious value and I hope will soon be extensively 
reformed as the Royal Commission has recommended. But 
the rules have grown up in response to the essential need to 
ensure that the material which is considered by the jury is 
only that which, as a matter of logic, actually tends to 
demonstrate guilt or innocence, not that which creates a 
suspicion and therefore, invites the making of assumptions 
for which there is no proper basis. The rules exist to ensure 
that a conviction of a criminal offence is founded upon fact 
not guesswork or conjecture. They afford vital protection of 
our freedom under the law. 657 
656 Rt. Hon. Lord Taylor of Gosforth, "The Lund Lecture", Medicine, Science and the Law, Vol. 35, No.1, 
January 1995, at 3. 
657 Id. 
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Professor Ormerod maintained that if offender profiling evidence is introduced in English 
courts in future, that the two hurdles of the law of evide;nce have to be overcome -
relevance and admissibility,658 He argued that the profile must render the facts more 
probable or less probable before it is legally relevant. He also noted that "English courts 
have, in recent years, adopted a strict interpretation of relevance in relation to both 
prosecution and defence evidence,,659, Professor Ormerod contended that a typical profile 
contains much information and that not all of the information will be relevant to any 
given case,660 
It has also been argued that in England, profile evidence will be excluded as being 
insufficiently relevant, unreliable, prejudicial and unscientific,661 Ormerod and Sturman 
argued that ''unless a profiler can show that psychology can support with sufficient 
strength a claim that he can reliably and consistently identify behavioural traits from 
scenes of crime and related information the evidence would lack a reliable foundation, 
and the English courts would rule it inadmissible,,662, Professor Ormerod concluded that 
"the prosecutor seeking to rely on a profile (if such a thing exists) or even part of a profile 
658 Ormerod, supra note 412, at 867. 
659 Id. 
66° Id. 
661 Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 182. 
662 Id, at 184. 
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will have to navigate his way through practically all the most difficult rules of 
evidence,,663. Professor Ormerod further maintained that: 
The rules of evidence also present difficulties for the criminal 
psychologist. If involved in the presentation of the case the 
criminal psychologist will have to face extensive questioning 
as to his expertise, the reliability of his methodology and 
working practices, the availability of alternative 
methodologies and their success rates. There would also be 
the inevitably detailed and testing questions in the light of 
evidence provided by the opposing party's own criminal 
psychologist who will have cast doubt on the methodology, 
the interpretations etc. In addition, the psychologist will have 
been constrained by the evidential rules even before setting 
foot in court. The hearsay rule will inhibit reliance on data 
even though it may be the most reliable available, the 
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will 
also necessitate the proof of computer reliability. 
In the case of a prosecution profile, the story does not end 
there. In the event that all of these problems are overcome by 
both the psychologist and the prosecutor, the court may still 
exclude the evidence, in its discretion, on the ground that it 
would be unfair to the accused.664 
Professor Ormerod further argued that English courts will exclude offender profiling 
evidence because of its extreme prejudice. He contended that "the prejudice contained in 
a profile will in almost all cases exceed the limited probative value of such an 
opinion,,665. Ormerod contended that offender profiling evidence will not be accorded 
much weight by the trier of fact because of its unreliability. Hence, "in any future trial in 
663 David Ormerod, "Criminal Profiling: Trial by Judge and Jury, not Criminal Psychologist", in D. Canter 
(ed) Profiling in Policy and Practice, 242 (1999) 
664 Id, at 243. 
665 Ormerod, supra note 412, at 877. 
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which is sought to adduce psychological profile evidence, these problems of reliability 
will be a hotly contested issue,,666. 
In fact, there are three main areas where offender profiling evidence is likely to be ruled 
inadmissible if it is introduced in a future trial in England. First, and as we have noted 
throughout this research, offender profiling is a technique without any adequate, reliable 
or objective foundation at the moment. As such, English courts will likely rule it 
inadmissible based on the Turner rule which requires that expert evidence must be based 
on facts which can themselves be proved by admissible evidence. If offender profiling 
evidence is introduced again in an English court, the trial judge is also likely to draw on 
United states court decisions that have rejected the evidence. English courts will likely 
adopt the decision in State v. Cavallo,667 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held 
that "until the scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not 
admissible,,668. 
The extreme prejudicial effect of offender profiling evidence is also another area where it 
is likely to be excluded in future trials in England. Indeed as Professor Ormerod and 
Sturman have pointed out "the prejudicial effect includes risks that the jurors could: 
convict a defendant on the basis of the characteristic alone (where it is reprehensible); 
assign a disproportionate weight to the evidence of the characteristic; deny the accused 
666 Id, at 870. 
667 supra at 224. 
668 State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 529, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982). 
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the benefit of doubt and convict on less than the full standard of proof; and the police 
could be inclined to 'round up the usual suspects",669. 
Above all, where the manner and methods of offender profiling were questionable, a trial 
judge will apply Section 78 of PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984), and 
exclude the evidence. This is one rule that may be applied to exclude offender profiling 
evidence in any future trial in English courts. Under Section 78 of PACE, a judge is 
allowed to exclude evidence "if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would 
I. 
, I 
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to I, 
admit it": 
In England, expert testimony on any form of offender profiling is not likely to be 
excluded merely on the hearsay rule. There are many exceptions to the rule. In fact, in R 
v. Abadom,670 it was held that once the primary facts on which an opinion is based have 
been proved by admissible evidence, the expert is entitled to draw on the work of others 
as part of arriving at his own conclusions. This was also supported in English Exporters 
(London) v. Eldonwall Limited. 671 Professor U glow also maintained that "where the 
primary information consists mainly or entirely of hearsay, the judge would be justified 
in warning the jury about the flimsiness of any foundation for that opinion". 672 
669 Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 185. 
670 R v. Abadom, [1983} 1 WLR 126. 
671 English Exporters (London) v. Eldonwall Limited, [1973} Ch. 415, Chancery Division. 
672 Uglow, supra note 173, at 623. 
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In the final analysis, one can safely say that in England, there are more rules and reasons 
supporting the exclusion of offender profiling evidence than are rules or reasons for its 
admission. Offender profiling deals with character traits, is too prejudicial than probative, 
not based on any reliable or objective data at the moment and Section 78 of PACE gives 
judges the wide discretion to exclude such evidence that is unfair to an accused. 
Canada 
Canada is a close neighbor of United States. It is not surprising therefore, that some 
forms of offender profiling have been admitted in Canadian courtrooms. There is general 
disagreement amongst scholars as to whether there is a specific rule governing the 
admissibility of expert evidence in Canada. As Professor Bernstein has pointed out, 
"most courts have adopted some version of a reliability test, while a minority apply the 
general acceptance test".673 Arguably, the main rule governing the admissibility of expert 
evidence in Canada today was laid down in R v. Mohan,674 where the Supreme Court of 
Canada laid down four factors that should be examined when faced with a decision to 
admit or exclude expert evidence. Prior to Mohan, two court rulings provided some 
673 David E. Bernstein, "Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth", 21 Yale 1. Int'} L. 123, 
140 (Winter 1996). 
674 R v. Mohan, 89 C. C. C 3d 402 (1994); 114 D.L.R (4th) 419; 1994 D.L.R LEXIS 1297. 
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guidelines to trial judges. The first is R v. Beland, 675 a case that involved the admissibility 
of polygraph. In this case, the defendant offered polygraph evidence but the prosecution 
argued that it should be excluded because it has not reached an acceptable standard of 
reliability. Delivering the judgment, Justice McIntyre stated that "even the finding of a 
significant percentage of error in the results of a polygraph would not by itself, be 
sufficient to exclude it as an instrument for use in courts,,676. The second case is R v. 
Lavellee,677 where evidence of battered woman syndrome was ruled admissible. 
Delivering the opinion, Justice Wilson stated that expert evidence is admissible if it was 
beyond the common experience and knowledge of jurors. Concurring, Justice Sopinka 
said that expert opinion should be based on forms of enquiry and practice accepted within 
the expertise. 678 
In Mohan, the defendant, Dr. Chikmaglur Mohan, a pediatrician was charged with four 
counts of sexual assault of four of his patients. The patients, all females, were aged 
between thirteen and sixteen at the time of the assaults. The assaults took place at the 
defendant's medical office.679 "The alleged assaults consisted of fondling of the girls' 
breasts and digital penetration and stimulation of their vaginal areas, accompanied by 
intrusive questioning of them as to their sexual activities. All of the complainants testified 
675 R v. Beland, [1987] 2 S. CR. 398. 
676 Id, at 417. 
677 R v. Lavallee, 55 CCC 3d 97 (1990). 
678 Id, at 132. 
679 Ih R v. Mohan, 114 DLR (4 ) 419; 1994 DLR LEXIS 1297. 
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that the respondent did not wear gloves while examining them internally. The respondent, 
who testified in his own defence, denied the complainants' evidence,,68o. 
At the trial, the defence sought to introduce a psychiatrist, Dr. Hill, "who would testify 
that the perpetrator of the offences alleged to have been committed would be part of a 
limited and unusual group of individuals and that the respondent did not fall within that 
narrow class because he did not possess the characteristics belonging to that group,,681. 
Dr. Hill stated that he had interviewed and treated three doctors who were accused of 
sexual assault of their patients. He also stated that based on a psychological profile, the 
likely offender in the first three sexual assaults was likely to be a pedophile, and that the 
perpetrator of the fourth sexual assault was likely to be a sexual psychopath.682 
680 Id. 
681 Id. 
In the voir dire, Dr. Hill, the expert, began his testimony by 
explaining that there are three general personality groups that 
have unusual personality traits in terms of their psychological 
profile perspective. The first group encompasses the 
psychosexual who suffers from major mental illnesses (e.g., 
schizophrenia) and engages in inappropriate sexual behaviour 
occasionally. The second and largest group contains the sexual 
deviation types. This group of individuals shows distinct 
abnormalities in terms of the choice of individuals with whom 
they report excitement and with whom they would like to 
engage in some type of sexual activity. The third group is that 
of the sexual psychopaths. These individuals have a callous 
disregard for people around them, including a disregard for the 
consequences of their sexual behaviour towards other 
individuals. Another group would include pedophiles who gain 
sexual excitement from young adolescents, probably pubertal 
or post-pubertal. 683 
682 R v. Mohan, 89 C. C. C 3d 402 (J 994); 114 DL.R (4th) 419, 423; 1994 DLR LEXIS 1297. 
683 Id. 
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Dr. Hill stated that pedophiles and sexual psychopaths constitute an unusual and limited 
class of individuals. Dr. Hill stated that he was of the opinion that Mohan does not 
possess the characteristics of pedophiles or sexual psychopaths and so would not have 
sexually assaulted the four victims. The trial judge, Justice Bernstein, ruled that the 
testimony was inadmissible. Justice Bernstein stated that the testimony was unnecessary 
and that the jury could decide for themselves. Justice Bernstein said: 
The evidence of Doctor Hill is not sufficient, I believe, to 
establish that doctors who commit sexual assaults on patients 
are in a significantly more limited group in psychiatric terms 
than are other members of society. There is no scientific data 
available to warrant that conclusion. A sample of three 
offenders is not a sufficient basis for such a conclusion. Even 
the allegations of the fourth complainant are not so unusual, as 
sex offenders go, to warrant a conclusion that the perpetrator 
must have belonged to a sufficiently narrow class.684 
Justice Bernstein concluded that "if the evidence was received as proposed, it would 
merely be character evidence of a type that is inadmissible as going beyond evidence of 
general reputation, and does not fall within the proper sphere of expert evidence". Mohan 
was convicted and sentenced to nine months imprisonment on each count, concurrently 
and two years probation.685 
The defendant appealed and the Crown also appealed arguing that the sentence was too 
light. At the Ontario Court of Appeal,686 Finlayson J.A. ruled that the trial judge erred by 
684 Id, at 425. 
685 Id, at 423. 
686 R v. Mohan, (1992) 8 o.R. 3d 173. 
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excluding the testimony by Dr. Hill. Justice Finyalson stated that the testimony was 
admissible on two basis. 
On the first basis, given that similar fact evidence was 
admitted showing that the acts compared are so unusual and 
strikingly similar that their similarities cannot be attributed to 
coincidence, Dr. Hill's testimony was admissible to show 
that the offences alleged were unlikely to have been 
committed by the same person. 
On the second basis, it was admissible to show that the 
respondent was not a member of either the unusual groups of 
aberrant personalities which could have committed the 
offences alleged.687 
Justice Finyalson also stated that the trial judge's conclusion was based on a 
misapprehension of the evidence. Justice Finyalson further stated that in his view, the 
expert did not base his opinion only on the three cases with three doctors, but based his 
opinion on all of his experience.688 The Court of Appeal therefore, reversed the judgment 
and remanded for a new trial. 
The case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, where Justice Sopinka stated that "on the 
basis of the principles relating to exceptions to the character evidence rule and under the 
principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence, the limitations on the use of 
this type of evidence require that the evidence in this case be excluded,,689. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the admission of expert evidence depends on the application of 
687 R v. Mohan, 89 C.C.C 3d 402 (1994);114 D.L.R (4th) 419, 426; 1994 D.L.R LEXIS 1297. 
688 Id, at 426. 
689 Id, at 427. 
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the following criteria - (a) relevance; (b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (c) the 
absence of any exclusionary rule; and (d) a properly qualified expert. 690 
On the relevance of expert evidence, Justice Sopinka stated that: 
Relevance is a threshold requirement for the admission of 
expert evidence as with all other evidence. Relevance is a 
matter to be decided by a judge as question of law. Although 
prima facie admissible if so related to a fact in issue that it 
tends to establish it, that does not end the inquiry. This 
merely determines the logical relevance of the evidence. 
Other considerations enter into the decision as to 
admissibility. This further inquiry may be described as a cost 
benefit analysis, that is "whether its value is worth what it 
costs": ... Cost in this context is not used in its traditional 
economic sense but rather in terms of its impact on the trial 
process. Evidence that is otherwise logically relevant may be 
excluded on this basis, if its probative value is overborne by 
its prejudicial effect, if it involves an inordinate amount of 
time which is not commensurate with its value or if it is 
misleading in the sense that its effect on the trier of fact, 
particularly a jury, is out of proportion to its reliability.691 
Justice Sopinka further stated that "in summary, therefore, it appears from the foregoing 
that expert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory or technique is subjected to 
special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether 
it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory 
conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer the evidence approaches an 
opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of this principle,,692. 
690 Id. 
691 Id. 
692 Id, at 431. 
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Addressing the issue of expert evidence as to disposition, Justice Sopinka stated that in 
his opinion, 
In order to be relevant on the issue of identity the evidence must 
tend to show that the accused shared a distinctive unusual 
behavioral trait with the perpetrator of the crime. The trait must 
be sufficiently distinctive that it operates virtually as a badge or 
mark identifying the perpetrator. 
Conversely, the fact that the accused is a member of an abnormal 
group some of the members which have the unusual behavioral 
characteristics shown to have been possessed by the perpetrator 
is not sufficient. In some cases it may, however, be shown that 
all members of the group have the distinctive unusual 
characteristics. If a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
accused has these traits then the evidence is relevant subject to 
the trial judge's obligation to exclude it if its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value. The greater the number of persons 
in society having these tendencies, the less relevant the evidence 
on the issue of identity and the more likely that its prejudicial 
effect predominates over its probative value. 693 
The Supreme Court of Canada also held that: 
"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of an accused, or 
another is admissible provided: 
(a) the evidence is relevant to some issue in the case; 
(b) the evidence is not excluded by a policy rule; 
(c) the evidence falls within the proper sphere of expert evidence. 
693 Id. 
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One of purposes for which psychiatric evidence may be admitted is to prove identity 
when that is an issue in the case, since psychical as well as physical characteristics may 
be relevant to identify the perpetrator of the crime".694 
"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of the accused, 
or another, if it meets the three conditions of admissibility above set out, is also 
admissible, however, as bearing on the probability of the accused, or another, having 
committed the offence".695 Justice Sopinka further stated that "where the crime under 
consideration does not have features which indicate that the perpetrator was a member of 
an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence that the accused has a normal mental make-up 
but does not have a disposition for violence or dishonesty or other relevant traits 
frequently found in ordinary people is inadmissible. The psychiatric evidence in the 
circumstances postulated is not relevant on the issue of identity to exclude the accused as 
the perpetrator any more than the possession of violent or dishonest tendencies by the 
accused or a third person would be admissible to identify the accused or the third person 
as the perpetrator of the crime".696 
The Supreme Court of Canada therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
and upheld the trial court's ruling. 




In R v. Ranger,697the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by admitting 
expert testimony on crime scene staging, where the expert went into 'criminal profiling'. 
On August 16, 1995, two sisters Marsha (19) and Tamara Ottey (16) were stabbed to 
death in their home in Scarborough. The defendant, Rohan Ranger and his cousin Adrian 
Kinkead were charged with the murders. The defendants were tried and convicted 
separately. Marsha was the Ranger's girlfriend but she ended the relationship because the 
defendant was very possessive and abusive. The Crown claimed that Ranger refused to 
accept that the relationship was over and that Ranger killed Marsha after he heard that 
Marsha was moving to United States to start college. The prosecution claimed that 
Ranger killed Marsha because "ifhe could not have her, nobody else can,,698. 
The defendant claimed that he was not in the house at the time of the murders and that 
Kinkead committed the murders. Police investigation showed that the house was 
ransacked but only three items belonging to Marsha were taken. The three items were a 
gold necklace given to Marsha by the defendant, a videotape of Marsha playing soccer 
and Marsha's electronic organizer.699 The Crown therefore, decided to call a crime scene 
reconstruction expert and criminal profiling expert, who testified that the crime scene was 
staged and made to look like a burglary. The expert, Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines 
(Manager of the Behavioral Sciences Section of the Ontario Provincial Police) testified 
that the crime scene was staged by "someone who had an association or relationship with 
697 R v. Ranger, 178 c.c.c. (3d) 375; 2003 c.c.c. LEXIS 265. 
698 Id, at 378. 
699 Id. 
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the victim, M., and who had a particular interest in M. 's possessions".7oo Detective 
Inspector Lines stated that she based her opinion on the crime scene photographs, crime 
scene videotapes, police reports and autopsy reports. 
At the trial, several witnesses testified for the Crown. Kinkead also testified for the 
Crown. The Crown also introduced evidence of the defendant's trip to Jamaica in January 
1996, where he overstayed and was arrested. The defense argued that the evidence should 
be excluded because it was prejudicial. Five witnesses also testified that they saw a man 
fitting the description of the defendant near the victims' home around 7.30 am on the day 
of the murder and the day before the murders. The defendant on the other hand, 
introduced a security video tape showing that he was at a shopping mall at 8.08am on the 
day of the murder. It should be noted that the time of death of the victims was given as 
7.30am. The prosecution contended that the defendant created a false alibi by going to the 
shopping mall so that he can be captured on the security video camera.701 
The defense argued that the expert testimony by Detective Inspector Lines should not be 
admitted. They argued that the jury did not need expert assistance to determine whether 
the crime scene was staged or not. That the expert evidence by Detective Lines was not 
required since the crime scene photographs and videotapes had already been provided to 
the court by Detective Ian Mann. 
700 Id. 
701 Id, at 379. 
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The trial judge ruled that the expert evidence was admissible and he said: "I am satisfied 
that opinion evidence is needed in this case in the sense that it will likely provide 
information that is outside the experience and knowledge of the jury. The factual issue of 
whether a break and entry is authentic or staged is not likely to be a subject within the 
common knowledge of the jurors. This, of course, is subject to the Crown qualifying the 
proposed expert as an expert in this particular area".702 Detective Inspector Lines was 
qualified by the court as an expert on crime scene staging and her testimony was 
admitted. 
The defendants were convicted. Ranger was convicted of first degree murder for the 
death of Marsha and convicted of manslaughter for the death of Tamara. He appealed, 
arguing that he received an unfair trial. He contended that the trial judge erred by 
admitting the unscientific expert evidence by Detective Inspector Lines; that the trial 
judge erred by admitting evidence of his arrest in Jamaica; and that the trial judge's 
instructions to the jury were insufficient. The defendant also argued that the expert 
evidence did not meet the reliability or necessity criteria as required by the Supreme 
Court decision in Mohan. 
At the Court of Appeal, Charron J .A, ruled that the trial judge erred and that there were 
five errors. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Charron said: "". Detective 
Inspector Lines's testimony was not confined to the opinion that the crime scene was 
staged. Notwithstanding the Crown's assurance that he would not elicit evidence relating 
to motivation, Detective Inspector Lines' examination-in-chief included an opinion about 
702 Id, at 388. 
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the motivation of the perpetrator for staging the scene and a description of the most likely 
suspects as someone who had a particular interest in Marsha Ottey". 703 
Justice Charron restated the fact that the Mohan requirements must be satisfied and she 
said; "The party seeking to introduce expert opinion evidence must meet four criteria: 
relevance, necessity, the absence of any other exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified 
expert. Even where these requirements are met, the evidence may be rejected if its 
prejudicial effect on the conduct of the trial outweighs its probative value. The first two 
criteria and the assessment of whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial 
effect also include an inquiry into the reliability of the proposed evidence". 704 
Justice Charron also stated that the Mohan criteria applies on a case by case basis. Justice 
Charron further stated that "Detective Inspector Lines' testimony, from the outset, went 
far beyond the scope of properly admissible evidence and, eventually, profiling that, in 
my view, was clearly inadmissible". Furthermore, "the manner in which the crime scene 
evidence was packaged for the jury in this case exemplifies the usual dangers associated 
with expert opinion evidence".70s Justice Charron stated that: 
703 Id, at 390. 
704 Id, at 394. 
705 Id, at 398. 
In this case, Detective Inspector Lines' opinions about the 
perpetrator's likely motivation for staging the crime scene 
and his characteristics as a person associated with the victims 
and having a particular interest in Marsha constituted 
evidence of criminal profiling. Criminal profiling is a novel 
field of scientific evidence, the reliability of which was not 
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demonstrated at trial. To the contrary, it would appear from 
her limited testimony about the available verification of 
opinions in her field of work that her opinions amounted to 
no more than educated guesses. As such, her criminal 
profiling evidence was inadmissible. The criminal profiling 
evidence also approached the ultimate issue in this case and, 
hence, was highly prejudicial. The prejudice was further 
heightened by the limits placed on defence counsel's cross-
examination and by the prominence that the trial judge gave 
to Detective Inspector Lines' evidence in his charge.706 
Charron J.A, also ruled that the evidence about the defendant's trip and arrest in Jamaica 
was of no probative value and was very prejudicial. The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the errors were harmful and remanded for a new trial. 
In R v. Clark, 707 the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that expert evidence on crime 
scene staging was admissible even though it went into criminal profiling. This is quite in 
contrast with its prior decision in Ranger discussed above. On December 26, 1995, the 
bodies of William Tweed and his wife Phyllis were found in their home in Thornhill, 
Ontario. They have been stabbed to death. Police investigators suspected that the 
perpetrator had staged the crime scene to show forced entry and burglary. The defendant, 
Clark, was the main suspect. Investigations showed that a few weeks before the murders 
that Clark had stolen the victims' credit card and used it to buy an engagement ring for 
his girlfriend.708 It should be noted that the defendant lived with his grandmother near the 
Tweeds and that his grandmother was very close to the Tweeds. The defendant also visits 
706 Id, at 405. 
707 R v. Clark, 69 OR. (3d) 321; 2004 Onto Rep. LEXIS 25. 
708 Id, at 325. 
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the Tweeds regularly as he helps them out with some odd jobs. They were so close that 
the Tweeds gave his grandmother a duplicate key to their house to keep in case of 
emergency. 709 
It should be pointed out that blood stains found on the defendant's pants matched Mr. 
Tweed's DNA. Furthermore, while he was in custody, the defendant confided in his cell 
mate (an undercover police officer), Sergent Matthews, that he stabbed the Tweeds and 
that he could not understand how the police were still able to detect blood on his pants 
because he had washed the pants after the murders.71 0 
The defendant admitted stealing the credit card but denied the murders. He stated that 
another man, Marcel Whyte committed the murders.711 At the trial, the Crown called a 
crime scene reconstruction expert to testify. Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines stated that 
the crime scene examination revealed elements of crime scene staging and that one 
individual was responsible for the murders. She stated that she based her opinion on the 
crime scene photographs, crime scene videotapes, personal visit to the house, police 
reports and autopsy reports. Detective Inspector Lines testified that the crime scene had 
been staged to look like a burglary, and that the killer was "someone who had some 
knowledge or relationship with the victims and some knowledge of the layout of their 
apartment".712 She also stated that it was a blitz-attack and that the victims were sleeping 
709 Id, at 326. 
710 Id, at 327. 
711 Id, at 331. 
712 Id, at 322. 
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at the time they were killed. In his ruling, Justice Peter Howden admitted the evidence. 
The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and he appealed. 
Among other claims, the defendant argued that the expert testimony by Detective 
Inspector Lines should not have been admitted because it was unnecessary, unreliable 
and too prejudicial than probative. The defendant also argued that much of the testimony 
by Detective Inspector Lines constituted inadmissible criminal profiling evidence. 
Delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Justice Moldaver ruled that the trial judge 
did not err in admitting the expert evidence. Justive Moldaver however, stated that a 
small amount of the evidence was impermissible criminal profiling evidence, but the 
small amount could not have affected the outcome. The Court of Appeal held that: 
A properly qualified expert in crime scene analysis can offer 
opinion evidence about what occurred at the crime scene and how 
the crime was committed (crime scene reconstruction evidence). 
Crime scene reconstruction evidence is potentially admissible. Its 
ultimate acceptance or rejection will depend on whether it 
conforms with the rules that govern the admissibility of expert 
evidence in general. In respect of crime scene reconstruction 
evidence, the following three areas will generally require close 
attention: whether the evidence is necessary in the sense that it is 
likely to fall outside the knowledge or normal experience of the 
average juror; whether the opinion is reliable in the sense that it is 
anchored in the evidence and not the product of guesswork or 
speculation; and whether there is a real danger that the jury will be 
overwhelmed by the evidence and give it more weight than it 
deserves. Crime scene reconstruction evidence is to be contrasted 
with expert evidence offered to explain why the crime was 
committed in a particular manner (the perpetrator's motivation) 
more particularly, who is more likely to have committed the crime 
("criminal profiling evidence"). Criminal profiling evidence will 
generally be inadmissible, as criminal profiling is a novel field of 
scientific evidence and often appears to be based on nothing more 
than educated guesses. In this case, the police officer's evidence 
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that the crime scene was staged was properly admitted, as was her 
evidence as to how the crime was committed. She was qualified to 
express an opinion about staging and her evidence fell outside the 
knowledge and experience of the average juror. Her opinion was 
reliable in the sense that it was anchored in the evidence and not 
the product of guesswork or speCUlation, and the evidence of 
staging was not so complex or technical that the jury was likel~ to 
be overwhelmed by it and give it more weight than it deserved. 13 
Justice Moldaver went on to say that the expert evidence was not an opinion on the 
ultimate issue. Justice Moldver stated that there was overwhelming evidence against the 
defendant that the some amount of criminal profiling could not have affected the 
outcome.714 
In dismissing the appeal, Justice Moldaver stated that the crime scene reconstruction 
evidence was properly admitted even though it contained some amount of criminal 
profiling evidence. This is quite in contrast with the Court's earlier ruling in Ranger on 
the admissibility of criminal profiling evidence. This case also supports our call for extra 
judicial control in all cases involving offender profiling or its derivatives. 
Offender Profiling in Other Countries 
Offender profiling is still in its infancy but it has been used in criminal investigations in a 
few countries, including Australia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia and South 
713 Id, at 323. 
714 Id. 
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Africa. This does not mean that it has been admitted in the courtroom. In Australia, 
offender profiling per se has not been admitted in any court. There has been no major 
court decision banning the reception of offender profiling evidence in courts. Under the 
Australian rules of evidence, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant to the facts at 
issue and not excluded by other evidence rules, such as the expertise rule, the common 
knowledge rule, the factual basis rule and the ultimate issue rule. Generally speaking, and 
as Petherick et al have pointed out, "the rules of expert evidence in Australia allow for 
profiling as expert testimony, even if only in a limited fashion, perhaps in some lower 
levels of the criminal justice system. As profiling receives more attention through 
practical application and academic literature, it stands to reason that it will receive a 
greater chance of being accepted in court".715 
In Finland, offender profiling is only used in crime investigations. It is not admissible in 
courts. Courts see offender profiling and its derivatives as an aid to crime investigation, 
not admissible evidence. In Netherlands, the Criminal Investigative analysis/FBI 
approach has been adopted, and is done by the Offender Profiling Unit of the National 
Intelligence Division of the National Police Agency. 
As we mentioned earlier, offender profiling technique is still in its infancy, hence the 
technique is not used in many countries, especially the developing countries. For 
instance, in countries like Nigeria, the technique has not been used in crime investigation. 
715 Wayne Petherick, David Field, Andrew Lowe and Elizabeth Fry, "Criminal Profiling as Expert 
Evidence", in Wayne Petherick (ed), Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling, 
94 (2006). 
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As such, the evidential implications of such evidence has not arisen. However, it is 
important to examine how the courts will receive such evidence if offered in future trials. 
Offender profiling deals with the character traits of an individual. In Nigeria, it is likely 
to be seen by the courts as permissible character evidence. In Nigeria, "the general rule is 
that the fact an accused has committed some other offences or other misconduct on other 
previous occasions or is of bad character or reputation is not relevant in subsequent 
proceedings. The rationale behind this rule is that the accused person's guilt has to be 
independently proved by the prosecution. The admissibility of previous misconduct will 
only go to prejudice the mind of a court. Section 69(1) of the Nigerian Evidence Act,716 
provides that the fact that an accused person is of bad character is irrelevant in 
subsequent proceedings, but this general rule is subject to some exceptions".717 The 
exceptions are contained in Section 69(2) of the Evidence Act, which states that: 
"The fact that an accused person is of bad character is relevant: 
(a) when the bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue; 
(b) when the accused person has given evidence of his good character; 
It is noteworthy to point out that Nigeria is a former colony of Britain, hence the Nigerian 
legal system is based on the English common law tradition. In fact, the Nigerian rules of 
expert evidence is virtually the same as that of England. Thus, a witness must be 
qualified as an expert and the opinion must be outside the experience and knowledge of 
716 Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation, 1990. 
717 Adah C. Eche, The Nigerian Law of Evidence, 115 (2000). 
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the judge or jury.718 In Nigeria, the general principle is that the facts upon which an 
expert based his opinion must be provided. This is where offender profiling evidence will 
likely be ruled inadmissible if it is to be introduced in a Nigerian court today. The 
Nigerian Supreme Court will likely draw from the position of English courts on the 
admissibility of offender profiling. They are also likely to state that such evidence should 
not be admitted until its reliability can be established. Thus, in Dickson Arisa v. The 
State,719 the Supreme Court of Nigerian ruled that opinion evidence by an expert on 
mental disease/natural mental infinity had no evidential weight because the expert failed 
to provide the basis for his opinion. Justice Agbaje stated that the law required that for 
expert evidence to be admitted, the facts upon which the opinion was based must be 
provided. Nigerian courts may not accord much weight to expert evidence where the 
factual basis was not produced.72o Furthermore, "where there are two conflicting expert 
opinions, the court will rely on that of the expert who shows the data on which he based 
his opinion".721 It should also be noted that in Nigeria, a technique, method or field of 
knowledge does not have to be scientific before it can be admitted. In a nut shell, the 
main area where offender profiling evidence is likely to be excluded in Nigeria, in future, 
is the lack of reliable data upon which the technique is based. The prejudicial effect of 
offender profiling will probably be another strong area for exclusion of offender profiling 
evidence. 
718 There is a legal provision for a jury in Nigerian, but jurors are not used. The trier of fact is the judge and 
whether expert opinion will assist him is not an issue to be contested by the parties. 
719 Dickson Arisa v. The State, [1988] 7 S.C.NJ (Pt.1) 76,84. 
720 Adah, supra note 717, at 126. 
721 Id. 
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In this chapter, we have examined the state of offender profiling in various jurisdictions. 
In all jurisdictions examined in this work, the trial judge has enormous latitude to decide 
who is qualified to give expert evidence and when such evidence is needed. Similarly, no 
jurisdiction examined in this study requires an expert to have gained the expertise in a 
certain way. An expert can be qualified by education, skill, training, or knowledge. All 
jurisdictions appear to be liberal in deciding who is qualified to give expert testimony. 
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Conclusion 
Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique that is normally used when an 
offender did not leave any physical traces at the scene of crime. It aims to predict the 
likely characteristics of the unknown offender by looking at behavioral patterns and other 
non physical clues. Profiling in general was not originally intended to be used for crime 
investigation or for courtroom purpose. Offender profiling began from the early attempts 
by criminologists to explain criminality and to predict criminals. It then moved on to the 
next stage of using it to profile heads of states (for intelligence purposes only and not for 
crime investigation). Later, psychiatrists and psychologists starting providing 
psychological profiles because they felt it could assist the police to find unknown killers. 
Following this stage, the FBI discovered that psychological profiles were indeed very 
helpful in their pursuit of unknown serial killers, and they devoted much attention into it 
and came up with their crime scene analysis approach. Today offender profiling has 
become one of the most controversial, useful, but worrying technique of crime 
investigation. It is submitted that we should now move on to the next stage of using 
offender profiling as a crime prevention technique. 
This dissertation concludes that there is an uneasy relationship among the different 
segments involved with offender profiling. All the different segments/approaches to 
offender profiling have a parochial view. Each segment sees offender profiling as their 
own monopoly, their exclusive club. As a result, the potential of offender profiling has 





an integrated approach, whereby all the segments can come together as a team. This will 
also ensure that we move on to the next level of using offender profiles in producing 
crime prevention measures. Psychiatrists, psychologists, criminologists, and law 
enforcement agents all have a role to play, not only in crime investigations, but also in 
coming up with crime prevention measures and programs. These professionals have 
knowledge of the kind of individuals likely to commit certain types of crime, knowledge 
of the location a particular crime is likely to happen, and knowledge about the type of 
individual that is likely to be a victim of a certain type of crime. Therefore, by coming 
together as a team and pulling resources together, the future of offender profiling looks 
very exciting and will prove to be an invaluable technique of crime investigation and 
crime prevention. As we have seen, offender profiling has not yet reached the level to be 
called a hard science at the moment, but in time it will be. It has been pointed out 
elsewhere that "if a technique cannot be proved, then it is not science,,722. Offender 
profiling at the moment cannot be proved, therefore, it is not science. 
The current lack of unity, cooperation, and absence of sharing information among the 
different segments further creates a legal dilemma - how much can one convince the 
courts as to the reliability and validity of offender profiling? Until all the different 
segments come together as a team, the search for the scientific basis and for general 
acceptance of this technique will continue to be a mirage. A way forward in the United 
States, for instance, will be the establishment of a professional body for offender pro filers 
where all the different professionals can come together and become members. The well-
established professional bodies can playa big role in this issue by organizing well 
722 Ebisike, supra note 12, at 93. 
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publicized interdisciplinary conferences, where all the different segments should be 
encouraged to attend and present papers. Such professional bodies, as the American 
Psychological Association, the Academy of Forensic Sciences, and the Society for Police 
and Criminal Psychology are best suited for this function. There is no gainsaying the fact 
however, that offender profiling at the moment is a 'specialized field of knowledge,' that 
is very useful in crime investigation. At the moment, there has been the tendency for the 
different segments to publish their work in their own preferred/particular journals. This is 
also hampering the potential of offender profiling. 
This research study has shown that at the moment, all the different approaches base their 
arguments on assumptions, inferences, on probabilities, on personal intuition, as well as 
on their clinical practice experience. Suffice it to say therefore, that none of these 
approaches can properly be described as being sufficiently reliable as to be used in 
proving the guilt or innocence of a defendant. We have also seen that offender profiling 
at best should be described as a multi-disciplinary practice that calls for knowledge and 
experience in such fields as criminology, psychiatry, psychology and law enforcement. 
This study supports the idea put forward by Professor David Ormerod that for offender 
profiling to be easily admitted in courts, the profile should be produced by a 'profiling 
team' rather than by individual profilers. We believe that courts are reluctant to accept 
expert opinion of a profiler because more of it is based on personal intuition. 
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The three main rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony in United States 
have their various strengths and weaknesses. Arguably, the Frye test offers ease of 
application. Trial judges do not have to become scientists to be able to decide on 
scientific evidence, thereby ensuring less burden on trial judges. The Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 is too loose and too liberal. Almost anything can be admitted as expert 
evidence - be it scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. Similarly, almost 
anybody can qualify as an expert under the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, either by way 
of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Daubert has proved very 
problematic in application, and is arguably not favored by many trial judges. Daubert has 
raised more questions than answers. 
Our examination of the three rules has shown the confusion and inconsistencies resulting 
from the adoption of these three rules of admissibility. This leads to one obvious question 
- is it possible to adopt one particular rule? The Frye test, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and Daubert are not constitutional constructions. As such they are not binding on the 
states. The United States operates a federal system of government. Hence, the states have 
always enjoyed the freedom to choose the rule they prefer. Above all, the United States 
Supreme Court has not given any reason why states should adopt one particular rule. 
It is hereby submitted that Frye, combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence, offers the 
most appropriate standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. This is not new and 
its success has been noted in Christophersen v. Allied -Signal Corp.,723 It is submitted 





that the United States Supreme Court should revisit the issue and give the lower courts 
and the states reasons justifying the need for the adoption of one rule. Then we can have 
some sort of uniformity in judicial decisions. Then the lower courts will not face the risk 
of having their decision reversed, simply because their state has adopted a rule different 
from the one adopted by the federal courts. 
One of the main issues surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony has been on 
general acceptance. Many states are in favor of the Frye test. Interestingly, many trial 
judges generally accept and prefer the Frye test. Several research studies have supported 
this argument. 724 Dahir et aI, for instance, carried out a study of 325 state trial judges 
(from the 50 states and the District of Columbia) and found out that there is "a strong 
tendency for judges to continue to rely on more traditional standards such as general 
acceptance and qualifications of the expert when assessing psychological syndrome and 
profile evidence.,,725 Their study also suggests that "judges do understand some of the 
less technical guidelines (i.e., general acceptance and peer review and publication) but 
not the more technical ones (i.e., falsifiability and error rate), and that they prefer general 
acceptance and qualifications of the expert as guidelines when determining the 
admissibility of psychological evidence.,,726 The study therefore, concluded that "judges 
724 See generally, Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski., 
Shirley A. Dobbin, and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and 
Profile Evidence", 11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 74 (March 2005). 
725 Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski., Shirley A. Dobbin, 
and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence", 
11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 73 (March 2005). 




are relying on criteria and habits of analysis familiar to them (mainly Frye v. United 
States's [l923) general acceptance standard, relevance, and qualifications and credibility 
of the expert) even as they struggle with new ideas foisted on them from above.,,727 It 
makes sense therefore, to adopt a standard which is generally accepted by trial judges as 
being the appropriate standard, bearing in mind that these trial judges are the 
'gatekeepers. ' 
Offender profiling is a multidisciplinary practice that falls under many disciplines. 
Offender profiling is largely based on intuition, guesswork and speculation. At the 
moment it can best be described as an art with the potential of becoming a science. When 
it comes to general acceptance, offender profiling should be generally accepted as being 
sufficiently reliable by the general profiling community, not just the law enforcement 
community. At the moment, it is only those in the law enforcement segment/community 
that see offender profiling or its derivatives as reliable techniques for courtroom 
purposes. Until the different segments come together as a team, offender profiling should 
not be taken as a technique that has achieved widespread recognition as to be 
admittedlintroduced into the courtroom as evidence. 
This research has noted that many of the experts who give testimony on offender 
profiling have the tendency to flaunt their qualifications in front of the courts. The result 
is that courts tend to be seduced by these impressive and sometimes "intimidating 
credentials". This also results in many of these experts testifying beyond their expertise. 





1 What is happening today is that many of the pro filers who are supposed to be criminal 
investigators have now assumed the role of criminal prosecutors. They tend to forget that 
their role is to testify and not to decide cases. It is therefore, submitted that there should 
be extra judicial control when dealing with expert testimony on offender profiling. In all 
cases involving offender profiling, the trial judge should inform the jury at the onset that 
offender profiling evidence does not identify a specific offender; that it is not 
identification evidence; and that its reliability cannot be objectively ascertained at the 
moment. The trial judge should limit the testimony to patterns of behavior and crime 
scene characteristics, which in some cases may assist the trier of fact in understanding the 
circumstances of a case. It is worrying that in some cases, profile testimony has even 
been admitted by trial courts, when it was clearly irrelevant to the case, as in United 
States v. Baldwin.728 There should be a jury instruction in all cases involving offender 
profiling and its derivatives. The trial judge should inform the jury about the level of 
reliability and validity of this technique. This will help them to determine the weight (if 
any) that should be accorded to the testimony. 
The above problem has been compounded by the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which as 
we have found out in this study is too liberal. Almost anybody can qualify as an expert 
either by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Offender profiling as we 
have seen falls under a specialized field of knowledge, but Rule 702 has created problems 
for trial judges when deciding who is qualified to give expert offender profiling 
testimony. 
728 United States v. Baldwin, 418 F.3d 575 (Ohio. 2005). 
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1 This research has also noted that offender profiling testimony is more effective when it is 
being proffered by the defendant to show innocence, than when it is being offered by the 
prosecution to show that the defendant is likely to have committed the crime. This 
argument merits further research though. Offender profiling is also effective when there 
are co-defendants and it is being offered to show that one defendant is less likely to have 
committed the crime. With offender profiling evidence, it is easier to prove innocence 
than guilt, but this does not mean that it is reliable. 
Offender profiling per se, is supposedly inadmissible in many jurisdictions, including the 
United States and Canada. However, when it is labeled differently and dressed up in 
other terms, courts have admitted it. Perhaps this is because many people including 
judges do not understand what offender profiling is and the different forms or shapes of 
offender profiling. Or is it that some criminal pro filers are playing on the intelligence of 
judges, lawyers and jurors? It is suggested that more research is needed in this area. If an 
expert witness says that he or she is going to testify on 'offender profiling', it will not be 
allowed, but if the same expert says he or she is going to testify on the same thing under a 
different label, then it will be allowed. Two of the cases in Canada at least have clearly 
highlighted this issue. There are other cases where an expert has been allowed to testify 
for instance, on crime scene staging, and then had gone beyond that area and eventually 
touched on the ultimate issue. It seems therefore, that in many cases, whether any form of 
offender profiling will be admitted depends on the label the expert is using, not on the 
content/issue involved. In United States for instance, profiling evidence on motivational 
analysis has been allowed in some cases. In Canada on the other hand, expert testimony 
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on motivational analysis is supposedly not allowed, but when it is dressed up as 
testimony on crime scene reconstruction analysis, then it may be admitted. Who is 
fooling who? 
After a critical examination of issues and several cases we conclude that offender 
profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is also submitted that offender 
profiling is too prejudicial than probative. The findings of this research also supports my 
claim that there is an uneasy relationship among the different segments involved with 
offender profiling. As a result, the potential of this technique has been limited. There are 
doubts as to the reliability and validity of this technique. It is submitted that offender 
profiling should not be used in the courtroom until its reliability can be properly and 
objectively ascertained. The guessing game of offender profiling should not be played in 
the courtroom. Offender profiling and its derivatives should not be admitted until their 
reliability can be objectively ascertained. Offender profiling is a technique based on 
probabilities and we conclude that no individual should be convicted on probability. 
I 
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